It may still be asked, however, how the predicate terms 'unequal' and 'inequality' in the two halves of the question are to be understood. Do they both alike stand for the Form of Inequality? If so, the second half of the question will simply be a doublet of the first, the 'or' between them having the force of 'i.e.' or 'that is to say'. In both halves, Socrates will be scouting the possibility of identifying Equality with Inequality. But this view appears to render the whole question inappropriate to the argument. For the predicate which will then be denied of the Form Equality in the second premiss will differ from that which was affirmed of the logs and stones in the first. They, it was said, can seem to be 'unequal', whereas the Form of Equality, it is now said, cannot seem to be 'inequality'. Yet the predicate in question needs to be the same in both premisses if the argument is to go through.
It might therefore be supposed that the first half of the question is scouting the possibility of the Form of Equality's being unequal, whereas only the second is denying that it could be identified with Inequality. This would make the first half of the question relevant to the argument. But the second half would still need to be explained. For the alleged impossibility of identifying Equality with Inequality would then be left without a clear role in the reasoning. ,
Robin translates the lines as follows: 'Mais quoi? L',Egal en soi s'est-il en quelque cas montre a toiinegal, e'est-a-dire l'Egalite, une inegalite?'. Such a translation would enable 'inequality' to be understood as meaning 'art inequality', i.e. an instance of inequality. This would bring the second half of the question into line with the first. In effect, Socrates would be asking, once again, whether the Form of Equality has ever seemed unequal. But 'inequality' is not easily taken in this way. For given that 'equality' has just been used as the name of a Form, 'inequality' is naturally read likewise as standing for a Form, rather than for an instance of one.
What is needed for the argument is a premiss to the effect that the Form of Equality can never (seem to) be unequal. The required premiss is of the form 'the Form F can never (seem to) be G\ Now, as noted earlier (see on 64d4—e5, p.93). Forms are designated with apparent indifference by adjectives and abstract nouns alike. We may therefore suppose that assertions of the form 'the Form F can never (seem to) be G' were not felt to be as distinct from those of the form 'the Form F can never (seem to) be G-ness' as they appear to us to be. Failure to distinguish between (A) 'Equality can never (seem to) be unequal' and (B) 'Equality can never (seem to) be Inequality' would be understandable if the Form Inequality was taken to be the true bearer of the names 'unequal' and 'inequality' alike. It would be all the more intelligible if the predicative function of the verb 'to be' was not yet clearly distinguished from its role as an identity sign (see on 65c2—4). For it might then be thought that (A) and (B) were simply equivalent ways of denying that equality could ever (seem to) be unequal. On this view the second half of the question at 74cl— 2 would appear as a perfectly natural variant for the first. For an explanation along these lines see Mills, op.cit. 48—9.
Note, however, that Inequality, if it is to be construed as a Form, cannot be understood in a manner altogether parallel to Equality, as the latter Form figures in the ensuing argument. For sensible un- equals could hardly be held to 'fall short' of Inequality in the way that sensible equals may be held to fall short of Equality. On a common interpretation of 74d4—e8, it will be suggested that equal logs and stones exemplify Equality imperfectly. But unequal logs and stones would seem to exemplify /^equality as well as could be desired. If so, it would be strange to postulate a paradigm of Perfect Inequality. This illustrates a general difficulty about the scope of the Theory of Forms, which arises if their roles as 'universals' and 'paradigms' are confused. For certain pairs of opposites, notably for value concepts such as 'good' and 'bad', 'just' and 'unjust', it is only one member of the pair that is naturally thought of as an ideal, of which particular things fall short. It may therefore be doubted whether 'paradigmatic' Forms are admissible for certain concepts whose title to 'universal' Forms is as good as any. See on 65d4-e5 (p.97).
74c7-d3. For the interpretation of 74c7-10 see on 74b4-6. Here, as above, Socrates speaks simply of our getting knowledge of the Form from particular sensible equals. He draws no distinction between acts of sensing and objects sensed. But he later uses a variety of expressions (75a7, 75al 1, 75bl, 75b6, 75e3, 76d9) which suggest that it is, strictly, our sensing of things, rather than the things themselves, that occasions our thought of the Form. It is, however, unclear in several of these passages whether the translation 'senses' or 'sense-perceptions' more nearly expresses the meaning. See on 65b 1-7.
At 74cll—13 it is noted that the Form may be either similar or dissimilar to its sensible instances, but that this 'makes no difference': provided that from seeing X we think of Y, recollection has occurred, whether X and Y are similar or dissimilar. The point of insisting on this here is not clear, but there seems no reason to follow Archer-Hind in excising the lines. It has not yet become apparent that being reminded of a Form by its sensible instances is a case of being reminded by similars. And the claim that one may be reminded either by similars or dissimilars will be reiterated at 76a3—4.
Bluck translates 74clclass="underline" 'Presumably either because it is like them, or else because it is unlike?' But it is incorrect to take 'being' in this line as a causal participle. It would be inappropriate to suggest that we might be reminded by sensible equals of the Form because it is unlike them (see on 73el—74a4). Bluck glosses the line: 'because they resemble it, or because they are associated with it only in thought' (67, n.4). But 'being associated with it only in thought' is not equivalent to 'being unlike it', nor does it correctly express the relation between unlike objects, one of which reminds us of the other. The boy at 73d5—8 is not associated with his lyre or cloak 'only in thought', but because he has been observed to use them. Any causal explanation of someone's being reminded of him on seeing them would have to mention this fact.
74cl3—d3, like 73c4-dl, represents 'thinking of Y from seeing X as a sufficient condition for 'being reminded of F. But one might, surely, think of Y from seeing X, without being reminded of the former, e.g. when one imagined Y or made it up. The condition mentioned is not, in fact, sufficient for 'being reminded', unless it be stipulated that Y is something previously known. But, with respect to the Form Equal, this is precisely what has to be proved. See J. L. Ackrill, E.A. 186-7.