Clearly, neither (i) nor (ii), nor the Form-Reason hypothesis as a whole, amounts to a definition. This precludes logos at 100a4 from meaning 'definition'. Whatever it may mean at 99e5 and lOOal, it must here mean 'proposition' or 'statement'. But the notion of definition is not, in fact, far off. For there is an obvious link between the definitional sense of logos and its use to characterize the Form-Reason hypothesis. In seeking a definition of F, one looks for a feature common to F things, in virtue of which they are F. The question 'What is FT naturally gives rise to the question 'What makes F things FT. The answers to the latter question in terms of Forms at 100b—101c are thus directly relevant to Socrates'interest in the former. If this is borne in mind, no sharp change in the meaning of logos between 99e5 and 100a4 need be supposed. The strongest logos is an appeal to Forms, when other answers to 'what makes F things FT, and thus to 'what is FT, have proved inadequate.
(2) The main difficulty in the notion of 'accord' has been succinctly stated by Robinson (op.cit. 126—9). If it means 'be consistent with', Socrates will be putting down as true whatever propositions are consistent with his theory. But it would seem a quite inadequate ground for putting down something as true that it should merely be consistent with a given theory. On the other hand, if 'accord' means 'is deducible from', Socrates will be putting down as not true whatever propositions are not deducible from his theory. And it would seem an equally inadequate ground for holding something to be untrue that it should not be deducible from a given theory. Hence Robinson concludes that Plato 'does not say quite all that he means'. Although 'accord' cannot, strictly, mean deducibility, what Plato here means is that one should take propositions deducible from one's theory to be true, and those whose contradictories follow from the theory to be untrue.
Hackforth initially (139) takes the notion of 'accord' similarly: 'Any proposition arrived at by what the inquirer deems a valid process of deduction is accepted, and the contradictory of any such proposition is rejected.' But his account of lOld-e, which he believes to give the detail of the process described in the present lines, seems inconsistent with this. He introduces a chain of propositions- G -F-E -D- C -B -A— successively deduced, in that order, from an initial hypothesis H. If these propositions survive the test described at 101d3-5, they will be 'in accord' with each other, and may all be put down as true. But if one of them-F, say-is successfully challenged, then it and G will be at variance: 'the one is not a valid inference from the other' (140). However, Fs not being a valid inference from G is clearly quite different from its being the contradictory of something that is a valid inference from H. And whereas the latter defect would give ground, to one who had adopted H, for putting F down as 'not true', the former surely would not.
As noted in (1) above, a quite different interpretation is favoured by Bluck. He takes 'accord' to mean 'conformity' of things to a definition: 'Having found an "account" or "definition", [Socrates] would accept as genuine instances of the thing concerned whatever seemed to conform to it, and reject what did not' (111, cf.l 14, n.l). But it seems hardly credible that the Greek at 100a5 should mean 'accept as genuine instances of the thing concerned'. The word that Bluck translates 'genuine' is much more likely to mean here 'true', as used of propositions. Moreover, Bluck's interpretation leaves the words both about a reason and about everything else' (a6) inexplicable. For they strongly suggest that the method was used in other spheres besides the inquiry into 'reasons'. Yet the idea of 'putting down as genuine things that conform to a definition' has no wider application. By contrast, a propositional interpretation allows us to see the hypothetical method in operation elsewhere. See on 84d4—85dl0,92cll-e3,93e7-94b3 (p. 166).
(3) The immediate context is, however, all-important. For it is to be expected that Socrates' account of his procedure should be adapted primarily to the matter in hand. If so, the method will be best understood by attending to its role in the quest for 'reasons'. The ensuing passage (100b—101c) may best be regarded as illustrating not only 'the theory judged strongest', but also the putting down as true whatever things seem to accord with it, and as not true whatever do not. Applications of the hypothesis that F things are F because they participate in the Form F are 'in accord' with that theory, whereas alternative 'reasons' yield statements that are not. Thus, 'x is beautiful because it participates in the Form Beautiful' and 'x is large because it participates in the Form Large' may be put down as true, since they are 'in accord' with the relevant Form-Reason hypothesis; whereas 'x is beautiful because of its colour or shape' and 'x is larger by a head' are not 'in accord' with the relevant hypothesis, and may therefore be put down as not true. 'Accord' is not, on this view, used in a sense equivalent to bare logical consistency. Socrates does not mean to accept just any proposition that may be logically consistent with the Form-Reason hypothesis. But 'accord' seems a natural enough term to use for the relation between the Form- Reason hypothesis and its applications. If, as suggested in (1) above, the hypothesis includes not only the assertion that the Forms exist, but also the thesis that F things are F 'for no other reason' than that they participate in the Form F (100c5—6, d4—5), then clearly the rejected alternatives will, in the sense just indicated, be 'not in accord' with it. The great mass of propositions, having no relevance to the issue about which any given hypothesis is put forward, will be neither 'in accord' nor 'not in accord' with it. They simply lie outside the scope of Socrates' remarks altogether.
This interpretation has the advantage of making Socrates' remarks directly relevant to their context. It also enables the plurals at 100a4—7 (the 'things' that do or do not accord), and the words 'on each occasion' (a4) to look forward to the plurality of examples that Socrates will give at 100c—101c. Thus, the present lines may be taken as simply enunciating a general schema into which those examples can be fitted.
For a somewhat similar interpretation see P. Plass, op.cit. 104—5. See also on 101c9-102a9.