101c9—102a9. Socrates here resumes his comments on hypothetical method, interrupted since 100a. They are now framed as precepts to Cebes, but are presumably to be taken closely with what
Socrates has said that he does himself. At 101 d 1-2 he says you 'would hang on to that safety of the hypothesis, and answer accordingly', i.e. in the way specified at 101c2—7, by appealing to the relevant Form. The phrase translated 'that safety of the hypothesis' is somewhat awkward. P. Plass {Phronesis 1960, 111—12) would translate 'that safe consequent of the hypothesis', supplying 'consequent' from 101d4 below. But this seems neither natural nor necessary, if the 'hypothesis' is not merely that Forms exist, but that things are F by participating in the Form F, i.e. the Form- Reason hypothesis of 100b5—c8. This answer you would give, Socrates tells Cebes, being 'scared of your own shadow' (c9-dl). Here he alludes to the risk incurred by any departure from the Form-Reason hypothesis. Any other answer to the question 'what makes F things F? would be prey to rebuttals of the sort illustrated at 101 a-b.
At 101d3-5 he continues: 'But if anyone hung on to the hypothesis itself, you would dismiss him, and you wouldn't answer till you should have examined its consequences to see if, in your view, they are in accord or discord with each other'. It is far from obvious what is supposed to give rise to this examination, or what it consists in. In particular, its intended scope is unclear. Is Socrates giving general guidance on hypothetical method? Or is he concerned merely with its use in the quest for 'reasons'? Note that his directions arise out of the example at 101c. 'The hypothesis itself (d3) must refer back to the hypothesis whose safety is clung to at 101 d 1—2, viz. that things come to be (are) two (one) for no other reason than that they participate in the relevant Form. This link with the preceding passage suggests that the present lines should not be isolated from their context. Here as at 100a the hypothetical method needs to be understood, initially at least, in application to the Form-Reason hypothesis itself. For the meaning of 'hang on to' at lOldl and 101d3 see note 67.
What are the 'consequences' of the hypothesis? The words translated 'consequences' (d4, e3) are not the usual technical term for logical conclusions, but are passive forms of the verb Socrates had used at 100a3 to mean 'proceed'. It seems, however, difficult to understand it here in anything but a logical sense. For unless some sort of test for propositional accord or discord is envisaged, no sense can be made of the examination to see if the things in question are 'in accord or discord with each other'. The word has therefore been translated 'consequences'. Cf. R. Robinson, P.E.D. 129—31, R. C. Cross, P.R. 1956, 406. For a different view, see Bluck, 14, 169.
What could be meant by asking whether the consequences that spring from the Form-Reason hypothesis are 'in accord or discord with each other'? It has seemed puzzling that Socrates should envisage testing the consequences of a hypothesis that he has already adopted as the 'strongest' (100a4), and with which, therefore, he should have been satisfied already. Moreover, if 'accord' and 'discord' here mean 'consistency' and 'inconsistency', how could consequences springing from a single hypothesis fail to be 'in accord' with each other? For no single proposition can logically entail consequences that do, in fact, contradict each other. For these difficulties, see Robinson, op.cit. 131—3. A hypothesis may, as he suggests, be viewed as having conflicting consequences if it leads to contradiction when combined with other standing assumptions. It was in just this way that Simmias' hypothesis that the soul is an attunement was disproved, (see on 92cl l-e3,93e7-94b3, p.166).
Could the Form-Reason hypothesis, which Socrates has insisted is 'safe' (lOOel), be thought to give rise to contradictions of that sort? Its 'consequences', e.g. that x is large because it participates in the Form Large, and that y is large for the same reason, and likewise z, would necessarily all 'accord' with each other, and could present no contradiction. How, then, could the question whether the consequences of that hypothesis were in accord or discord with each other possibly arise?
A possible answer is that Socrates here has in mind sophistical opponents of the Theory of Forms. The Forms, they might object, are no less vulnerable than particulars to the 'contradictions' developed at 101a—b. An assault of that sort is mounted against the Theory in the Parmenides, where 'monstrosities' are proved with respect to the Forms Large and Small (13 la—e), that are recognizably similar to the 'monstrosities' (101b 1) that the Theory is here designed to avoid. The present passage need not, of course, be held to refer to the particular arguments given in the Parmenides. But it seems natural that Socrates should tell Cebes that he should be ready to face arguments of this general type. For it would be of special importance, for anyone whose faith in rational argument rested upon the Theory (cf.90c9—dl), that it should be immune from the difficulties that gave rise to it. The fact that Socrates ends his present remarks with a slighting allusion to 'contradiction-mongers' (e2) suggests that a supporter of the Form-Reason hypothesis would, indeed, have to defend it against them.
In this way, perhaps, 101c9—d5 can be related to the hypothesis at 101c that was its point of departure. But now (d5— el) Socrates moves to a new and still more difficult stage: 'and when you had to give an account of the hypothesis itself, you would give it in the same way, once again hypothesizing another hypothesis, whichever should seem best of those above, till you came to something adequate'.
What is meant here by 'giving an account' of the hypothesis itself? For different meanings of 'give an account', see on 76b4—clO. The most natural sense for it to bear here is 'give a proof', i.e. support or justify the initial hypothesis. Socrates seems to be thinking, as Robinson says (op.cit. 136), of the objector who says 'Yes, your conclusion follows from your hypothesis; but how do you know the hypothesis is true?' This new challenge is understandable. For it would not, presumably, be sufficient to adopt a hypothesis ad hoc, merely because it would yield one's desired conclusion. There must be some further ground that would recommend it independently. This ground is to be given 'in the same way', i.e. in the same way as the initial hypothesis was put forward. It, in its turn, will be related to a further hypothesis, in the same way as the original conclusion was related to it.