'Knowledge' and 'correct account' (a9—10) are interrelated, the former involving the ability to provide the latter—see on 76b4—clO. At 73b 1 the word translated 'diagrams' could mean 'proofs'. Cf. Cratylus 436d2, and see Gulley, op.cit. 197. 'Diagrams' would fit the context well enough, however, and the words 'or anything else of that sort' can then be easily explained as referring to solid models (cf. Hackforth, 67, n.l). The words 'that this is so' (b2) are consistent with either the 'diagram' or the 'proof interpretation. They may refer to the fact that people can answer well-framed questions correctly, or to the inference that 'knowledge and a correct account' are present within them. Either of these things could be made clear by introducing them to proofs or to diagrams.
73cl—3. Socrates here begins to formulate conditions for 'being reminded'. Are these conditions intended as necessary or sufficient, or as both? This point is critical for the structure of the Recollection Argument. Necessary conditions would enable inferences to be drawn from the Recollection doctrine. Sufficient conditions would enable the doctrine itself to be inferred. Unfortunately, the conditions seem to vary in this respect. The one given here, that what one is reminded of one.must previously have known, is represented, like the one given at 74a5—8, as necessary. But the requirements that on perceiving one thing one think of another (73c4—dl), and that one should have forgotten the latter (73el-4), seem meant as sufficient ('whenever' 73c4, 73d5, 73e2). The application of these conditions to the case in which we think of the Form Equal on perceiving its sensible instances is therefore problematic.
J. Gosling (Phronesis 1965, 155) has suggested that all of the conditions are meant as both necessary and sufficient. But there is nothing in the text to suggest this, nor could it reasonably be maintained. Thinking of one thing upon perceiving another is obviously not a necessary condition for being reminded of the former. At 73el it is said to constitute 'a kind of Recollection, i.e. only a single form of it. And Simmias' joking use of the word at 73b7 shows that it is possible to be reminded of things in a very different way, namely by verbal prompting from another person. Cf. also 60c9, 105a5.
73c4—dl 1. Two further conditions for 'being reminded' are now given: (1) on seeing, hearing, or getting some other sense-perception of a thing, one 'not only recognizes that thing, but also thinks of something else' (c6—8); and (2) what is thought of must be the object 'not of the same knowledge but of another' (c8).
(1) The meaning of the first condition depends on the sense of the verb translated 'recognize' at 73c7 and 73d7. This is an ordinary word for 'know', but is distinct from the verb that will mainly be used for 'knowing' the Forms. It can, like the English 'know', mean 'recognize'; and it is plausible to hold that if one is to be reminded of Y on perceiving X, one must, indeed, not merely perceive X, but must also notice features of X by reference to which the association of Y with it in thought can be explained. Cf. J. L. Ackrill, E.A. 182-3.
At 73d5-8 lovers are said to 'recognize' their favourite's lyre, and get in their minds the form of its owner. Does 'recognizing' here consist merely in recognizing the instrument as a lyrel Or do they recognize it as its owner's lyre? If the latter, it may be asked if their thinking of the boy is a separate mental act, distinct from recognizing the lyre. Are they not already thinking of the boy, in recognizing the lyre as his? A similar question arises in the crucial example of Simmias and his picture (73e9—10). In recognizing the picture as one of him, it seems that we should eo ipso necessarily be thinking of Simmias himself. If so, the question would arise whether the thing thpught of and the thing perceived are, in this case, objects of 'another knowledge', i.e. whether the second condition here laid down for 'being reminded' has been met. This bears on the later suggestion that sensible equals 'remind' us of the Form Equal (74c7—d3). For it might be objected that in recognizing sensible equals as such, we are eo ipso thinking of Equality. The Form and its instances would not then be objects of 'another knowledge', and the conditions for our being reminded of the former by the latter would not be met.
(2) Hackforth (67, n.4) rightly rejects Burnet's view that the point of the second condition is merely to exclude cases where one member of a pair of opposites, such as odd and even, or darkness and light, reminds us of the other. Although the idea that opposites are objects of the same knowledge will appear later (97d5), it has no relevance here. But Hackforth's own explanation is also dubious. He suggests that Socrates means to exclude cases in which perceived features of a man might remind us of things we know about him but do not perceive. For the latter features would form part of 'our total knowledge of the man', and would therefore be objects of 'the same knowledge'. But, in that case, how should 'our total knowledge of the man' be defined? Why should it not include his lyre or his cloak, so that these too, contrary to the suggestion of 73d3—4, would be objects of 'the same knowledge'? Moreover, why should the cases Hackforth refers to be excluded as irrelevant for Socrates' purpose? The point of the exclusion remains obscure.
At 73d3—4 it is agreed that 'knowledge of a man is other than that of a lyre'. This might be taken to mean merely that the concept of a man is different from that of a lyre. But such an interpretation would not suit all the examples of 'being reminded' that follow. One may be reminded of Cebes on seeing Simmias (d9). Yet these two, since both are men, would presumably instantiate the same concept, and thus, if concepts were meant, would be objects of'the same knowledge'. If the knowledge of Cebes is different from that of Simmias, what makes it so? Not the mere fact that they are numerically distinct, for it would then be otiose to add the condition at all. It would be met automatically in any case where the thing thought of was numerically distinct from the thing perceived.
Ackrill has suggested (op.cit. 184—5) that knowledge of Y is 'other' than knowledge of X if the thought of the former is not already given in the recognition of the latter. Thus, one may see and recognize Simmias, or a picture of Simmias (73e6—7), without eo ipso thinking of Cebes. If this is the meaning, then, as Ackrill says, the condition will be infringed by the case of Simmias and his picture, since one cannot recognize a picture of Simmias without eo ipso thinking of Simmias himself. It is unclear whether the condition, as thus interpreted, would be satisfied in the case of the Form Equality and its sensible instances. See (1) above. In any case, no use appears to be made of it in what follows. Socrates will make no effort to show that the Form Equality is, in fact, the object of a different knowledge from its sensible instances. He will show only that it is non-identical with them (74b7—c6).
73el—74a4. The further examples of Recollection given here are so arranged as to lead up to the case of Simmias and his picture (a9—10), which best illustrates the relation between Forms and sensible particulars. But it is hard to see why so many examples are given, and in particular why 'being reminded by dissimilars' is illustrated at such length, since cases of this sort will play no part in the coming argument about Forms and particulars. Why does Socrates insist that there is Recollection from dissimilar things (74a2—3, cf.74cll—d2, 76a3-4), as well as from similar? Hackforth (68, n.l) suggests that he does so because 'a particular is obviously "like" a Form, and yet may be said to be unlike it because they belong to different orders of existence'. But the case of Simmias and his picture would seem well suited, and sufficient, to make a point of this sort, whereas the case of a lyre and its owner seems quite unsuited to it. For those objects, although unlike each other, both belong to the same order of existence.