At 75d7 'on each occasion' must refer to each occasion on which the soul becomes incarnate. At 75e3 the meaning of the phrase translated 'using the senses about the things in question' is far from clear. See on 65b 1—7 and 74c7—d3.
At 76al-4 Socrates recalls points agreed earlier (73c6—dl, 74cl3—d2): one may, on perceiving X, think of Y, which one had forgotten, whetherX and Y are similar or dissimilar. Note, especially, the condition that one should have 'forgotten' Y, repeated from 73el—3. The claim that we 'forgot' the Forms at birth is an important element in the argument summarized in the first paragraph of this note. However, since prenatal knowledge of the Forms is presupposed in this claim, such knowledge cannot be inferred from it without begging the question.
Hackforth translates at 76a3—4: 'something with which the first object was connected, whether by resemblance or contrast'. The suggestion that dissimilarity is itself the source of the association is no more implied in the Greek here than at 74cl 1. See on 74c7—d3. The nature of the association is not clearly specified in the verb translated 'was related', but the idea is, perhaps, that dissimilar items have frequently been found together.
76b4-cl0. The ability to 'give an account (logos)' is said at 76b5—7 to be a necessary condition for knowledge. 'Correct account' was also linked with knowledge at 73a9—10.
What is it to 'give an account'? The phrase can mean 'give a definition', and this would be a natural way of taking it here, where the things about which an 'account' has to be given are Forms. On this interpretation, no one has knowledge of the Form F unless he can give a definition of F, say what F is. See also 78dl—5, and cf. Republic 534b. However, 'give an account' can also mean 'give proof' (cf.95d7), and it may be the having of grounds for a proposition, or the ability to prove it, that Socrates has in mind as requisite for knowledge. Reasoning of this sort is said to distinguish knowledge from correct belief at Meno 98a. On this interpretation, 'giving an account' about the Forms will mean defending propositions about them by rational argument. 'Giving an account' in this sense, and giving one in the definitional sense, are, of course, related, the former being required for the latter.
Inability to give an account is agreed at 76b8—c3 to preclude most men from knowing the Forms. For the conflict with 74b2 see on 74b2—3. Hackforth (76) would reconcile the present lines with 74b by saying that it is moral Forms, as distinct from mathematical ones, that Socrates here has in mind. But there is no hint in the text of any such restriction. On the contrary, 'moral' and 'mathematical' Forms are expressly said to be on a par (75cl0—d2).
76cll-13. The inference is drawn here that our souls existed before entering human form 'apart from bodies'. The most natural interpretation of this last phrase is 'apart from bodies altogether'—i.e. in a discarnate state, cf.ll4c3. It might be objected that on this interpretation the inference does not, strictly, follow. For our present incarnation might have ensued immediately after a previous death, without any discarnate intermission. The most that could then be claimed would be that our souls existed apart from our present bodies, incarnate in some previous one. This seems a less likely interpretation of 'apart from bodies'. But even if it were correct, the required point could still be made. 'We' are not to be identified with our present bodies, since we already existed before they did. Nor can 'we' be identified with our previous bodies, since we still exist when they no longer do. Hence, 'we' who once knew the Forms, and are now reminded of them, must be identified with a persisting non-bodily subject. See on 72e7—73a3.
There can be no doubt, however, that the argument does envisage us as having known the Forms in a discarnate state. As W. D. Ross pointed out (P. T.I. 25), the Recollection doctrine would not explain how we can now come to know Forms on the suggestion of sensible things, merely by referring back to a previous knowing of them in the same way. For this previous knowledge would require explanation no less than does our knowing them on the suggestion of sensible things now. The Recollection doctrine therefore points to a direct and immediate knowledge of the Forms. But since we have no such knowledge of them while the soul is incarnate (66d7-67b2), the Recollection doctrine, if it is to explain what it is introduced to explain, requires that the soul must at some time have existed in a discarnate state.
76cl4—d6, Simmias tries to resist the conclusion that our souls existed before birth, by suggesting that we might acquire the relevant bits of knowledge at the time of birth. He is silenced by being asked at what other time we could lose them.
But he gives in too easily. For why should it be inferred from our lacking knowledge when we are born, that we must 'lose' it at that time? An analogy may be useful here. We should not think of a child born blind as losing his sight at birth, since he never had it. No one would argue from his lack of sight at birth that he must have lost it at that time, and therefore possessed it prenatally. Someone born without sight has never possessed it, and therefore could not be said to have 'lost' it at all. Nor, if he should later acquire sight, could he be said to 'regain' what he had never had.
If, then, we are born lacking knowledge, the inference that we 'lose' it at birth, and subsequently 'regain' it, is justified only if it is already assumed that we once possessed it. Why should this be assumed here? Only, it would seem, because, the idea that we acquired it before birth is contained in the disjunctive hypothetical at 75d7—11 and 75e2—7. Both disjuncts assume prenatally acquired knowledge. See on 75 d7—76b3. But this assumption is precisely what Simmias is here questioning.
It is true that Socrates has already, at 75c4—5, obtained the admission that we gained knowledge of the Form Equal before birth. But once this is granted, he already has all he needs to prove pre- existence, and the ensuing argument for the Recollection doctrine will be otiose. Alternatively, if the Recollection doctrine is meant to be a ground for holding the thesis of prenatal knowledge, the reasoning seems circular. For, as argued above, the thesis of prenatal knowledge is used at 75d7-76c5 in establishing the doctrine. Simmias is here challenging the thesis. But he is rebutted only by appealing to the very assumption his objection calls in question, that we did in fact gain knowledge before birth. It should therefore be asked whether prenatal knowledge and existence are logical consequences of the Recollection doctrine, or whether it is a consequence of them. It cannot function both as premiss and conclusion of the same argument.
76d7—77a5. Socrates refers to the Forms as 'what was formerly ours' (el—2), meaning that they were objects of our knowledge
before birth. Cf.92d8-9 and note 50.
At 76e2—7 the existence of the Forms and the pre-existence of the soul are said to be equally necessary. Socrates then adds: 'and if the former don't exist, then neither did the latter'. Simmias' reply shows that he too thinks of the Forms' and the soul's existence as logically interdependent. But the nature of the relation is not entirely clear. The passage might be taken to authorize a biconditionaclass="underline" 'If the Forms exist, our souls existed before birth; and if they don't exist, our souls didn't exist before birth.' But Socrates can hardly mean that the pre-existence of the soul and the existence of the Forms are materially equivalent, so that either can, without further premisses, be inferred from the other. He means, more likely, that the existence of Forms necessitates the pre-existence of the soul in virtue of the Recollection Argument; and that their existence is also necessary for the success of that argument. 'If they don't exist, this argument will have gone for nothing' (76e4—5). The words 'if the former don't exist, then neither did the latter' are perhaps only a somewhat inaccurate restatement of the latter point. The existence of the Forms is, indeed, essential to the Recollection Argument, and is the ruling hypothesis of the dialogue. Cf.92d, and see on 65d4-e5 (p.97).