How can the soul be essentially rational in virtue of its kinship with the Forms, and yet be reborn in animal bodies? This is a further point of conflict (see previous note) between the view of the soul's nature espoused by the Affinity Argument and what is actually said about it. E. R. Dodds remarks: 'The notion of reincarnation in animals was in fact transferred from the occult self of Pythagoreanism to the rational psyche which it did not fit' (G.I. 229, n.43, cf.215).
At 82a7—8 the meaning may be 'And it is clear that the way every other class also would go depends upon the nature of their previous practices' (Bluck). With this translation, what is clear is the general principle that souls will be reborn into appropriate forms of life, rather than the form of life that each soul will actually enter.
At 82c 1—8 the philosopher is said to practise restraint not for ordinary prudential reasons (cf.83b8—c2), but to become purified, and thus escape from reincarnation. This should not be taken to mean, or to imply, that virtue should be practised only for the sake of reward in the after-life. See on 69a6-c3 and 107cl-d2.
83b2-3. 'And not to regard as real what it observes by other means and what varies in various things': what the soul observes 'by other means' is, of course, the sensible world, observed by means 'other' than the soul itself, i.e. the senses (cf.83a3—5). The soul's mediated observation of sensible things is contrasted with its unmediated observation of the Forms. Note the stress (83b 1—2) upon the soul's being 'alone by itself', which is correlative to the state of the Forms (cf.66e—67a).
The sensible world is characterized, literally, as 'what is other in other things'. Bluck (82, n.l) argues for the meaning 'appearing variously in various other things', on the ground that the emphasis is not so much upon the invariability of the soul's object as upon its purity, corresponding to that of the soul itself, when it is 'alone by itself'. However, the variability of sensible things is itself one among several features that render them 'impure', and the phrase 'other in other things' is too vague to be tied closely to any single feature.
The word translated 'real' can also mean 'true' (see on 66b 1— c5), but 'real' is clearly required here, as at 81b4, where the unpurified soul was said to regard nothing but sensible things as 'real'. Cf.83c7 below, where pleasure and pain are said to dispose the soul to regard their objects as 'most clear and most real' (see also 83d6). The superlatives there may be merely intensive ('transparently clear and utterly real', Hackforth). But Plato elsewhere speaks of Forms as 'more real' than sensible things, notably in the Republic 514a— 516a, 585b—e.
What sort of 'reality' is at issue when sensible things are said not to be real, or not to be the only, or the most, real things there are? G. Vlastos (N.E.P.A. 1-19,A.P.A. 1965-6, 5-19) has argued that in questioning the reality of sensible things, Plato does not mean to deny their 'existence'. Nor, in denying that they are 'most real', does he ascribe to them a lesser degree of 'existence' than to Forms. Rather, the Form F is 'more real' than sensible Fs in that 'it yields a better disclosure of what an F is' (N.E.P.A. 5). Would such an interpretation fit the present passage? Philosophy tells the soul not to regard what it observes through the senses as 'real'. Could this mean 'not to regard, e.g., sensible equals as really equal'? Or does it mean 'not to regard sensible things as real beings'? The latter surely suits the context better. The error to which sense-bound souls were said to be prone at 81b4 is not that of taking objects of sensual enjoyment to be the only real Fs, but that of taking them to be the only 'real beings'. In the wider context, the point required is that sensible bodies are not the only real beings, and the survival of the soul therefore need not depend upon the continued existence of the body. It would be irrelevant to this point to insist that sensible things are unreliable exemplars of attributes such as equality or beauty. The essential point would be to maintain that they are not the only 'realities' or 'things that are\ It is the Forms that 'are' in the fullest possible way. Cf.77a2—5, where their 'being' seems undeniably existential, and see on 76d7—77a5.
If this is correct, the point of denying that sensible things are (fully) real, or of asserting that Forms are more real than sensible things, is that the latter are more properly said to be 'real' or to 'be'. The so-called 'realities' and 'beings' of the sensible world are, strictly, miscalled. High standards for the proper use of 'being' are thus imposed, to which Plato does not always adhere himself. See, e.g., 79a6 and note 34.
83b5—e3. Bodily pleasure and pain are reproached here for compelling belief in the reality of their objects. There is no suggestion that they are themselves unreal or not fully real. But see on 60b 1— c7. For the alleged 'greatest and most extreme of all evils' (83c2—3) see on 89dl-4.
84a2—b8. The phrase 'not the object of opinion' applied to the Form world at 84a8 glances at the important Platonic contrast between 'opinion' and 'knowledge'. These are differentiated in the Republic (476d—480) according to their 'objects', Forms being the only objects of true knowledge, and sensible things being the objects of opinion. The distinction is not drawn in these terms in the Phaedo. But its essence is everywhere present in the contrast between philosophers and other men—e.g. 82al 1—b3.
At 84b2 the soul is said to 'die'. Strictly, this is inconsistent with the thesis that it is 'deathless'. The meaning, however, is clearly that it ends its :association with the body. Cf.77d4 and see on 64c2—9 (p.86).
Socrates ends (b5—8) by scouting all fears that the soul could be 'blown away by winds'. This reminds us that the Affinity Argument has been concerned to correct the popular misconception of the soul's nature. See on 80d8—81a3.
3.4 Simmias' and Cebes' Objections (84cl—88b8)
Counter-arguments are now advanced by Simmias and Cebes. Simmias likens the soul to the attunement of an instrument, and Cebes compares it with the weaver of a series of cloaks. These images suggest that it perishes at death.
84d4—85dl0. Socrates' comparison of himself with his fellow servants, the swans, illustrates the theme of mortal obedience to divine rule (80a). See on 58a6—c5. For 'eleven Athenian gentlemen' (85b9) see on 59e6-60al.
Simmias' remarks about philosophical inquiry (85cl—dlO) are notable on several counts. In recognizing that certainty is either difficult or impossible to attain in this life (85c3—4, cf.l07a8—b3), he echoes what was said at 66e—67a and 68a—b. The reference to a 'divine doctrine' (85d3-4) may be to Orphic teaching, but Simmias seems to entertain little hope of a revelation. He conveys a clear sense of the difference between philosophic inquiry and religious dogma. His characterization of fallible human reason as a 'raft', and his 'voyage' metaphor, are expressive of the open-minded tone of the discussion. Indeed, Simmias is committed to the very method that Socrates will later describe as his own (99c-100a). The parallel may escape notice in translation, because uniform rendering of logos, a key word in both passages, is impossible. Among its commoner meanings are'discussion', 'account', 'definition', 'reason', 'argument', and 'statement', none of which will suit the present contrast between the human and the divine (85c9, d3). 'Doctrine' has therefore been "used here. Later, where Socrates speaks of his own recourse to logoi (99e5, lOOal), it has been translated 'theories'. But the close similarity between the passages should be observed. Cf. especially, 85c7-d2 with 99c8-dl. See also on 90b4-91c5,92c 11- e3, and 100a3-9 (p. 181).