Sometimes 'the things that are' clearly refers to Forms (78d4, 83b2), sometimes clearly not (79a6, 97d7, 99d5). More often the reference is indefinite: cf.65c9, 66a8, 66c2, 74dl0, 82e3-4, 90c4, 90d6, 99e6, 100a2, 101e3, 103e9.
65d4—e5. The so-called 'Theory of Forms' is introduced at this point. As this theory is of central important in Plato's thought, and is more prominent in this work than in any dialogue usually regarded as of earlier date, a general note on the Forms may be useful here. The following account will be based mainly upon the Phaedo, and will be limited to (1) the terminology of the Theory, (2) its philosophical basis, and (3) its relationship with the proofs of immortality.
(1) Two of Plato's commonest semi-technical terms for Forms are eidos (102bl, 103e3, 104c7, 106d6) and idea (104b9, 104d2, 104d6, 104d9, 104el, 105dl3). Both derive from a common root which appears in the Greek verb 'to see', and they are thus connected with the visual appearance of a thing. Ordinarily, they connote 'shape' or 'figure', and also 'sort' or 'species'. These associations are preserved in the conventional translation 'form', which has been adopted for both words in their Form-referring use. A third word, morphe, also normally meaning 'shape', has been translated 'character' (103e5, 104dl0). As used for Forms, the three words seem interchangeable. See note 72.
The English 'idea' is an exact transliteration of one of the above words. But its associations are misleading. The Forms are in no sense 'psychological' or 'subjective' entities. They are not thoughts or concepts, existing only 'in the mind' of a thinker. Nor are they mind-dependent objects. They may be thought of by the mind, 'viewed with the soul' (66el—2, and see previous note), but they do not depend upon being thought of for their existence. Just as physical objects exist independently of eye and vision, so Forms exist independently of mind and thought.
Individual Forms are typically designated by a neuter singular adjective, occasionally standing alone, but more often with the definite article or the pronoun 'itself, or with both. Such expressions have been translated as literally as possible. Thus, phrases such as 'the equal', 'the beautiful itself, have generally been retained. For the present passage, however, see note 5, and on 74a9—bl, lOObl— c8. Abstract nouns are frequently used for Forms, and have been translated by the corresponding English abstracts, e.g., 'health', 'largeness', 'strength' (65dl2—13). For the special problem posed by
Forms for numbers, see on 101b9—c9.
Individual Forms are referred to in these Notes as, e.g., 'the Form Equal', 'the Form Beautiful', 'the Form of Three', or as 'Equality', 'Beauty', etc. The variable F is sometimes used to stand for the adjectival component—'the Form F\ 'the F', 'the F itself, 'F-ness'. Note that phrases of the form 'the F' are liable to be ambiguous. They need not refer to a Form, but may simply mean 'that which is F', i.e. a thing characterized as F. See on 70e4—71all (p.108), 103a4—c9. It is sometimes uncertain whether a Form is being referred to or not. Typographical distinctions for Forms of any kind have therefore usually been avoided in the translation.
Forms are designated by several other expressions. 'That which is' and 'the things that are' are sometimes, although not always, so used—see previous note. Plato also uses ousia, an abstract noun ordinarily meaning 'property' or 'estate'. This has been translated 'Being', to distinguish it from the present participle 'being', on which it is formed—see note 7. Sometimes a Form F is referred to as 'the F in nature'. See on 103a4—c9. In several places an exceptionally puzzling expression for Forms is used: literally 'what F is', or perhaps 'what is F', or 'the F which is'—with or without the emphatic 'itself. Sometimes F is omitted, leaving only 'what it is'. The phrase is still in need of elucidation. Cf.65dl3-el, 74b2,74d6, 75bl—2, 75b5—6, 7Sd2, 78d3-5, 92d9. See on 75c7-d6 (p.130), and notes 7,21,24-6, 28, 31,50.
(2) Platonic Forms are conceived as timeless and non-spatial objects, immutable entities set over against the changing world of sensible things, a realm of 'things that are' transcending the 'things that come to be'. They are the realities of which sensible objects are mere appearances or 'phenomena'. Each Form is unique, a single 'one' set over its 'many' sensible instances. Each is a perfect original, of which sensible things are imperfect copies. Forms are invisible to the eye, but 'intelligible'—accessible to 'intelligence', the mental organ that 'sees' them. In terms of a contrast that Plato draws in the Republic between 'knowledge' and 'opinion', they are the only objects of true 'knowledge'. See on 84a2—b8.
Plato writes of Forms, such as Equality, Largeness and Health, as if they existed 'alone by themselves', in splendid isolation from the familiar world of equal sticks, large men and healthy children. It is this 'separation' of Forms from sensible objects that distinguishes the fully-fledged version of the Theory found in the Phaedo. Nowhere is the contrast between Forms and sensible things drawn more sharply than here. The soul-body dualism already postulated (64e— 65a) is one aspect of the same dichotomy. In effect, Plato adapts metaphysical dualism to his present purpose by equating the domain of Forms with the 'next world' of religious faith. Thus the Forms not only afford the ground for believing in the immortality of the soul; they are also its destination.
They are sometimes spoken of in terms suggestive of direct acquaintance or even mystical experience. See, e.g., 79dl—7,84a8— b4. Since it is also suggested that such direct acquaintance is unattainable during this life (66e2—67b2), it might be supposed that their existence has to be accepted purely on faith. The Theory is, indeed, everywhere assumed rather than proved. Nevertheless, it is not adopted arbitrarily or merely to buttress the case for immortality. Rather, it offers a solution to a number of philosophical difficulties, which will now be considered.
The Theory has its origin in Socratic inquiries into value concepts such as 'just', 'beautiful', 'holy', and 'good'. Plato depicts these in several earlier dialogues, whose prime question is 'What is FT, where 'F' stands for a value term in common use that is felt to require clarification. No such inquiries occur in the Phaedo, but they are familiar to the speakers, and the Theory is explicitly connected with them. Cf.75dl—3 and 78dl—2, where the 'questions and answers' mentioned evidently concern the essential nature of each of the concepts referred to, the attempt to specify what each of them is. This enterprise is envisaged in the Republic as a prospective science called 'dialectic', which would aim, in ethical and metaphysical matters, for the objectivity and rigour achieved in mathematics. It would also aim to secure the foundations of the mathematical sciences themselves.