A further source of puzzlement is the idea that two opposite processes, addition and division, should be 'reasons' for the same thing, i.e. for one's 'coming to be two' (97a5—b3). The clear implication of this is that two opposites cannot function as 'reasons' for a thing's coming to have one and the same property, i.e. cannot be constitutive of that property. Vlastos (P.R. 1969, 312, n.57) questions both the assumption that opposite processes cannot be 'reasons' for the same state of affairs, and its application to the present case. For, he says, the items that have 'come to be two', by addition and division respectively, are different in either case. But Socrates might reasonably wonder how two different items could acquire a common character in virtue of two opposite processes being performed upon them. If what is sought is a 'reason' that is constitutive of the character in question, then two quite different and opposite answers would be unsatisfactory. The 'safe' answer that Socrates will give (101a—c) will be immune from this criticism. See on 101b9-c9.
97b8—98b6. The translation 'Intelligence' has been used here as best suited to the idea that things are arranged for the best, which Socrates thought implicit in Anaxagoras' theory (97c4—dl, 98a6— b 1), but which 'mind' and 'intellect' fail, in different ways, to convey. 'Intelligence' (nous) should be understood here as a substance term. It is the faculty of thought, or that which thinks, rather than a mental quality, such as 'sagacity' or 'good sense'. It is cognate with the verb translated 'think' (83b 1), used for thinking of Forms, and also with the adjective 'intelligible', used to describe their status as objects of thought (80bl, 81b7,83b4). For the original Anaxagorean theory, see DK 59 B 11, 12,13, 14.
Note that Socrates' first reaction to the theory (97c3) was that it seemed to him 'to be a good thing' that it should be so. What 'seemed a good thing', i.e. what appealed to his own intelligence, was the hope of understanding all things as the work of another intelligence. Accordingly, at 97d7 he says that he was pleased to think that he had found in Anaxagoras an instructor 'to suit my own intelligence'. The translation tries to capture a pun, which is obscured by 'after my own heart' (Hackforth). Burnet says that such a joke would be 'very frigid'. Not only is it entirely in keeping with Socrates' ironical treatment of Anaxagoras, but a repetition of it may be suspected at 98b8—9: 'I beheld a man making no use of his Intelligence at all'. In explaining things, Anaxagoras failed not only to invoke his theory of a cosmic intelligence, but also to use his own.
The programme of explaining natural phenomena in terms of 'what is best' is carried out in detail in the Timaeus, both for the universe as a whole, and for its contents. Cf., e.g., Timaeus 29—34, 44d—46a, 68e-71a, and see G. R. Morrow,P.R. 1950, 147-63. The present passage marks the transition from a mechanistic to a tele- ological conception of the natural order that was to dominate European science for the next two thousand years.
At 97d4 (cf.98b6) the better and the worse are said to be objects of 'the same knowledge'. Socrates may mean that an understanding of one member of a pair of opposites (F) requires an understanding of the other (G). This is clearly the case, where, as with 'better' and 'worse', F and G are overtly relational, so that (x, y) (xFy =yGx). He may also be hinting that evil is a necessary complement to good, and that a complete explanation of the universe would encompass both.
98b7—99b6. In view of the connection between an aitia and the notion of responsibility (see on 95e7—96a5, p. 169), it is natural that Socrates should give, as a paradigm instance of a 'reason', his own judgement that it was better to abide the decision of the Athenian court. In his parody of Anaxagoras he charges him with confusing a reason of that sort with the physical conditions necessary for that reason to take effect. The distinction is related to, though not the same as, the modern distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions. The physical conditions specified are necessary not merely for Socrates' sitting in gaol, but for enabling the true reason to function as a reason (99b2—4). This does not mean that Socrates will regard the judgements of rational agents as the only reasons ever admissible, but only that they are indicated by any appeal to 'intelligence' in explaining something. Nor does Socrates mean that he will countenance only the purposive use of the word 'reason'. He himself will use it later (112b 1) in the sense disparaged here.
Note also: (i) Socrates' account of his reason for staying in gaol (98e2—99a4) contains a wry contrast between morality and expediency. By implication, the Athenian court's decision was based purely upon the latter.
Socrates' judgement is in turn attributed to the judgement of the court (e3). Thus, one human decision is explainable by reference to another.
Explanations of action such as Socrates gives may be loosely labelled 'teleological', and linked with Aristotle's 'final causes'. But the reason here mentioned cannot, strictly, be identified with Socrates' 'end'. It is not an object for the sake of which he acts, but consists simply in its seeming to him that the relevant action would be for the best. This judgement needs to be distinguished from the
moral or prudential grounds on which it was based.
(iv) The physical conditions in Socrates' example have their counterparts in the material elements and forces used by the divine craftsman who fashions the universe in the Timaeus. They are 'accessories' or 'co-reasons', necessary for realizing his designs. Cf. Timaeus 46c7-e6, and see G. R. Morrow, P.R. 1950, 151.
99b6-d3. Socrates scolds his predecessors for not acknowledging any supernatural power sustaining the universe, but for thinking to find'an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this', i.e. a permanent material support to hold up the physical world. Their disregard of 'the good or binding' as the real sustaining force points to the theistic account of the cosmos that Socrates himself envisages. Similarly Leibniz, citing the present passage: 'the general principles of physics and mechanics themselves depend upon the action of a sovereign intelligence and cannot be explained without taking it into consideration' (Letter on 'Explaining the Laws of Nature', P.P.L. i.542. Cf. Discourse on Metaphysics, §§ 19—20). The word translated 'binding' (c5) means 'obligatory', and is here connected with 'binding' in the physical sense (cf. Cratylus 418e).
The nature of Socrates' 'second voyage' (c9—dl) has been much debated. The phrase may mean 'taking to the oars when the wind has failed' or 'making a second, safer journey'. The former sense is well attested, and suggests a second-best method of reaching one's destination. Cf. Philebus 19c2—3. But if so, what is Socrates' destination? And in what sense is the approach that he will now describe 'second-best'? For both questions see W. J. Goodrich, C.R. 1903, 381-4, 1904, 5-11, N. R. Murphy, C.Q. 1936, 40-7, L. E. Rose,Monist 1966,464-73.