The participles in (A), (B), and (D), 'being afraid' (e5), 'desiring' (e6), 'being overcome' (e7, a2) have all been translated with causal force. This is essential to support the claim that temperance is achieved 'because of intemperance. The agent abstains from certain pleasures only 'because' he desires others, e.g. those of health or saving money.
'Well-ordered' non-philosophers are so called in (A) as a variant for 'temperate'. They are characterized in (B) as 'abstaining from pleasures', and thus in (D) as 'overcoming pleasures'. In (C) 'intemperance' is equated with 'being overcome by pleasures (e7—al). Thus, a man who restrains himself for reasons of health or economy can be represented as temperate 'because of intemperance', since he is 'overcome' by the pleasures of health or saving money (cf.82c5— 8, 83cl—2). Yet the meaning of 'intemperance' has here been artificially stretched, as Socrates recognizes with the phrase 'a kind of intemperance' (e3), and by adding the qualification 'after a fashion' at 69a3. By a parallel extension of 'temperance', it might be argued that a drunkard is 'intemperate because of temperance'. For he is overcome by the pleasures of the bottle, through having overcome those of a healthy liver and bank-balance. This is parallel to the difficulty raised about bravery in (1) above.
There is a parallel problem here also in keeping Socrates' argument from impinging upon the philosopher. He too, it might be objected, is gratifying one kind of desire only through yielding to another, his passionate desire for truth and wisdom (66e, 68a—b). He too, therefore, overcomes some pleasures through being overcome by others. At 114d8—115al Socrates will speak of one who rejects bodily pleasures and devotes himself to those of learning, adorning his soul with temperance, justice, and bravery. It might be asked what distinguishes the virtues of such a man from those of an enlightened hedonist? This raises the question of the role, of wisdom in relation to the other virtues, and of the ethical position of the Phaedo more generally. See next note.
69a6—c3. This eloquent but difficult sentence forms the climax of Socrates' defence of the philosophic life. For the text and grammar see note 13. The key concepts are those of wisdom, goodness, and pleasure. The relations between these call for some comment.
Two words are usually translated 'wisdom': sophia and phronesis. The former ordinarily means 'skill', 'knowledge', 'learning', or (in a pejorative sense) 'cleverness', 'subtlety' (96a7, 101e5). The latter normally means 'practical judgement', 'prudence', or 'good sense'. In Plato's usage, however, the words are not sharply differentiated. Here, and generally in this dialogue, phronesis is a solemn term for the condition of the soul for which the philosopher yearns (66e3, 68a2, 68a7, 68b4), attainable only in communion with the Forms (79dl—7). It has been translated 'wisdom' throughout. See note 14.
The word translated 'goodness' at 69a7, 69b3 and 69b7 (arete) can connote non-human as well as human goodness. Hence the inadequacy of the traditional translation 'virtue', which is mainly confined to good qualities in human beings, and a limited range even of these. 'Virtue' has a convenient plural, however, and is sometimes useful as a generic term. It stands for the 'whole' of which bravery, temperance, justice, and wisdom are elsewhere treated as 'parts'. Each of them is a virtue, and also part of virtue as a whole. See Protagoras 329c—330a and Meno 73e—74b. For the virtues generally see F. E. Sparshott, Monist 1970,40-65.
What is the relation between wisdom and virtue? Are they identical, or is the former a means to the latter? If they are identical, is the whole being equated with one of its parts? Or is one of the parts supposed to be a necessary and sufficient condition for each of the others, and thus for virtue as a whole? If wisdom is a means to virtue, regarded as something distinct from it, why is it represented (a6—10) as the sole object of value? And how can it be 'sold' (b2) without being given up? These questions turn upon the interpretation of the 'money' metaphors at 69a6—b6 and of 'purification' at 69cl—3. See Bluck, 154-6, Hackforth, 191-3, J. V. Luce, C.Q. 1944,60-4, and P. W. Gooch, J.H.P. 1974,153-9.
In treating wisdom as the only 'right coin' (a9—10), Plato assigns to it an intrinsic worth that he denies to pleasure. The latter is supplanted by wisdom as the sole standard of value. In this context 'pleasure' is implicitly restricted to that of the body (cf.83b—d). The distinctions Plato will draw in other dialogues between different kinds of pleasure (see on 60b 1— c7) enable this stark and misleading opposition between wisdom and pleasure to be moderated. At Republic 505b—d rival accounts of 'the good' in terms of wisdom or pleasure alone are both rejected. Cf. Philebus 20e—21e. The opposition between them is evidently artificial, since there can be pleasure in the pursuit of wisdom itself— cf.59a3.
On a sufficiently broad interpretation of 'pleasure', it might be argued that the philosopher pursues it as much as anyone else. He too seeks to maximize his own pleasure, now and hereafter. His practice of virtue in this life, it might also be said, is motivated ultimately by self-interest in the next. See, e.g., 107cl—d5, 114c6— 8. But the spirit of the present passage, and of the dialogue as a whole, is against this interpretation. The philosopher is not merely one whose prudential judgements take account of the afterlife. He seeks wisdom and virtue for their own sakes, and not merely as a means to eternal reward. They are, in some sense, their own reward. See on 81d6-82d8 and 107cl-d2.
3. THE CASE FOR IMMORTALITY (69e6—107bl0)
Cebes' objection that the soul may not survive death leads to the series of arguments that form the core of the dialogue. Each of these will be labelled for convenient reference, and they will be separately analysed in the following notes. But it is important to observe the connections between them. Plato does not offer a set of discrete, self-contained proofs of immortality, but a developing sequence of arguments, objections, and counter-arguments. As the dialogue unfolds, the earlier arguments are criticized, refined, or superseded, until Socrates' belief in immortality is finally vindicated. It is in this process that the intellectual power of the work is largely to be found.
The closely integrated arguments of the Phaedo contrast sharply with the solitary, and quite different, proofs of immortality in the Republic (608c-61 la) and Phaedrus (245c-246a).
3.1 The Cyclical Argument (69e6— 72el)
Socrates begins by appealing to the principle that opposites come from opposites, and positing cyclical processes between every pair of opposites,
69e6—70c3. The popular idea that the soul may be dispersed at death rests on a misunderstanding of its nature. Later Socrates will return to this idea (77d5—e2), and will argue that the soul is not the kind of thing that can be 'blown away by winds' (84b4-7). In the Cyclical Argument he is concerned, rather, with the possibility of its separate existence. The other half of what Cebes requires, 'that it possesses some power and wisdom' (70b3—4), will be supplied by the Recollection Argument (72e—78b). For the relation between these arguments see on 77a6—d5. For the translation 'wisdom' see note 14.
Socrates' denial that he is 'talking idly' (70c 1—2) may be an allusion to Aristophanes' caricature of him in the Clouds. For the gibe cf. Republic 489a, Gorgias 485 d—e. As if in answer to charges of'irrelevance', the close connection between the present inquiry and Socrates' own situation is stressed again and again (76bl0-12, 78al—2,80d7—8, 84c6-85b9,89b, 91a-c, 98c-99a).