A definition of death in terms of the relation between soul and body provides, it need hardly be said, no useful criterion for determining when a person is dead. But even if this medical question is judged irrelevant, the definition gives a questionable account of the concept. For it provides that the body has 'come to be apart, separated from the soul, alone by itself. But the body's post mortem existence is not, in fact, a necessary condition for death, whether death be viewed as an event or as a state. The bodies of those long dead do not exist. And after certain kinds of death the body may not remain 'alone by itself at all. Nor, in saying that a person is dead, need any reference be made to the existence or state of his body.
The definition of death poses some difficulty for the interpretation of 'deathless', as that term will later be applied to the soul. If 'death' means 'the soul's being separated from the body', how can the soul be 'deathless' in that sense? So far from denying that it is separated from the body, Socrates affirms precisely this. For the word 'deathless' or 'immortal' see on 72e7—73a3,95b5—e6,105dl3— e9. As applied to the soul it must mean the capacity to persist through separation from the body. The soul survives the transition from attachment to the body to a state of detachment from it. It survives, we might say, the 'event' of death into the 'state' of death. In this sense it could be held 'deathless' in a manner consistent with the present definition. It is, however, a further question whether the term 'death' is itself used consistently with this definition throughout the dialogue. See on 71d5-e3, 91d2-9, 105el0-107al (p.221), and cf.88al—b8,95b8—el, 106b2-4,106e5-7.
Behind the above difficulties lies a more fundamental one. Is the view that living beings are a composite of body and soul tenable? The assumption that an independent entity, 'the soul', animates the body is implicit throughout the discussion, and is made explicit at 105c9—d5 (cf.79b 1—2). Yet for many readers the question of the soul's immortality is pre-empted by that of its existence. Socrates' conception of it will later be challenged by Simmias, with the counter-hypothesis that the soul is an 'attunement' of bodily elements (85e—86d). By refuting that alternative (91e—95a), Socrates clears the way for his own view. More positive support for the assumption can be found in other sections of the dialogue. See on 76cll—13 and 105el0-107al (p.220). A philosophical reading of the dialogue should examine the basis for it. See next note.
64e4—65a3. Socrates now pursues the implications of the soul- body dichotomy for the philosopher's life: his attention will be turned away from the body as far as possible, and 'towards the soul'. The traditional 'soul' has been used throughout for psyche. But the dialogue contains no explicit account or consistent usage of this term, and it therefore remains unclear exactly what it is whose immortality Socrates is seeking to prove. No short account can do justice to this huge subject. All that can be attempted is an outline of some aspects of it that are especially relevant to the Phaedo.
The soul is that element in us whose good condition constitutes our true well-being. Its 'care' is therefore paramount, and overrides all other human concerns. This teaching, familiar from other Platonic dialogues, is elaborated in the Phaedo in two ways. First, the body is seen as a constant hindrance to the care of the soul, its demands incessantly conflicting with the soul's interests (66b—d). Hence the repeated stress upon 'purifying' the soul (67a—c, 69c), 'releasing' it from the body as far as possible (67c—d), and 'admonishing' or 'punishing' the body (94b—d). Hence, also, the stern disparagement of bodily pleasures and material possessions (64d— 65a). Nowhere else in Plato is asceticism so uncompromisingly extolled. Secondly, the nurture of the soul is viewed as of vital importance, not only for this life but for the life to come. This gospel, proclaimed with unequalled eloquence, imbues the dialogue with its distinctive ethos of religious fervour and earnest moral concern.See especially 63b5-9, 69d2-e2, 80d5-84b8,90d9-91al, 107cl—5, 108a6—c5, 114dl-115a3.
The soul is 'the true self, 'the real person*. Hence in caring for his soul, the philosopher is caring for 'himself. In this vein Socrates will urge his friends to take care of'themselves' (115b5—cl). After his death they should not speak of burying 'him', but rather 'his body' (115c4—116al). 'Socrates' is to be distinguished from his body, and is thus implicitly identified with his soul. The use of 'our souls' for 'us' will be critical for the argument at certain points. See on 70c4—8 (p. 105). An argument for identifying the person with his soul is presented in the (possibly spurious) Alcibiades I (129a- 130e).
The soul is often equivalent to 'intellect' or 'reason', a 'thinking faculty' or 'cognitive principle' by which the quest for wisdom is pursued. In this quest, the soul is referred to as 'attaining the truth' (65b9), as 'reasoning' (65c2-5), 'getting knowledge' (76c6), and 'possessing wisdom' (76c 12-13). It seeks 'vision' or 'grasp' of its objects, analogous to the seeing or touching of material things. It is an organ of intellectual sight or touch, or a 'subject' by which the truth is apprehended. At 67c3 'soul' is replaced by 'intellect', as if that term were a natural variant for it. Cf.65e7, 66a2, 79a3, and see on 65c2-4.
The soul also functions as 'the rational self in opposition to emotions and bodily desires. This opposition is not between 'reason' and some other 'part' of the soul, but simply between soul and body. No distinction is drawn in the Phaedo between 'reason', 'spirit', and 'appetite', which Plato treats elsewhere as separate 'parts' of the soul— see Republic 435a—441c andPhaedrus 246a—b, 253c—e. Phenomena viewed in those dialogues as 'mental conflicts' are described in the Phaedo as struggles between soul and body: the soul opposes 'the bodily feelings' (94b7—cl, c9—e6), which include not only hunger and thirst (94b8—10), but also passions and fears (94d5). In opposing them, the soul thus performs the role played in the Republic (439c2—d8, 441b2—c2) by the 'reasoning element' only.
In several passages the soul is treated as the subject not only of rational thought but of a wide range of conscious states. Thus Socrates can speak of 'the pleasures that come by way of the body' (65a7), and of hearing or sight, pleasure or pain, as 'bothering' the soul (65c5—9). Later (79c2—8), the soul is said to be 'confused and dizzy' when it studies things through the senses, to be 'intensely pleased or pained' (83c5—6), and to 'share opinions and pleasures with the body' (83d7). Pleasure and pain are viewed not merely as changes in the body, but as psychic states (cf. Philebus 33d2-el, 35c3—d7, 55b3). In such places the soul is depicted as an inner recipient or 'owner' of sense impressions and feelings—or as what will, in a later era, be called 'the mind'. Cf. Theaetetus 184b—186a.
The soul is often conceived as a 'life-principle', or 'animating agent', bringing life to the body which it occupies. This idea, although largely absent from the English 'soul', is close to the root sense of psyche, which is cognate with a verb meaning 'to breathe'. It underlies the definition of death already given at 64c, and will appear in both the first and the final arguments for immortality (72all—d5, 105c9—d5). This view of the soul is not restricted to human beings but applies to all living things. Cf.70d7—9. Note also that since the universe as a whole is regarded by Plato as a living thing (cf. Timaeus 30d, 92c), soul as life-principle may be conceived as animating not only individual organisms, but also the universe itself. For the etymology of psyche see Cratylus 399d-400b.