74d4-8. Socrates now makes the point, to be repeated several times, that we think of sensible equals as 'falling short' of the Form Equal. The Form is here referred to as 'what it is itself. For this phrase see on 75c7-d6 (p.131) and note 24. The phrase translated 'the instances in the logs' contains no word as specific as 'instances'.
More literally: 'the things in the logs'.
Why, and in what sense, are we said to think that sensible equals 'fall short' of the Form, or that they 'strive', unsuccessfully, to be like it (75a2—3, bl-2, b7-8)? The usual interpretation of these remarks is that the Form is never perfectly realized in its sensible instances. Cf. Burnet's notes on 65d4, 74a9, 74e9, 75cll, and see on 65d4—e5 (p.96). The Form F serves as a paradigm, a perfect exemplar or standard F, to which sensible Fs can only approximate, and against which they may be judged: no sensible equal is ever exactly equal; only the Form Equal is so. On this view, 'F' not only names the Form F, but can be predicated of it. Indeed, strictly, it is only of the Form F that it is predicated correctly.
The Theory of Forms, as thus interpreted, gives rise to a number of acute difficulties, (i) It is hard to imagine how the Form Equal could function in the way proposed, or to believe that in practice it ever really does so. To suppose that we might determine whether one log is equal to another by comparing either or both of them with a non-sensible Form, to see if they share its character, seems a travesty of what we actually do. To find out if they are equal, or how nearly equal they are, we measure them not against Equality but against each other, or against some other sensible object, such as a ruler.
The judgement that two logs are not exactly equal is no doubt of a kind that we do sometimes make. We know that our senses or instruments are inaccurate, and we may therefore suppose that closer measurement would always reveal inequalities that had previously escaped us. But in judging that two logs are not exactly equal, we do not take ourselves to be comparing them with a non- sensible Form, and finding that they lack a property which it alone possesses. Indeed, we may make such judgements without supposing that any such entity exists.
It is debatable whether, in order to be able to make such judgements as 'these logs are not exactly equal', we must previously have been acquainted with something which is exactly equal. More generally, it is not clear that judgements to the effect that 'X is not exactly F' require prior acquaintance with an x that is exactly F. Must we have encountered perfection in order to recognize imperfection?
As noted at 65d4—e5, the Form F functions, in some contexts at least, as a 'universal': it is the character F-ness common to all particular F things. But if the Form is construed as a universal, it seems, for many values of F, nonsensical to say that it, and it alone, is perfectly F. Equality cannot itself be equal; no more can smallness be small, or largeness large. Forms, as universals, cannot, in general, have the characteirs that they are. The paradoxes incurred by attributing the character F to the Form F were recognized by Plato and explored in the .later Parmenides (132a-b, 132c—133b). They can easily be generated if the paradigmatic and universal roles of the Forms are confused. Whether Plato himself confused them in the Phaedo and other dialogues of his 'middle period' has been a major crux of recent scholarship. See S.P.M., Chs. 4, 12—14.
(v) If 'equal' is predicated of the Form Equal, even in its purely paradigmatic role, it may be asked whether it is equal to anything, and if so, to what. It could hardly be equal to everything. If it is equal to some things but not to others, it will suffer from the very defect from which Forms are supposedly immune, and which, on one plausible interpretation of 74b8—9 above, was said to distinguish sensible equals from it. If it is equal only to itself, it will fail to be a genuine paradigm for items that are said to 'strive to be like it'. Should we conclude, then, that the Form Equal is not equal to anything, either to itself or to anything else, but is just equal simpliciterl On this view, it would fail, once again, to be a genuine paradigm for the things supposed to approximate to it. And to treat 'equal' as a non-relational attribute seems a patent misconstruction, deserving to be characterized, as a case of 'Greek mistreatment of "relative" terms in the attempt to assimilate them to simple adjectives' (G. E. L. Owen, S.P.M. 310).
Does the present passage, in fact, improperly predicate 'equal' of the Form? Undeniably, it implies that the word 'equal' is grammatically predicated of it. For it must be taken to mean that sensible equals seem to us to fall short of being equal in the same way as the Form Equal is equal. The italicized words, though not in Burnet's text at 74d6, clearly have to be understood. See note 24 and cf.l00c4-5, 102e5. But in what way 'is' the Form Equal equal? Is it possible to interpret 'the Form Equal is equal' without raising the difficulties mentioned above? A possible solution is to understand it not as attributing equality to the Form, but simply as an identity statement: the Form Equal is (identical with) Equal. Sensible equals are therefore not equal in the way that it is. For they are not identical with the Form, but only (to use the terminology introduced later) 'participate' in it. They 'fall short' of it, not in failing to be exactly equal, a claim for which the present passage has provided no argument whatever, but rather in that they are non- identical with it, as argued at 74b7—c6. They 'strive to be like it', but they fall short. For they suffer from the defects that characterize sensible particulars as such.
On this view, the judgement that sensible equals 'fall short' of the Form Equal will not be that of a plain man confronted with logs that he regards as not quite equal. It will be the judgement of a philosopher, who has recognized that the Form is distinct from its sensible instances, and who, on sensing the latter, reflects upon how different they are from the former. This interpretation avoids some difficulties in the traditional view. See H. F. Cherniss, S.P.M. 368-74, R. E. Allen, P.R. 1960, 147-64. It is not clear, however, that it will fit all contexts. In particular, it runs into difficulty in the later discussion of Largeness and Smallness. See on 102al0— d4 (p. 194).
74d9—75c6. It is now argued that on perceiving sensible particulars, we 'refer' them to the relevant Form (75b7, cf.76d9-e2), and judge that they 'fall short' of it (74d9-e2, 75al-3, 75al 1 -b3). Such judgements are held to require prior knowledge of the Form (74e2— 75a4), and consequently (75a5—b9) knowledge of it before we began to use the senses, which was at birth (75b 10— 11). For the expression 'what equal is' see notes 25, 26, and on 75c7—d6 (p.131).
Is it legitimate to infer, as Socrates does at 75cl—6, that we possessed knowledge of the Forms before birth? At 75b4—9 he argues that we must have gained knowledge of the Form before we began to use our senses. Yet it has so far been shown only that we gained knowledge of the Form before the first occasion on which we referred sensible equals to it (74e9—75a4). Might this occasion not have been some time after we began to use the senses? Cf. J. L. Ackrill (P.R. 1958, 108): 'One could admit that we saw and heard from birth, and that referring what one sees and hears to standards implies prior knowledge of the standards, and one could still deny that we had prenatal knowledge of standards. For we may have done a good deal of infantile seeing and hearing before we began to refer what we saw and heard to any standards (in fact we certainly did).'