(iii) With Loriaux's translation (199), the meaning will be: 'You will perhaps be surprised at the idea that (PI) this doctrine (sc. the prohibition of suicide) is alone of all things (sc. doctrines) absolute, and that (P2) it never happens for man, as other things do on some occasions and for some people, that (P3) it is better to be dead than alive. And (Q) if there are some for whom death would be preferable, you are no doubt surprised that for them suicide is forbidden.' Cebes is here viewed as expressing surprise at PI and P2+P3. He takes both of them to be Socrates' opinion, and disputes PI because he rejects P2+P3. This line of thought is then developed more explicitly inQ.
This reading has the advantage of giving point to the words 'on some occasions and for some people'. They are here taken with 'as other things do', to mean 'as in other domains, where one distinguishes circumstances and people'. However, the interpretation takes P2+P3 in an unnatural way. For it seems unlikely that Cebes should impute to Socrates, even as part of an objection, the view that there is never anyone for whom death is better than life. Socrates has already virtually rejected such a view in saying that philosophers will wish for death (61c8—9, d4—5). Nor could it reasonably be ascribed to him on the strength of anything he has said about the wrongness
of suicide.
L. Taran (A. J.P. 1966, 326-36) has advocated taking PI and P2 closely together, and P3 after a semicolon as a new main clause. On his reading, 'this' in PI refers to the prohibition of suicide, and it is this prohibition that is being contrasted with all others: 'It will perhaps seem surprising to you that (PI) this (sc. the prohibition of suicide) is alone of all things (sc. all prohibitions) unqualified (i.e. unaffected by the addition of good and bad), and (P2) never applies to man in the way the others (sc. other prohibitions) do; (P3) there are times when and people for whom it is better to be dead than alive; but (Q) for those for whom it is better to be dead, you are surprised if for these very men it is not holy etc.' Here P1+P2 are represented as true for Socrates but as surprising to Cebes. Socrates then asserts P3 outright, and finally gives it to Cebes as (Q) a basis for questioning the absolute character of the prohibition of suicide.
Taran's punctuation leaves P3 without a connective particle. But his solution is attractive. It simplifies the grammar and makes sound logical sense. Alternatively, if his punctuation is not accepted, the sentence may be taken as in the present translation and construed as follows:
'It will perhaps seem questionable to you whether (PI) this (sc. the prohibition of suicide) is alone of all things (sc. doctrines) unqualified, and whether (P2) it never happens, as other things do on some occasions and for some people, that (P3) it is better for man to be dead than alive; and (Q) for those for whom it is better to be dead, it perhaps seems surprising to you if for these men it is not holy etc.' PI and P2+P3 are here put forward as doctrines that Cebes might doubt ('wonder whether'), without any implication that Socrates holds them to be true. Q is likewise translated so as to leave Socrates uncommitted. Good sense is obtained by reading the sentence purely as an expression of the doubts in Cebes' mind: 'Is suicide alone', he may ask, 'unlike everything else, to be absolutely prohibited without regard to circumstances? Are there never times when, and people for whom, it is better to be dead than alive? And is it forbidden for such people to do themselves a good turn?' These doubts, expressed in indirect speech by another person, would yield the sentence in the text.
This interpretation requires the sense 'questionable' for the first occurrence of the word translated 'a matter for wonder'. The force may be, more exactly, 'Perhaps it will seem to you that one must ask in astonishment whether...' See H. Reynen,Hermes 1968,41—6.
It may be useful to summarize the above solutions in symbolic form. If D = 'a man better dead than living', K = 'a man permitted to
kill himself, T = 'true for', F = 'false for', ? = 'possibly', S = 'Socrates', and C = 'Cebes', then:
0)
PI
(x)(Dx)
TS, TC
P2+P3
~(3 x){~Dx)
TS, TC
Q
(3x) (Dx.-Kx)
TS, FC
(ii)
Pi
(x)(yDx)
FS, FC
P2+P3
(3x) (Dx)
TS, TC
Q
(3x) (Dx.~Kx)
TS, FC
(iii)
Pi
(*) (~Kx)
TS, FC
P2+P3
~(3 x)(JOx)
TS? FC *as alleged by Cebes
Q
(3x) {Dx.~Kx)
(iv)
P1+P2
(x) (~Kx)
TS, FC
P3
(3 x)(Dx)
TS, TC
Q
(3x) (Dx.~Kx)
TS, FC
(v)
Pi
(x) (~Kx)
?TS, ?FC
P2+P3
~(3x) (Dx)
FS, FC
Q
(3*) CDx.~Kx)
?TS,?FC
The above symbolism is too simple to express the variety of possible relationships between P and Q and their components. It cannot, for example, handle 'P, nevertheless Q'. Moreover, an exact interpretation should indicate not only the truth-values of P and Q, but the speakers' beliefs and attitudes regarding them, which are inadequately represented here. However, the symbolization shows the scale of the problem, and the range of solutions now in the field.
62b 1— c8. Socrates suggests two possible grounds for the prohibition of suicide: (1) we are placed in a 'prison' (or 'garrison') from which we should not run away (b2—6); (2) we are the possessions of the gods, and therefore may not dispose of our own lives (b6—c8). These suggestions are not sharply distinct, but they will be considered separately here.
(1) The meaning will depend upon the translation at 62b4. If 'prison' is correct (see note 1), Socrates is probably referring to the Orphic doctrine that life is an imprisonment of the soul within the body. Cf. Cratylus 400c and Gorgias 493a. The consequent analogy between suicide and escape from prison recalls the theme of the Crito. Cf. also 98e3—5. However, the central argument of the Crito against escaping from gaol would be ineffective against suicide. In that dialogue Socrates derives 'his obligation to obey the Laws of Athens from the benefits of citizenship he has enjoyed (50d—e, 51c). But life in itself confers no benefits analogous to these. He argues that he has implicitly contracted to obey the Laws, by spending his life in Athens when he might have emigrated (5Id—e, 52d—53a). But there could be no comparable 'emigration' from life, and hence no analogous opportunity to opt out of the 'contract'—except through suicide itself.