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93d 1—5. Socrates now reaffirms B2, and then says: 'and this is the admission that no one attunement is either more or to a greater extent, or less or to a smaller extent, an attunement than another'.

Thus:

B5. One attunement is not more or less an attunement than

another (d3-4).

Burnet takes B5 as reiterating 93all—b3, which he interprets as claiming that attunement admits of no degrees. Thus he translates: 'this is just our admission, (namely B5)'. But his interpretation seems untenable for the reasons given above. See on 93al 1—b3. The natural sense of the present lines is 'this (sc. B2) amounts to the admission that B5'. See note 53. On this view, B2 yields B5 by substitution of 'attunement' for 'soul', based on Simmias' hypothesis (H). This raises two questions: (1) Is B5 consistent with Bl? (2) Is it validly derived from B2?

B5 will be inconsistent with Bl, if, but only if, the latter is construed as asserting categorically that an attunement can be more or less an attunement. There need be no inconsistency, if Bl is taken as non-committal regarding this possibility, as urged above (see on 93all—b3). Some, however, find the present lines irreconcilable with 93all—b3, and would therefore emend the text at 93d4. For the effect of the emendation upon the argument, and some objections to it, see note 53.

Those who would retain the MS. reading (e.g. Archer-Hind, Hicken) sometimes construe B5 as restricted to the attunements specifically under discussion, namely soul-attunements. Nowhere in the text is any such restriction stated. But if B5 extends to attune­ments in general, or refers to 'attunement' as such, its derivation from B2 is fallacious. From the premiss that no soul is more or less a soul than any other, conjoined with the hypothesis that soul is an attune­ment, it would not follow that no attunement whatever is more or less an attunement than any other, but only that no soul-attunement is more, or less a soul-attunement than any other.

It should be noted that Greek lacks the indefinite article, and the sense of 'is' in 'soul is attunement' (H) is therefore unclear. In English we may distinguish more easily between (HI) 'soul is (identical with) attunement' and (H2) 'soul is an (or a kind of) attunement'. Socrates' refutation of H depends upon interpreting it as HI, and treating 'soul' and 'attunement' as interchangeable salva veritate. Substitutions of'soul' and 'attunement' are made, according­ly, at 93d 1—4, 93dl2-e2, and 94a2-6. The attunement theory is, indeed, often expressed simply as 'soul is attunement' (92c9—10, 92e3, 93c3, 94a2, 94bl-2, 94c4, 94e2-3). But Simmias clearly need not be committed to the view that 'soul' and 'attunement' are equivalent terms. It is clear from several passages (86c2—3, 88d4—5, 91dl—2, 92a8, 94e8-95al) that his meaning would be better expressed by H2. If so, Socrates' refutation of him is open to the

above criticism.

93d6—e6. The argument continues:

B6. That which is not more or less an attunement has not been more or less tuned (d6—8).

B7. That which has not been more or less tuned participates in

attunement to an equal degree (d9—11).

Hence,

B8. Soul has not been more or less tuned (dl2—e3). Hence,

B9. Soul does not participate more in non-attunement or in attunement (e4—6).

With Burnet's text at 93d4, the subject 'that which' (d6, d9) in B6 and B7 must be 'the attunement' rather than 'the soul', as would be required if the text were emended—see note 53. B6 then follows from B1 by contraposition. B7 introduces the new termin­ology 'participating in attunement', which seems to mean 'being in a state of attunement' as distinct from 'being an attunement'. If so, it is best taken as an independent premiss, rather than (with W. F. Hicken, C.Q. 1954, 21) as derived by conversion from B6: an equal degree of tuning entails an equal state of attunement. For the distinction between 'being in a state of attunement' and 'being an attunement' see next note.

B8 is prefaced by a repetition of B2, but is presumably derived by substituting 'soul' for 'attunement' in B6. B9 is derived from B8, together with a similar substitution in B7. The point of repeating B2 in obtaining B8 is not clear, but it may be meant to recall its role at B5, and consequently to suggest resubstitution of 'soul' for 'attune­ment' in B6 and B7. Strictly, however, what is needed to obtain B8 and B9 is the reintroduction of H. For the validity of substitutions based upon H, see previous note.

93e7—94b3. The attunement theory is now reduced to absurdity as follows:

BIO. One soul does not participate more in goodness or badness than another (e7-10).

Bll. A soul could never participate in badness (94al—7). B12. All souls of all living things are equally good (a8—11). B13. B12 conflicts with B3 (supplied). Hence,

B14. H is not correct (al2-b3).

Here BIO is derived from B9 by substituting 'goodness' for 'attunement' and 'badness' for 'non-attunement', on the strength of B4. B11 is given as a still more paradoxical conclusion than BIO. B12 is based upon BIO and B11, with further reference to B2.

BIO and B12 are straightforward steps. The derivation of Bll, however, is much more problematical. It is obtained from H (94a2) together with:

B5*. An attunement is completely itself, namely an attunement (a2—3). This yields:

B5**. An attunement could never participate in non-attunement (a3—4).

Bll then follows by substitution of 'soul' for 'attunement' and 'badness' for 'non-attunement', based on H and B4 respectively, in B5**.

How is B5** supposed to follow from B5*? No doubt B5* should be taken as an abbreviated form of B5, 'One attunement is not more.,or less of an attunement than another'. The reasoning will then be from this assertion to B5**. But this transition is highly dubious. For it is arguable that, although every attunement is, indeed, as much an attunement as any other, nevertheless some attunements lack attunement, and some may, to use the terminology introduced at B7, 'participate' in attunement more or less than others. The shift to this terminology was represented in the previous note as a change from 'being an attunement' to 'being in a state of attune­ment'. This distinction must now be clarified.

'Attunement' may be taken to mean either a tuning (attunement1) or a correctly tuned state (attunement2). It might be agreed that every attunement1 is an attunement1 equally, no one attunement1 more or less so than any other. But it may also be held that some attunements1 participate in attunement2 more or less than others, and that there is no contradiction in holding that an attunement participates in non-attunement2, i.e. lacks attunement2. Thus it could be admitted that every attunement1 is equally an attunement1, yet denied that every attunement1 is equally in a state of attunement2.

For example, the normal tuning of a guitar is E-A-D-G-B-E. This might be held to be no more an attunement1 than the variant tuning D-A-D-G-B-E, which involves lowering a single string by one tone. It might also be held to be no more an attunement1 than, say, F-A- DfrG-A#C, a random combination of notes to which the strings could be, but are not in practice, tuned. Either of these latter tunings might be said to be no less an attunement1 than the usual one. But if the usual tuning is assumed to be the only 'correct' one, then the second and third tunings mentioned could be regarded as participating less in attunement2 than the usual one. There would be no contradiction in holding that they participated in non- attunement2, or lacked attunement2. The third tuning might intelligibly be said to participate in attunement2 less than the second, because it is, in an obvious way, further from the normal tuning than is the second. Note that these points are quite inde­pendent of a distinction that might be drawn between any of these tunings and particular instances of them. They could be expressed equally well in terms of the tunings themselves or in terms of their particular instances.