The saying referred to at 66c4—5 is unknown. For the verb there translated 'think' cf.96b4. It is cognate with one of the nouns for "wisdom' discussed at 69a6—c3, and is thus linked with apprehension of the Forms.
68a3—b7. The analogy between wisdom and human loved ones demands that the literal meaning of 'philosopher' be brought out at 68b2—3. He is a 'lover of wisdom', contrasted with other kinds of 'lover' at 68cl-2 (cf.82bl0-c8). Philosophy is thought of as the quest for wisdom, not the attainment of it. See 66e2—67a 1, and note 12. Cf. also Symposium 204a—c.
At 68a4—5 there may be a reference to Jocasta or Evadne, whose suicides occur in Euripides' Supplices (985ff.) and Phoenissae (1455ff.). Evadne's was committed for the sake of reunion with her husband.
68b8-69a5. This passage develops a contrast between the genuine goodness of the philosopher and the spurious goodness of other men. Non-philosophers withstand evils only for fear of worse alternatives, or forgo some pleasures only to secure others. Their so-called 'bravery' and 'temperance' are thus no more than an intelligent hedonism.
The hedonistic position is elaborated more fully, perhaps ironically, in the Protagoras (351b—360e), where a calculus of pleasures and pains is expounded in terms similar to those used here. Its role in the Protagoras, and the extent of Plato's commitment to it in that dialogue, which is probably earlier than the Phaedo, are much disputed. However, the view proclaimed in it by Socrates is essentially similar to the one he is made to disparage here. In other dialogues the thesis that 'good' is equivalent to, or definable in terms of, 'pleasure' is generally rejected. See Gorgias 495e—500a, Republic 505c—d, Philebus 20c-21d, 53c-55c.
Socrates deals here with 'bravery' and 'temperance' only. No parallel argument is given for 'justice', despite its inclusion at 69b 1— c3 and 82all—b3. These qualities, together with wisdom, make up the quartet of 'cardinal virtues', as they later came to be called. They are analysed more fully in the Republic (427e—444e), where the central concept is justice. The Phaedo, concerned as it is with the distinctive nature of philosophers, assigns a special role to wisdom. Bravery and temperance are explored in the Laches and Charmides respectively.
At 68c6 the translation 'people of the disposition we have described' slightly expands the text, so as to make clear that it refers to philosophers, and not to the non-philosophers who have just been mentioned (cl—3). 'Bravery' could not be meant to apply to the latter, for it must be parallel to 'temperance', which is ascribed at 68cl0 to philosophers only. 'What is named "bravery"' (c5) is best taken, with Burnet, to be paralleled at 68c8 by 'what most people name "temperance"'. In respect of both qualities, a distinction is being drawn between 'so-called' and genuine goodness, which Socrates will proceed to sharpen at 69a6—c3. Cf.82bl—2. Here, as often, 'what they call JP suggests that in ordinary usage the term is misapplied. See on 107cl—d2.
Note that Socrates does not, as might be expected, simply ascribe 'so-called' goodness to the ordinary man, while reserving true goodness for philosophers. What he suggests is that 'bravery' and 'temperance', even as commonly understood, apply especially to philosophers, or to them alone. He is questioning the non-philosophers' title not only to 'true bravery' and 'true temperance', but also to 'bravery' and 'temperance' so-called. A weaker claim is made for 'bravery' than for 'temperance': the former is attributed to philosophers 'especially' (c6), the latter to them 'only' (clO). In arguing that philosophers deserve the title of 'so-called' bravery and temperance, Socrates does not, of course, mean to deny 'true' bravery and temperance to them. See 69b2, cl—2, and Hackforth, 57.
The arguments about (1) bravery and (2) temperance are rather different. In both cases, however, it is claimed that the qualities are 'strange' (d2—3) or 'illogical' (dl2—13, cf.e3): non-philosophers are 'brave through cowardice', 'temperate through intemperance'. They are thus F by reason of G-ness, where F and G are opposites. This is paradoxical, and also—it may be noticed—conflicts with the account given later (100c—e) of the 'reasons' by which a subject can be characterized by one member of a pair of opposites.
(1) For 'bravery' the argument runs as follows (68d5—el): (A) non-philosophers count death a great evil (d5—6); hence, (B) 'brave' ones abide death through being afraid of greater evils (d8—9); hence (C) they are 'brave' through fearing and fear (dl 1—12); yet (D) it is illogical that anyone should be brave through fear and cowardice (dl2—13).
The argument hinges partly upon an assumed equivalence between 'brave' and 'fearless', 'cowardly' and 'fearful'. Philosophers are 'brave' in this popular sense, since, unlike other men, they do not regard death as an evil, and are therefore 'fearless' of it. The noun translated 'being afraid' in (B) differs from that used in (C) and (D) for 'fear'. The latter is cognate with the verb for 'fearing' in (C) and also with the noun translated 'cowardice' in (D). This facilitates the dubious slide in (D) from 'brave through fear' to the full-blown paradox 'brave through cowardice'.
The move from (A) to (B) assumes (i) that men faced with a choice between evils will take the one they regard as lesser; and (ii) that what they regard as evil they also fear. For these assumptions see Protagoras 358d—e. It is worth noting that they could be used to represent any agent who chooses what he considers a lesser evil as doing so from 'fear' of a greater one, and therefore as acting 'from cowardice'. Even philosophers may be motivated by a desire to avoid consequences which they regard as evil, and which they therefore 'fear' to incur—see, e.g., 83b5-c3. If so, they too might be represented, along the lines of the present argument, as acting 'from cowardice'.
Conversely, it could be shown that non-philosophers may perform cowardly actiorts'frombravery': those who shun death do so through being 'fearless' of the alternatives. They are 'fearful through fearlessness', hence 'cowardly through bravery'. In this way it might be argued that the 'cowardice' of non-philosophers is no less paradoxical than their 'bravery'. Yet Socrates does not speak of 'so-called cowardice'. Nor is it anywhere suggested that the terms for bad qualities, like those for good ones, might be systematically misapplied.
(2) The word rendered 'temperate' is notoriously difficult to translate. It can mean either (a) 'sensible' or (b) 'self-controlled' in the sphere of bodily pleasures. Its opposite in the latter sense, here translated 'intemperate', means literally 'unchastened', 'Temperance' in sense (b) signifies moderation rather than abstinence, control rather than elimination of the desires. It is only the 'true temperance' of the philosopher that entails a purifying or total purging of the emotions (69c 1).
The argument at 68e2—69a5 runs thus: (A) 'well-ordered' non- philosophers, being afraid of being deprived of certain pleasures, and desiring them (e5—6), (B) abstain from some pleasures, being overcome by others (e6—7); yet (C) 'to be ruled by pleasures' they call 'intemperance' (e7—69al); therefore (D) they overcome some pleasures, being overcome by others (69a2); hence, (E) they achieve temperance, after a fashion, as a result of 'intemperance' (a3—4).