Simmias is not (cf.91e—92a). Unlike Simmias, therefore, he can preface his objection by harking back to the state of the argument at 77b5—c5.
At 87a5—7 he dissociates himself from Simmias' objection 'that soul isn't stronger and longer-lived than body'. Here he speaks as if Socrates had asserted and Simmias had denied that soul is 'stronger' and 'longer-lived' than body. Neither of them had used those words. But Socrates' argument at 80c—d was based on the supposition that soul is more durable than body, and Simmias had countered by comparing the soul with an attunement. Cebes here rejects the implications of that comparison. He goes on (87a7—b2, cl—5) to parody the argument of 80c—d in his own way.
87b4—8. It is essential to Cebes' analogy, as Hackforth rightly argues against Burnet, that the weaver should both weave and wear his own cloaks (b7—8). This introduces a new and striking picture of the relation between soul and body: the latter is causally dependent upon, 'made by', the former. In this respect Cebes' theory is antithetical to Simmias', exactly reversing the order of causal dependency between body and soul. If the soul, in some sense, 'makes' the body, it must exist before it. Makers exist before their products. But they need not survive them. Indeed, many kinds of product, such as statues and buildings, last longer than men. Cloaks are not among these, however, and the special implications of weaving are developed further below. See on 87d3—e5.
Since cloaks are relatively short-lived, it is of some importance that the weaver should die in old age (b5). An old weaver would quite likely die before his last cloak wore out, whereas a younger one might be expected to outlive the cloaks he was currently making. Accordingly, the soul would have less chance of surviving its last 'cloak', if the weaver were old. His age would not matter, of course, if it were stipulated that he goes on weaving and wearing cloaks till he dies. For he would then have to predecease his last cloak in any event.
87cl—3. 'Which class of thing is longer-lived, a man, or a cloak in constant use and wear': the terms of Cebes' parody suggest a distinction between classes and their members. From the premiss that Xs as a class are more durable than Ys as a class, it cannot be inferred that this X will last longer than this Y. Even if souls as a class are stronger than bodies as a class, the fact that the body is preserved for some time after death does not show that the soul survives also. Men as a class last longer than cloaks in constant use. But some cloaks last longer than some men, and even the longest-lived of men will perish before a cloak finished on his dying day. It should be noted that men and cloaks alike have a finite life-span, and that a member of the longer-lived class may thus predecease a member of the shorter-lived one. This is why Socrates must show not merely that soul is 'stronger' or 'longer-lived' than body, but that it is 'completely immortal and imperishable' (88b5—6).
87d3—e5. Cebes now deploys his analogy in a more damaging way. If it is correct, the soul's immortality is not only not proven, but is actually disproved. The soul does not survive the last of the 'many bodies' that it weaves and wears out (d7—8). These 'bodies' are, it should be observed, the series of tissues that are successively wasted and rebuilt in the course of a single life-time. At 87d9 and 87e5 'the body' reverts to its usual meaning. For Cebes, it is, of course, only a series of 'bodies' in the special sense of 87d8. On his theory, our ordinary concept of 'the body' as a single, persistent entity is, strictly, a fiction. Cf. Symposium 207d—e. The body is in constant flux, and must be continually 'rewoven' by the soul(87el, cf.91d7). Death occurs when, and because, the soul itself perishes (e3—5). The soul is conceived here as a source of vital energy, an agent of continuous organic renewal, finally exhausted at death. Thus, it is later suggested that death might be 'just this, the perishing of soul'. See on 91d2—9.
Note that Cebes does not, as yet, raise the possibility that the soul might occupy a succession of 'bodies' in the ordinary sense, i.e. become incarnate in one living body after another (95d5). The words 'especially in a life of many years ... while the man is still alive' (87d8—9) show that his 'weaving' image cannot be taken in that way. The idea of a series of incarnations is not broached until 88a (see next note).
Cebes' statement of his theory shouid be compared with Socrates' restatements of it at 9Id and 95b—d. Significantly, it is never refuted in the sequel. Unlike the attunement theory, it is not recanted or denounced as an impostor (92dl—4).'Socrates will, indeed, argue that the soul, unlike the weaver, is imperishable. But otherwise he never disputes the theory as a model for understanding the relation between body and soul. Perhaps, therefore, it expresses his own view of the soul's animating function (cf.l05c9—d5), though it is incompatible with the notion of soul as a 'prisoner' in the body.
88al—b8. For the text and grammar of this passage see note 43. It might be granted, Cebes suggests (a4—7), that some souls could have undergone many previous incarnations. But unless the soul can be proved 'completely immortal and imperishable', no one can feel assured that his own soul is not incarnate for the last time, and will not perish at his death (b3—8).
To admit that reincarnation is possible would, of course, preclude inferring from the mere fact of death that the soul had perished, as was suggested above (87e4—5). But even so the soul, conceived as a source of vital energy, might eventually wear out. Successive incarnations might have weakened it (a8—9), or incarnation might be the start of a 'terminal illness' for it (cf.95dl—4). Socrates will try to meet this objection by arguing that soul is not the kind of thing that can 'wear out' at all. The effect of Cebes' remarks here is to show that previous incarnations, even if admitted, would give no 'inductive' grounds for a belief in survival. For we can never tell how many previous incarnations a soul has undergone, or what its present condition is.
'No one can know this death or detachment from the body which brings perishing to the soul—since none of us can possibly perceive it' (alO—b3). Hackforth (100, n.2) translates and interprets these words as if they supported the viewpoint of someone who grants, improbably, that the soul 'does not suffer in its many births', i.e. one who holds that the soul could survive many deaths and rebirths without ill effect. But they are much more likely to support the sceptical position for which Cebes himself is arguing, the view that, for all we can tell, our soul's present incarnation may be its last. It is not, indeed, very clear exactly what it is that we cannot 'perceive', since the object of that verb is not expressed. But perhaps Cebes means that, since we cannot perceive the soul, we cannot tell how badly 'worn' it is, and therefore cannot gauge its chances of survival. Hence, no one can know whether his own death, or—more generally—whether any particular death, will bring perishing to the soul.
At 88b 1 the words translated 'detachment from the body' are taken by most translators to mean 'dissolution of the body'. The present version takes 'from the body' as genitive of separation, and makes the phrase explanatory of 'this death' which precedes it. It will then be parallel with 'its present disjunction from the body' at 88b7—8. It shows that 'death' is here used in the sense established at 64c2—9, and suggests that the soul's repeated 'deaths', like its 'births' (a6—9), may be traumata, one of which proves fatal to it. The usual interpretation would imply that the soul might be destroyed by 'dissolution of the body', i.e. decomposition. But this would be inapposite. For decomposition does not ensue immediately at death (80c4—5), and there is no reason, on Cebes' theory, to suppose that it affects the soul at all.