It may seem curious at 60e4—6 that 'the same dream' should have different visual manifestations. Whatever the necessary conditions of 'sameness' in dreams may be, it seems natural to count similarity of visual content among them. But perhaps Socrates means that the dream figure was Apollo himself, and that the god has often appeared to him in different forms. The translation 'now in one guise, now in another' assumes this interpretation.
For the Greek view of dream experience see E. R. Dodds, G.I., Ch.4. For Plato's treatment of dreams see D. Gallop, E.A.G.P. 187-201.
61d3—e9. Philolaus was a Pythagorean who survived the expulsion of the sect from southern Italy in the mid-fifth century B.C. and settled in Thebes. If his teaching on suicide was along the lines that Socrates suggests at 62b—c, it can hardly be reconciled with the account of the soul that his disciple, Simmias, will give later. See on 86b5—d4 (p. 148).
62a2—7. The grammar and logic of this intractable sentence are much disputed. The present translation requires deletion of the comma in Burnet's text after 'as other things do' (a4), and insertion of a comma after 'for some people'. For the translation 'to be dead' (a5), see note 4. For a review of many proposed solutions see Loriaux, 50—9.
Full discussion of the sentence is impossible here. The meaning will depend upon (1) the implications of the repeated phrase 'perhaps it (will) seem(s) a matter for wonder to you' (a2, a5-6) for the truth-value of the two 'if clauses (hereafter P and Q) that follow it; and upon (2) the content of P and Q themselves.
(1) Note that Socrates is anticipating Cebes' reaction to the view of suicide he has been putting forward. He is imagining an objection Cebes might well make, pending any satisfactory rationale for the prohibition of suicide. 'Perhaps', he is suggesting, 'you will (some day) hear something (to satisfy you). But (meanwhile) it will perhaps seem a matter for wonder to you if P; and perhaps it seems a matter for wonder to you if Q.' The wording 'a matter for wonder if preserves an ambiguity in the Greek construction between (a) 'it (will) seem(s) surprising to you that P (or Q) should be the case', (b) 'it (will) seem(s) questionable to you whether P (or Q) is the case', and (c) 'it (will) seem(s) surprising to you if P (or Q) is the case'. For the ambiguity in 'wonder if see 97a2. Cf. also 95a9—b4, where the first 'wonder if is clearly interrogative, and the second conditional. Matters are further complicated by the question whether Cebes is supposed to wonder about P and Q as two separate propositions, or as one compound proposition to the effect that 'P and yet Q' or 'Despite P, nevertheless Q'.
Of the three variants just noted, only (a) carries any implication that Socrates for his part regards P or Q (or both) as true, (b) would imply merely that Cebes doubts whether they are true, (c) would suggest that he believes them to be probably false. But neither with (b) nor with (c) need Socrates be committed to them. It seems preferable, in fact, to regard him as uncommitted, at least with respect to Q. For the view of suicide under discussion, which is embodied in Q, is not his own (61cl0, e5). He is repeating it only at second hand (61d9—10). Not until 62b2 does he express any support for it, and he finally endorses it only in qualified terms (62c6). While it may be assumed, therefore, that P or Q (or both) would be questioned by Cebes, it is not clear that Socrates, let alone Plato, would maintain them without reservation. Cf. Laws 873c—d, and
see next note.
(2) What are P and Q? The latter (a5—7) presents no problem. Clearly, it is that 'for these men (sc. those for whom it is better to be dead), it is not holy to do good to themselves, but they must await another benefactor'. Cebes will find it paradoxical that those who would be better off dead may not dispatch themselves, but must wait for someone else. It would seem 'unreasonable' (cf.62bl— 2) to prohibit suicide in cases where it is in the agent's own interest. This is, indeed, the basic point in the whole speech. For it is precisely the apparent contradiction between a veto upon suicide and the belief that death may sometimes be for a person's own good that Socrates will now try to resolve.
The content of P, however, is highly obscure, and it is here (a2—5) that the heart of the difficulty lies. The meaning turns partly upon the referent of 'this' in 'if this alone of all things is unqualified' (PI); partly upon the relationship of that phrase to 'and it never happens to man as other things do' (P2); and partly upon the connection between P2 and 'sometimes and for some people it is better to be dead than alive' (P3). Five solutions will be considered.
'This' in PI refers to the doctrine that death is preferable to life. On this view, defended by Bluck (151-3), it will surprise Cebes that despite the universal applicability of this doctrine to man, suicide should nevertheless be forbidden. 'You will be surprised that although (PI) this (sc. death is preferable to life) is alone of all things true without exception, and (P2) it never happens for man, as do other things (sc. whose preferability depends upon circumstances), that (P3) it is only sometimes and for some people that it is better to be dead than alive, nevertheless (Q) suicide is forbidden.'
This interpretation places immense strain upon the text. To say 'it never happens that it is only sometimes and for some people that it is better to be dead than alive' seems an intolerably clumsy way of expressing the idea that it is always better to be dead than alive; and it requires a gratuitous 'only', unwarranted in the text. Moreover, neither in the Phaedo nor elsewhere is it held that death is always better than life. Nor could this plausibly be supposed as a basis for questioning the prohibition of suicide. It is a recurrent thought in Plato that some people, those who are incurably sick in body or soul, would be better off dead (e.g. Laches 195c—d, Gorgias 51 le—512a, Republic 409e—410a), but not that everyone would be. In the Phaedo it is only philosophers, and not mankind in general, for whom death is said to be preferable to life (cf.61c8—9).
'This' in PI refers to the supposition that life is preferable to death. This view, adopted with variations by Burnet, Hackforth, and Verdenius, interprets Cebes as challenging the idea that (P) life is unconditionally preferable to death; and then, granted that this idea is mistaken, as being surprised that (Q) suicide should nevertheless be forbidden. 'Perhaps it will seem questionable to you whether (P) this (sc. life is preferable to death) is alone of all things simple (i.e. admits of no distinctions according to circumstances), and (P2) it never happens as other things do, that for man (P3) it is better on some occasions and for some people to be dead than alive; and perhaps it surprises you that (Q) for those who would be better dead, suicide should nevertheless be forbidden.'
The chief difficulty here is that 'this' in PI would have to refer to a completely unstated doctrine. The supposition that life is always preferable to death might, indeed, be naturally represented as a vulgar error, rejection of which would justify Cebes' surprise at the absolute prohibition of suicide. However, it is not at all easy to supply this doctrine out of the blue. Burnet says that 'this' in PI is 'really anticipatory and only acquires a definite meaning as the sentence proceeds'. But could it 'anticipate' something that is nowhere expressly said?
The solutions still to be considered share a common starting point: they all take 'this' in PI to refer to the prohibition of suicide, which is surely its most natural referent in the context—cf.61e8 'one ought not to do that', and 62c9, where 'that' clearly refers to the same prohibition.