It is apparently assumed without argument that the possible sources of life are finite and constant. Support for this assumption is sometimes found in Republic 61 la, where it is argued that the number of souls must be 'always the same'. There, however, constancy in the. number of souls does not support, but rests upon, acceptance of their immortality. For it is adduced as a rider to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. The prool of this rider assumes, without further explanation, that everything's 'ending up immortal' is inconceivable.
(5) The present argument makes the complementary assumption that everything could not conceivably end up dead. This also is left unexplained; and it is natural for a modern reader to ask why the implication that all life would eventually be exhausted should discredit a view that gives rise to it. For it seems to us conceivable, and even likely, that this will happen. It has to be recognized that Plato's view of the physical world as a whole is organic. The universe is itself a living thing. The present assumption may be connected with the principle that 'nothing can come from nothing or disappear into nothing'. See on 105el0-107al (p.220).
72d6—e2. The three main propositions which the Cyclical Argument purports to have established are resumed here in order of logical priority. The translation follows Burnet and most editors in omitting the final words (72el—2), 'and it is better for the good souls, and worse for the bad ones', as an edifying 'enrichment' of the text. In substance they recall 63c6—7, but they are logically and grammatically out of place here.
3.2 The Recollection Argument (72e3— 78b3)
It is now argued that what we call 'learning' consists in 'recollection', the recovery of knowledge possessed in a former existence. The soul must, therefore, have existed before birth.
72e3—7. The doctrine of Recollection (anamnesis) is one of the best-known of all Platonic themes. It is prominent in the Meno (80d-86c), and is briefly mentioned in the Phaedrus (249e-250c). It is introduced here as a familiar tenet (e4—5), and its significance goes well beyond the present context. Both here and in the Meno the immortality of the soul is inferred from it, but its philosophical interest is largely independent of that conclusion.
Although the doctrine states broadly that so-called 'learning' is recollection (73b5, 75e5, 76a6—7), it does not cover everything to which the term 'learning' would ordinarily be applied. It does not, for example, include the learning of factual information, learning by rote, or the learning of skills. It should be borne in mind that the word translated 'learn' can also mean 'understand'. For it is with coming to understand certain concepts, in particular those that give rise, to the Theory of Forms, that the doctrine of Recollection is concerned.
'Recollection' has been used throughout the translation, and in these notes, for the noun anamnesis, and 'be reminded' has been used for the cognate Greek verb. Note, however, that 'recollection', as ordinarily used, is too broad a term for the context and is used here only for want of a suitable English noun cognate with 'remind'. The key element in the process that Socrates describes at 73c—74a is that on perceiving one thing, a person should think of another. But 'recollection' need not be occasioned by any such experience. 'Be reminded' is closer to the Greek verb both in grammar and sense. In Greek as in English, one is 'reminded of Y by JC, where Y and X are the thing remembered and the reminding item.
The translation and the notes on this section of the dialogue owe numerous points to the valuable article by J. L. Ackrill in Exegesis and Argument, 177—195.
72e7—73a3. The Recollection doctrine is here taken to imply that the soul existed before being born into human form. The reasoning has some force. If 'we', who are now reminded of certain things, are to be identified with 'we' who formerly learned them, and if, as the coming argument will try to show, 'we' learned them before entering human form, then 'we' who learned them cannot be identified with the whole human being, the present composite of body and soul, since before our entry into human form our present bodies did not exist. Hence prenatal learning requires a pre-existing subject—'the soul'. See also on 76cl 1—13.
The Recollection Argument partly resembles the Cyclical Argument. Both turn upon the idea that if, at any given time, we are re-Xed ('re-born', Ve-minded'), we must already have existed before that time. For if we had not thus existed, we could never have been Xed, and therefore could not possibly be re-Xed. But the Recollection Argument escapes an objection raised earlier against the previous argument. 'Being reminded' is a familiar predicate, intelligible without special assumptions. But 'being reborn' is not intelligible unless a previously existing soul is presupposed (see on 70c8—d6). The Recollection Argument cannot be convicted in this way of assuming what has to be proved.
At 73a2 the word translated 'immortal' occurs for the first time in the dialogue. For the difficulty of interpreting it consistently with the earlier definition of 'death', see on 64c2—9 (p.87). It may surprise a modern reader that the soul's prenatal existence should be taken as evidence for its immortality. 'How', it has been asked, 'can pre-existence be evidence for post-existence?' (E. J. Furlong, Hermathena 1940, 65). But 'immortality' must cover more than 'post-existence'. Cebes will say later (77cl—2) that only half what is needed has been shown. The Recollection Argument proves only the prenatal 'half of the total immortality thesis. Cf. Meno 81b3—6, 81c5—7, where 'immortality' is understood not merely as 'post-existence', but as persistence through a series of incarnations. See also on 95b5-e6, 105dl3-e9.
73a4—blO. For the translation at 73a7-b2 see note 19. These lines, although not necessarily an allusion to the Meno, clearly refer to the method there followed. Socrates questions a slave boy, previously unversed in geometry, and elicits from him the right solution to a geometrical problem. The present argument for Recollection is offered as an alternative to a proof of that sort (b3—4), and differs from the 'reminding' of the slave boy in several respects, (i) It makes no reference to any mathematical problem, but mentions only judgements about the deficiency of sensible things, (ii) It is concerned with the understanding of concepts, rather than with the proof of propositions, (iii) It does not introduce the Recollection doctrine in the context of a 'what is FV inquiry, or to overcome an apparent obstacle to such an inquiry, (iv) In the Meno no stress is placed upon the use of the senses, whereas Recollection will here be said to be occasioned by their use (74b4—5, 75al 1—b2, e3—4). (v) No mention is made in the Meno of Forms, whereas in the Phaedo they are of central importance.
Nevertheless, both passages are concerned with the mathematical and value notions that give rise to the Theory of Forms (see on 65d4—e5, p.95). Both may be viewed as concerned with 'a priori knowledge'. See R. E. Allen, R.M. 1959-60, 165-74, N. Gulley, C.Q. 1954, 194—213, G. Viastos, Dialogue 1965,143-67.