At 77a3—5 Simmias says that the Forms are 'in the fullest possible way'. Degrees of 'being' may sound paradoxical to a modern reader; but the use of 'are' is 'complete' here, and seems undeniably existential, in view of the connection with the pre-existence of the soul. See on 65c2-4 and 83b2-3.
77a6—d5. Simmias and Cebes object (bl—c5) that only half what is needed has so far been shown—the soul's pre-existence. Socrates replies (c6—d5) that its post-existence has been proved as well, if the Recollection and Cyclical Arguments are 'combined'. But how exactly is this to be done?
Archer-Hind (45, n.3) takes the arguments as two halves of a single proof, one showing the pre-existence and the other the post- existence of the soul. But what Socrates here claims to have been proved by conjoining the two arguments is simply 'post-existence'. For 'that's been proved' (c6) must refer back to the claim that our soul 'will exist after we've died' (c3—4). It is not, therefore, the whole of Socrates' thesis for which the two arguments are to be combined, but only the post-mortem half of it. But if so, how? As E. J. Furlong has argued (Hermathena 1940, 62—72), the Cyclical Argument, whatever its defects, seems equally relevant to pre-existence and to post-existence. It would 'prove' either without combination with the Recollection Argument. On the other hand,
the Recollection Argument has no bearing upon post-existence at all.
It is usually supposed that whereas the Cyclical Argument is meant to prove the bare existence of the discarnate soul, the Recollection Argument meets Cebes' further demand to be shown that it possesses 'some power and wisdom' (70b3—4). This latter inference has indeed been drawn, with respect to pre-existence, at 76cl2—13. But its bearing upon the present problem is doubtful. It is not mentioned here, nor would it be to the point. The objection Socrates faces is not that our souls have not been proved to exist after death possessed of power and wisdom, but simply that they have not yet been proved to exist after death at all. He would merely evade this objection by replying that they possessed power and wisdom before birth.
At 77c9—d5 Socrates explains the combination of the arguments as follows: the soul 'must also exist after it has died, given that it has to be born again' (d3—4). This is inferred from a conjunction of (1) 'the soul does have previous existence' (c9—dl), and (2) 'when it enters upon living and being born, it must come from no other source than death and from being dead' (dl—3). (1) and (2) appear to invoke the Recollection and Cyclical Arguments respectively. Yet, as noted above, (1) is derivable from the Cyclical Argument alone. So if Socrates thinks that the Recollection Argument is needed at this point, he is in error.
Hackforth (80, cf. C.R. 1925, 12) interprets Socrates as wanting to show that 'the soul as conceived in the Recollection Argument, the soul which apprehends the Forms, exists after death as well as before birth'. Hackforth claims that the principle 'all that is living comes from that which is dead' (c9), derived from the Cyclical Argument, justifies us in regarding the conclusion of the Recollection Argument—'the soul does have previous existence' (c9—dl)—as involving the corollary that the soul must also exist after it has died. For, he suggests, 'the time before birth is the time after death'.
If this is the reasoning, it supports the required conclusion by a mere sophism. For to say that 'the time before birth is the time after death' would be true only in the sense that the time before the birth of one living thing is the time after the death of an earlier one. The argument would show that a soul animating any given living thing must have survived the death of some previous one. It would not show that it will survive the death of the living thing in which it is now incarnate. So the argument gives the speakers no assurance that their own souls will survive death. Essentially the same objection will be raised by Cebes later (88a—b, cf.95c4—el).
Note that at 77d4 Socrates speaks of the soul as 'dying'. This, although formally inconsistent with its 'immortality', must mean merely that it becomes separated from the body. See on 64c2—9 (p.86) and 84a2-b8.
3.3 The Affinity Argument ( 78b4-84b8)
Socrates next argues that the soul must be immortal in virtue of its affinity to the unchanging and eternal Forms. He then speculates upon the after-life of purified and unpurified souls, and renews his advocacy of the philosophic life.
78b4—10. 'What kind of thing is not liable to it?' (78b7): the translation follows Burnet in supplying 'not', which is omitted in the MSS. at this point. The passage sets out concisely the programme that will be followed in the coming argument. Socrates asks (1) which class of thing is liable to destruction and which is not, and (2) to which of these classes soul belongs. (1) will be considered at 78cl— 79all, and (2) at 79bl—80a9. The conclusions will be drawn at 80al0—81a3.
78cl—9. Socrates here links (1) incompositeness with indestructibility (cl—4), and (2) constancy with incompositeness (c6-8).
The supposition that incomposite things are indestructible has a strong intuitive appeal. For the destruction of a material thing seems to require the separation of its component parts. How an incomposite material thing could be destroyed it is not easy to conceive. So it seems that if the soul were material and incomposite, it could not be dispersed 'like smoke'. But according to the present argument, the soul is essentially immaterial. And it is doubtful whether the principle that incompositeness entails indestructibility applies to immaterial things. Simmias will later (85e—86a) give an example of something immaterial—the attunement of a lyre—that is clearly destructible, but (although composite) is not destroyed through the separation of its own components. Perhaps, then, immaterial things, even if incomposite, might nevertheless be destroyed. In that case, the soul's incompositeness would not show its indestructibility.
At 78c3—4 it is suggested that 'if there be anything incomposite, it alone is liable, if anything is, to escape this (sc. destruction)'. The first 'if clause need not be taken to imply doubt as to the existence of something incomposite. Nor need the second 'if clause be taken to cast doubt upon there being anything indestructible. Cf.l06d2—4.
There seems no difference in meaning between the phrases translated 'constant' and 'unvarying', or their respective opposites. At 78e5 Cebes uses one of these phrases to answer a question framed in terms of the other. Both mean 'being in the same state', 'admitting of no kind of alteration' (cf.78d6—7). For the kinds of alteration envisaged, see on 78dlO- e5.
At 78c6—7 it is not clear which of the phrases 'the things that are constant and unvarying' and 'the incomposite' is to be taken as subject and which as complement. Is it being said that unvarying things are likely to be incomposite, or that incomposite things are likely to be unvarying? Or are the classes of unvarying and incomposite things thought of as coextensive? On the translation adopted, Socrates is saying that unvarying things are likely to be incomposite. Logically, this makes better sense, since he is arguing that the Forms, being unvarying, are likely to be incomposite, and he therefore needs the premiss that unvarying things are likely to be incomposite rather than the converse. Hackforth's translation makes him say that incomposite things are likely to be unvarying. But this, since its converse would not hold, unless the classes were assumed to be coextensive, would not further the argument.