Socrates' destination is the discovery of 'the reason', i.e. the reason for coming-to-be and destruction. Note that he does not say that he is making a second attempt to find a reason of the kind that he had vainly expected from Anaxagoras. Hence there is no need to interpret the Form hypothesis introduced at 100b in teleological terms, as Bluck and others have supposed. It may simply be taken as an inferior pattern of explanation, containing no reference to the teleological ideal. Relative to that ideal it is, indeed, 'second-best', and the phrase may be read without irony. It would not, of course, be second-best in comparison with the cosmologists whom Socrates has just criticized, and the phrase 'second voyage' would be ironical if related to them. But it need not be so understood. The passage is, rather, in the vein of Simmias' remarks at 85c—d. See on 84d4— 85dl0.
Some commentators would insist that all reference to the teleological ideal must be excluded. See, e.g., G. Vlastos, P.R. 1969, 297, n.15, 302-3, and E. L. Burge, Phronesis 1971, 1, n.2. But this seems to be going too far. Whatever state of mind on this point may be imputed to Socrates, his words do not prove that no allusion is intended by Plato in what follows to teleological explanation. As Vlastos says (303, n.37), both here and in the Timaeus teleological explanations are exemplified solely in the purposeful agency of a mind. But it seems conceivable that the Form hypothesis, and the 'subtler' reason that succeeds or supplements it (105c—d), should point to the action of a divine mind as the 'reason' for coming-to-be. This idea is, in fact, discernible later. See on 105el0— 107al (p.221).
N. R. Murphy (I.P.R. 146-7) holds that Socrates' destination on his 'second voyage' is different from his original one, and thus that he avoids altogether the problems of efficient causation and temporal change. But this would disappoint the expectations aroused by 95e9—96al. Those expectations are, indeed, very imperfectly fulfilled (see on95e7—96a5,p.l71). But to deny any reference whatever to a source of coming-to-be and destruction would be to sever Socrates' story from the objection of Cebes which gave rise to it.
99d4—100a3. This passage has suffered from over-interpretation, especially in the light of the sun simile in Republic vi—vii. See W. J. Goodrich, C.R. 1903, 383—4 for a critique of several misunderstandings. When Socrates says that he had tired of studying 'the things that are' (d4—5), he cannot be referring to Forms, which have not yet entered his narrative, but simply means, non- committally, 'things', i.e. the scientific and mathematical matters raised at 96a—97b, and the conceptual questions arising therefrom. No subtle symbolism need be read into the reference to the sun (d6): its eclipse is mentioned merely as the occasion when people are most inclined to look at it. The 'objects' (e3) that Socrates thought he should not look at with his eyes (el—4) cannot be Forms, for Forms cannot be observed by the senses at all (65d—e, 79a). They must, presumably, be the scientific and mathematical matters mentioned above.
Why did Socrates fear that by using his senses to examine them he might altogether 'blind his soul'? Is he harking back to his earlier, ironical suggestion that scientific studies had 'blinded' him (96c5)? Or is he hinting that such studies, if continued, would have unfitted him for conceptual inquiry? The soul's 'vision', its capacity for 'seeing' Forms, might be thought of as damaged by sensory observation (cf.79c2—9). But there is no allusion to the Forms, at least until Socrates speaks of his resort to 'theories' and of his studying in them 'the truth of the things that are' (e6). For this phrase, which does seem to contain a presentiment of the Form hypothesis, cf.90d6—7. For 'theories' (logoi) at 99e5 and lOOal, see on 90b4—91c5, and next note.
The sentence in which Socrates qualifies his comparison of 'theories' with images (al—3) is confusing in translation. The point is not to deny that 'theories' or concrete things are images, but to question whether the former are more so than the latter. To look at things 'in concrete' is to study them in images at least as much as is looking at them 'in theories'. It is being suggested that 'theories' are images of a higher grade than objects in the sensible world, and thus closer to the Forms. This idea, in a more developed form, governs the structure of Republic ii—ix. See D. Gallop, A.G.P. 1965, 113-31.
'Perhaps my comparison is, in a certain way, inept' (99e6—lOOal): more literally, 'Perhaps that to which I liken things is not like.' The words for 'liken' and 'be like' are cognate with the word translated 'images' (99el, 100a2).
100a3— 9. These difficult lines, together with the further precepts about method at 10Id—e, have been much discussed. See Bluck, 13— 14, 111-12, 160-73, Hackforth, 138-42, R. Robinson, P.E.D., Ch.9, K. Sayre, P.A.M., Ch.l, N. R. Murphy, C.Q. 1936, 40-7, P. Plass, Phronesis 1960, 103—15. The main problems are: (1) What is meant at 100a4 by 'hypothesizing on each occasion the theory (logos) I judge strongest'? (2) How can the metaphor of 'accord' (a5) be interpreted in such a way that 'putting down as true whatever things seem to me to accord with it, and as not true whatever do not' will seem a logically defensible procedure? (3) How. is this procedure related to its context, especially to the illustrations at 100b-101c?
(1) logos has been translated 'theory', so as to leave it open whether it should be taken to mean 'definition' or, more broadly, 'proposition', 'statement'. 'Definition' might seem to fit well with Socrates' account (99el—100a3) of his resort to theories after giving up using his senses. The quest for definitions could be expected to figure in an account of his development. Adoption of what he judged to be the strongest definition in each case would form a natural part of this quest, and would enable him to set down particular things as/% or not F, according as they did, or did not, conform to the definition. This reading would link logos at 100a4 closely with its occurrences at 99e5 and lOOal, where it could well mean either 'definitions' or 'conceptual discussions' aimed at producing them. Bluck (13—14, 164—6) understands the lines in this way.
But this view is untenable. For the meaning of 'the theory I judge strongest' must be gathered, partly at least, from Socrates' illustrations at lOObl—101c9. Bluck would, indeed, avoid this, by taking the latter passage as marking a deliberate shift from Socratic to Platonic doctrine. Socratic definitions are, he thinks, there being supplanted as 'causes' by Platonic Forms. But this interpretation is itself bizarre. Definitions are nowhere said to be 'causes', and the words 'it's nothing new' (lOObl) expressly disclaim the notion that Plato is somehow improving upon what has already been said. Clearly, he is making Socrates elucidate the cryptic utterances of 100a, See R. C. Cross,P.R. 1956,405.
The elucidation consists in (i) 'hypothesizing' that beautiful, good, large, and other Forms exist (b5—7), and (ii) agreeing that particular things are beautiful, large, etc. because they participate in the corresponding Forms. Note that Socrates uses the verb 'hypothesize' at 100b5 as he did for 'the strongest logos' at 100a3. The latter therefore almost certainly exemplifies what he will later call a 'hypothesis' (101d2, d7, cf.l07b5). For the notions of'hypothesizing' and 'hypothesis', see R. Robinson, op.cit., Ch.7. 'Hypotheses' need not be hypotheses in the modern sense, i.e. explanatory theories as yet unconfirmed. Nor need they be 'hypothetical' in the sense of being conditional in form, though they may need to be supported by further argument (101d3—el, 107b5—8). Only (i), and not (ii), is here explicitly said to be 'hypothesized'. But (ii) is evidently inseparable from (i), being integral to the Theory of Forms itself. And if it is taken to form part of 'the strongest logos', it will explain why the logos is 'strongest'. It is so, in this context, for the same reason that it is 'safe' (100d8—e3): it is proof against certain kinds of counter-argument. It will be convenient to call (i) and (ii) together 'the Form-Reason hypothesis'.