As J. L. Ackrill has pointed out (E.A. 188-9), recollection from similars is, in one important respect, not parallel with recollection from dissimilars. One may think of Simmias on seeing his picture because it is like him. But one does not think of a boy on seeing his lyre because it is unlike him. Similarity may be part of the associative mechanism, whereas dissimilarity is not. See on 74c7—d3 and 75d7—76b3.
74a5—8. It is here agreed that whenever one is reminded of a thing by something like it, one must consider whether the reminding object 'is lacking at all, in its similarity, in relation to what one is reminded of. This assertion could hardly be defended as a necessary condition for all cases of being reminded from similars. Only in the special cases in which the reminding item is not merely like, but also a likeness of, what one is reminded of, does it have any plausibility.
But the claim is dubious even in these cases. J. Gosling (Phronesis 1965, 151—61) has argued that it would be implausible to hold as a necessary, or even as a common, condition of 'being reminded' of a person by his picture, that one must assess it as a likeness of him. He therefore suggests that a picture is judged as 'lacking' simply in virtue of its being an image, and thus, precisely because it is an image, failing to possess some features of its original (cf. Cratylus 432b—c). Thus, one who is reminded of Simmias by his picture must judge that it 'falls short', e.g. in virtue of its being two-dimensional.
The point is crucial for the interpretation of the later assertion (74d4—8) that sensible equals appear to us to 'fall short' of the Form. On Gosling's view they do so, not because they are not as equal as the Form, or because they fail to be exactly equal, but because they are mere sensible instances of Equality, and must, as such, differ from the Form itself.
This interpretation is attractive. It frees Socrates from making the unsupported claim that sensible equals, unlike the Form, are never exactly equal. However, (i) is it, in fact, necessary that, in being reminded of someone by his picture, one should consider whether it falls short of him, and always hold that it does so? Must one, if one is to be reminded of somebody by a pencil sketch of him, attend to the fact that it is black-and-white and only a few inches long? Are not such things simply taken for granted and disregarded, rather than consciously noticed? (ii) At 74e2—5 it is asserted that whenever one judges that this X falls short of that Y, one must have known Y previously. But this could hardly be held necessary forjudging that a picture 'falls short' of its original in Gosling's sense. One may readily judge that a picture falls short of its original in this way, whether one has previously known the original or not. Only if the picture has to be compared with its original, as Socrates says we 'compare' sensible particulars with Forms (76e2), is prior knowledge of the original required.
74a9—bl. The Form Equal is introduced here, and will be used as a specimen Form in the coming argument. For the Theory of Forms generally see on 65d4—e5.
The words translated 'we say, don't we, that there is something equal' (74a9—10) might be rendered 'we say, don't we, that equal is something', in conformity with the Greek idiom 'X is something' for 'there is such a thing as X* (see on 64c2—9). However, the continuation 'I don't mean a log to a log, or a stone to a stone' follows more naturally if 'equal' is taken predicatively. The translation follows the explanation of these lines given by G. E. L. Owen, A.D. 114-5. See also note 5, and on 100bl-c8.
74b2—3. More literally, 'we know it, what it is'. The pronoun 'it' refers to the Form Equal, and functions both as direct object of 'know' and as subject of the 'what' clause. Cf., e.gRepublic 354c, and see note 21. Verbs of knowing, in Greek as in English, can govern a direct object or an indirect question. Note that 'he knows the man who is on duty' could mean either 'he is acquainted with the man who is on duty' or 'he knows which man is on duty'. These are logically independent statements (neither entails the other), but their meanings converge in the common Greek construction in which a noun is taken both as direct object of 'know' and as subject of the interrogative clause. This construction helps to assimilate 'knowing what F is' to 'knowing the Form F\ The assimilation is natural, given Plato's use of 'what F is' as a standard designation for the Form F (see on 75c7—d6), and given also his tendency to treat the quest for definitions as a search for Forms (see on 65c2—4).
The assertion that 'we know what the Form Equal is', assuming its equivalence to 'we know the Form Equal', appears to be contradicted at 76b4—c3. It is there denied that all men know the Forms, on the ground that they cannot give an account of them, and that the ability to do so is necessary for knowledge (see on 76b4— clO). This contradiction could be avoided in one of two ways, (i) The sense of 'know' might be less strict here than at 76b—c. Here it might be meant merely that we have the concept of equality, 'know what it is' for normal human purposes; whereas the 'knowledge' referred to at 76b—c would require the ability to give a philosophical analysis of it. This, however, would involve (a) an unacknowledged shift in the meaning of 'know', and (b) a shift in the reference of 'we' from 74b 1, where it means 'we philosophers', to 74b2, where it would mean 'people in general'. Alternatively, (ii) 'we' might be taken to mean here not 'people in general', but 'we philosophers' (cf,74a9—bl, 75d2, 76d8, and 78dl). This would limit the scope of the Recollection Argument to the souls of philosophers. But no such limitation is indicated in the Recollection Argument itself. Indeed, 76c4 says that even those who cannot 'give an account' of the Forms are reminded of them. This suggests that Recollection is not a philosopher's privilege, but, as in the Meno, is possible for human beings generally. See also next note.
74b4—6. The claim that we thought of the Form Equal, or got the knowledge of it, from sensible things recurs several times (74c7— 10, 75a5—7, 75al l-b3, and cf.75e3-5), and is evidently vital to the argument. Yet its meaning depends upon that of the question at 74b4 'where did we get the knowledge of it?', and this is far from obvious. Is Socrates asking (i) from what source we (people in general) acquired the concept equality, i.e. how we learnt, for ordinary purposes, to recognize things as equal, and to describe them as such? Or is he asking (ii) from what sources we (philosophers) became acquainted with the Form Equal, i.e. how we came to acknowledge its existence and to discover its nature? Is he concerned with ordinary concept formation, or with philosophical clarification? Uncertainty on this point pervades the whole argument.
There is difficulty on either view, (i) The assertion that we acquired the concept of equality 'from' sensible equals, or 'from' sensing them, although perhaps congenial to common sense, would be a jejune answer to a complex empirical question. Clearly, much more would need to be said about how we learnt to compare and measure sensible things in order to judge them equal. The role of counting would have to be considered. And it would need to be shown that we could have acquired the concept in no other way (75a6) than through sensing.
Alternatively, (ii) if Socrates is talking about the clarification of concepts, his insistence that we could acquire knowledge of the Form Equal only from sensing particular equals must seem surprising, in view of his continual disparagement of the senses elsewhere (65a9— 66al0, 79a, 83a—b). They are denounced as nothing but a hindrance in the quest for Forms (see on 65b 1—7). Socrates will later tell how he gave up using them in his own inquiries (99d4—e6). How then could we, in using the senses (75e3), regain the very knowledge to which they have been said to deny us access?