We find, however, no explicit discussion of these issues. Why are the major questions raised by Cebes' objection apparently disregarded? Perhaps because, as Socrates' very first example will suggest (96b2—3), he is concerned primarily with the genesis of living things. And in their case 'to be' is 'to be alive'. 'Coming-into- being' can thus be equated with 'coming to be alive'. Where the value of F is 'alive', 'coming to be F and 'coming to be simpliciter' will coincide. So too will 'ceasing to be F and 'ceasing to be simplicitef, i.e. 'perishing'. A living thing's birth (or conception) is its'coming-into-being', and its death is its 'perishing' or 'destruction'. If these equivalences are assumed, it follows that Cebes' objection demands an inquiry into 'coming to be (alive)', i.e. being born (or conceived), and into 'ceasing to be (alive)', i.e. dying. A conceptual examination is needed of being and coming-to-be, birth and life, death and destruction. This huge task is, as Socrates aptly remarks, 'no trivial matter' (95e8), and his own narrative and discussion are mere prolegomena for it. Apart from a few hints (see on 105el0— 107al, p.220), he does not pursue it himself. He merely offers his 'own experiences' (96a2—3) to Cebes (and the reader) for further reflection.
96bl-8. The question at 96b2—3 seems concerned with the origin and nourishment of the earliest animals, not with the development of individuals. The theory mentioned, perhaps that of Archelaus (see Burnet's note), conspicuously makes no reference to 'soul'. Similarly, in the next example (b4—5), 'what do we think with?', the answer 'soul' or 'intelligence' is avoided. The verb translated 'think' occurs at 66c5 with different overtones (see on 66b 1—c5). Here it seems to be used in a general way to cover various conscious states from sensation upwards (b5—8). It is perhaps implied that the stock scientific account of perception and thought is inadequate, as providing for no subject of consciousness (cf. Theaetetus 184b—186a and see on 64e4—65a3, p.89).
96cl-e5. G. Vlastos (P.R. 1969, 309, n.50) treats Socrates' 'unlearning' of his former beliefs about nutrition as quite distinct from the 'puzzles' introduced at 96d8—97b3. It marks, he thinks, a preference for 'windy theorising' over homespun explanation, born of Socrates' passion for natural science. But this interpretation destroys what looks like a continuous sequence of thought running from 96c2 to 96e7. At 96c3 Socrates begins to specify what he formerly 'supposed' he knew (c6, cf.d6). He then gives four more examples of what he 'supposed was an adequate view' (d8—e4). When Cebes asks (e5) what he thinks about these things now, he answers (96e6—7) that he is 'far from supposing' that he knows 'the reason' about them. All this suggests a simple contrast between a state of confidence preceding his 'scientific' phase and one of confusion following it, which still, in a manner, persists.
For reasons that will emerge shortly (see next note) Socrates is confused by standard explanations of growth in terms of aggregation. All such explanations, whether couched in simple or sophisticated terms, lead to problems. His claim to have been 'blinded' by science (c5) is ironical (see also on 99d4— 100a3). He pretends that his inability to accept even the simplest common-sense explanation, which rendered him 'unfit' for scientific study, was actually produced by it. In reality, his problems are conceptual. They arise from philosophical reflection, not from empirical study. His profession of 'puzzlement' may seem disingenuous, considering that he has the Theory of Forms up his sleeve (cf. Hackforth, 124, n.2). But the Theory offers only a provisional solution, which is itself in need of further exploration (107b4—10). And Socrates' puzzlement is no doubt meant to be infectious. A reader who first has to puzzle over the nature of his puzzles will come to feel them as his own. See also on 100e5-101b8.
The general nature of these puzzles may be brought out by the following expansion of the text at 96d8—e4, linking the difficulties posed in that passage with the questions of growth at 96c2—7: 'A thing grows, anyone would think, in virtue of its "coming to be large" (d4—5) (i.e. larger than it was. But what does "larger" mean?). Is one man or one horse "larger" than another in virtue of (the measure of the difference between them, namely) "a head"? (If "larger" means "containing a greater number of units of measurement", then what does "a greater number" mean?) What makes (a given number of units, such as) ten "greater" than (another number, such as) eight? Is it "greater" in virtue of the accruing to it of two? And is (a given length, such as) two cubits "larger" than (another, such as) one cubit in virtue of exceeding it by half (of itself)?'
Note that Socrates is not seeking a 'causal' explanation of one thing's being larger or more numerous than another, but an account of the concepts 'larger' and 'more numerous'. If this concern is not understood, some of his problems will appear unreal or meaningless. Thus, Hackforth (131) complains that 'there is no more a cause of 10 being greater than 8 than there is of Thursday coming after Wednesday'. Certainly, ten's being greater than eight neither needs nor admits of causal explanation. But this is to miss Socrates' point. In considering 'why' ten is greater than eight, he is interested in what constitutes it as 'greater', what its being 'greater' consists in.
'By a head' (el) is a use of the dative case to express the measure 'by' which one thing exceeds another. It need not be supposed that Plato confuses this dative with a 'causal' one. He is using a trivial example to make a serious point: the difference in size between x and y is not what constitutes x's being larger than y. For a further implication of this key example, see on 100e5—101b8.
96e6—97b7. Some words added to the MS. reading by Wyttenbach and Burnet have not been translated. If they are supplied, an extra 'or the one that's been added' must be inserted after 'that's come, to be two' at 96e9. The words are not essential, but they would enable all possible answers to the question 'what has come to be two?' to be taken into account.
What exactly are Socrates' puzzles? He says that he does not accept the view that when one is added to one, either the latter unit (or, on Burnet's reading, the former), or both units have 'come to be two because of the addition of one to the other*. For the meaning of 'I wonder if at 97a2 see on 62a2-7 (p.79), and cf. H. Reynen, Hermes 1968, 44, n.3. Socrates is asking himself in astonishment (i) whether it is the process of addition that makes them two, and thus (ii) whether any of the things mentioned can properly be said to 'come to be two', i.e. what the subject of the predicate 'come to be two' could be.
These two difficulties are connected. First, Socrates is evidently recognizing that the physical propinquity of two items is not what constitutes their being two. For they were two already, before they were juxtaposed. Cf. Frege: 'Must we literally hold a rally of all the blind in Germany before we can attach any sense to the expression "the number of blind in Germany"?' (The Foundations of Arithmetic, §23). This gives rise to the second problem. 'Two' can be predicated of a pair of items taken together, but of neither taken singly. 'One' can be predicated of either taken singly, but not of both taken together. Cf. Hippias I, 300—303, where number predicates are contrasted with others in this very respect. In the light of this, the predicate 'come to be two' is, indeed, puzzling. For two items taken singly can never be two, and taken together they must always be two. A set cannot, it seems, change its cardinal number, whereas the verb 'come to be...' suggests that it can. More generally, how can things 'come to be F', where F is a character that they either always or never possess? Number predicates appear to be such that things cannot 'come to' acquire them. Comparable difficulties can be seen to arise over the predicates 'come into being' and 'cease to be', if negative existential statements are disallowed. This problem too, inherited by Plato from the Eleatics, lies close to the surface of Socrates' inquiry into 'coming- to-be and destruction'.