Socrates would no doubt ask when and how prior knowledge of the standards was acquired. If referring sensible things to standards requires 'direct acquaintance' with those standards, then it would follow, given his assumptions, that the referring of sensible things to standards implies prenatal acquaintance with the latter. For we can have had no direct acquaintance with them since birth, given (a) that there is no direct acquaintance with them through sense experience (65d9-e5, cf.79al-5), and (b) that it is only through sense experience that we have thought or could think of them at all (75a5—7). But this line of thought is not made explicit. The argument is therefore defective as it stands.
The inference at 75cl—6, that we must have gained knowledge of the Equal before we were born, would suffice to prove the soul's prenatal existence directly. Yet it takes a further page of argument, proving the Recollection doctrine, before prenatal existence is inferred at 76cll—13. What is the role of this further argument? If, as seems to be the case, the Recollection doctrine is premissed upon the conclusion drawn in the present lines, and prenatal existence is then derived from it, the reasoning from 75c7 to 76cl3 will be circular. See on 76cl4—d6.
75c7-d6. Hackforth (71, n. 1) rightly notes that the clause 'if, having got it before birth, we were born in possession of it' (c7—8), like that at 75d7 below, expresses a hypothesis that Socrates does not accept: it will shortly be argued that we do not possess knowledge of the Forms at birth (cf.76d2-3). But although the protasis of the present sentence will prove false, the apodosis is clearly held to be true. It extends the conclusion that we knew the Form Equal before birth to the whole range of Forms posited in dialectical question and answer. The correctness of this extension cannot be meant to depend upon the truth of the 'if' clause.
Note that the claim that a Form's instances 'fall short' of it, as often interpreted in connection with Equality, would be untenable with respect to some of the Forms mentioned here. The interpretation considered at 74d4—8 was that sensible equals are judged only approximately, never exactly, equal. But it could make no sense to suggest that on seeing two logs, one larger than the other, we judge the former to be only approximately, never exactly, larger than the other. It may be answered that there is no question of postulating a Form of Larger, as distinct from that of Large. The language is, as Hackforth says (71, n.2), loose, and the Forms of Large and Small are meant. But even so, do we judge sensible objects to be only approximately large in the way that such objects may be judged only approximately equal? In what sense could anything be, or fail to be, 'exactly large'? The interpretation clearly breaks down in this case. Yet a satisfactory interpretation of'falling short' of the Form should preferably fit as many of the Forms mentioned here as possible.
The phrase at 75d2 translated 'what it is' is a standard Platonic expression for the Forms. It occurs, with variations, at 65dl3—el, 74b2, 74d6, 75b 1-2, 78d4-5, 92d9, and often in other dialogues. The phrase is here recognized as semi-technical—'we set this seal' on the Forms. Often the name of the relevant Form is included, but sometimes, as here and at 92d9, no name is specified. The phrase then consists simply of the neuter singular relative pronoun followed by 'is'. The word 'itself', though sometimes added, seems not (despite Burnet's note on 75d2) to have been an integral part of the phrase. For the departure from Burnet's text at 75d2, see note 28. Cf. also notes 25 and 31.
Where the name of a Form 'F' is included, the phrase may be taken in three different ways:-
that F which is;
that thing which F is;
that thing which is F.
In (a) 'is' will be the 'complete' or 'absolute' use of the verb 'to be'. In (b) and (c) it will be 'incomplete' (see on 65c2-4). In (b) it must function as an identity sign. In (c) it could be taken either (i) as an identity sign, or (ii) as attributing to the relevant Form the character F. If the 'is' is an identity sign, the choice between (b) and (c) (i) will be unimportant. On interpretation (c) (ii), however, the Form will be 'self-predicated' in the manner that gives rise to the difficulties discussed above (see on 74d4—8).
Interpretation (a) can be ruled out in some passages on grammatical grounds. See notes 7 and 25. Other passages are less clear, however, and it cannot, perhaps, be assumed that occurrences must be construed uniformly, even within a single dialogue, or with respect to a single Form. K. W. Mills (Phronesis 1957, 146) takes the phrase in sense (b), as correlative to the question 'What is FY, where this is understood to mean 'What is the thing of which "F" is the name?' Similarly, G. F. Else, H.S.C.P. 1936, 43-4. This fits the reference in the present passage, and at 78dl— 5, to dialectical questions and answers, which may indicate the provenance of the phrase. It could well have arisen from asking and answering the question 'What is FY—the Form being designated, in answer to that question, as 'the thing that F is'. Mills's view of the phrase has been adopted throughout the present translation. Occurrences of the phrase without 'F' have been rendered 'what it is'. Alternative renderings for these occurrences, corresponding to (a) and (c) above, would be 'that... which is' and 'that which is...' respectively.
See, further, H. Cherniss, S.P.M. 372, A. R. Lacey, C.Q. 1959, 51, G. Vlastos, R.M. 1972,452—8, and R. Loriaux, E.F.P., reviewed by K. W. Mills, Gnomon 1957, 325-9.
75d7—76b3. Simmias is now presented with two hypothetical statements, the first (ifP, Q) at 75d7—el, and the second (ifR, S) at 75e2—8. He is then offered a choice (76a4—7) between their respective consequents, Q and S. Q will be rejected, for reasons to be given in 76b4—c3. S will then be inferred at 76c4—5. The argument down to 76c5 is therefore of the following form:
IfP, Q (d7—el).
If R, S (e2—8).
So (3) Either Q or S (a4-7).
But (4) Not-Q (cl—3).
So (5) S (c4—5).
In this argument, step (3) follows if, but only if, it is assumed that:
(2*) Either P or R. In terms of the actual argument, this is the contention that at birth, either (P) we did not forget our prenatally gained knowledge of the Forms, or (R) we lost it. In view of the equivalence between 'losing it' and 'forgetting' (dlO-11), P = Not-R, so that (2*) is an application of the Law of Excluded Middle. Its presupposition, that we did gain knowledge of the Forms before birth, is built into (1) and (2) by the wording at 75d7 and 75e2. Both antecedents, P and R, begin with the words 'having got them'—i.e. having acquired the knowledge prenatally. If we gained knowledge before birth, it is supposed that we must either have retained it at birth or lost it. But Simmias' suggestion at 76cl4-15 will cast doubt upon whether we did get it before birth. His point does not seem to be satisfactorily answered. See below, and on 76c 14—d6.