O'Brien (C.Q. 1967, 200, n.l) says that the relational feature of the example is incidentaclass="underline" 'the colour of an apple, which is an accidental but not a relative attribute, would have served equally well as a contrast to, and as a preparation for, the essential hotness of fire and the essential aliveness of soul'. But the case of an apple's colour would not be a foil to the principle to be maintained at 102d5—103c9, that opposites exclude opposites. For an apple cannot be red and green all over at the same time, as Simmias can be larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo at the same time. Yet it is the compresence of opposites in a particular that seems significant. For it will next be argued that Largeness, unlike Simmias, cannot be large and small 'at the same time' (102d7, cf.e8). See next note.
(2) What is gained by interpreting 'Simmias is larger than Socrates but smaller than Phaedo' in terms of Largeness and Smallness being in Simmias (102b5—6)? It may be intended to clarify the notion of largeness, the simple term 'large' being held to be covertly comparative. To say that an individual is large is to say that it is a large member of some class, and therefore larger than most, or than average, members of that class. If so, an account of 'large' will require an account of 'larger'. Yet this will seem unsatisfying, if one expects the simple term to be primary, and the comparative to be explicable in terms of it. The proposed analysis of the comparative statement as 'largeness and smallness are in Simmias' (b5—6) may, therefore, be an attempt to restore primacy to the simple adjective by treating Largeness and Smallness as 'relational properties'. Cf. I. M. Crombie, E.P.D. ii. 312.
But the analysis gives rise to a difficulty. (SI) 'Simmias is larger than Socrates' means, we are to understand, (S2) 'Simmias has Largeness in relation, to Socrates' Smallness.' And this, apparently, means (S3) 'Simmias' Largeness overtops Socrates' Smallness' (102dl— 2). But since 'overtops' is equivalent to 'is larger than', S3 will imply (S4) 'Simmias' Largeness is larger than Socrates' Smallness.' But if so, how is the ascription of 'larger than' to the Form Largeness in S4 to be understood? It looks as if it is 'self-predicative' in the way that was earlier seen to give rise to paradox. Thus, given that:
(x, ,y){(x is larger than y) = (x has Largeness in relation to y's
Smallness)},
then, where x and y are Simmias' Largeness and Socrates' Smallness respectively, S4 will yield (S5) 'Simmias' Largeness has Largeness in relation to Socrates' Smallness.' Here a regress threatens, akin to that of Parmenides 132a—b. If, on the other hand, S4 is not self- predicative, it is not clear what it should be taken to mean. It does not seem readily construed as an identity statement, in the manner sometimes proposed for 'the Form Equal is equal' (see on 74d4-8, p.128). How else could the predicate 'larger than' or 'overtops', as applied to the Form Largeness, be understood?
102d5— 103a3. It is now argued that opposite Forms cannot be characterized by their opposites. For the translation at 102e5—7, see note 69.
Several problems arise here:
The connection of thought expressed by 'I want you to think as I do' (d5) is not obvious. Why should the foregoing analysis of comparative statements have been given in order that Cebes may share Socrates' view on this new point? Perhaps the analysis was meant to dispose of cases in prima facie conflict with the principle being maintained here. The principle that opposites exclude each other might seem to be breached by particulars in which Largeness and Smallness can coexist. But, on the analysis just given, the principle is not really infringed. For the analysis at 102cl0—d2, even if it requires 'larger' to be predicated of Largeness, and 'smaller' of Smallness (see previous note), does not require Largeness and Smallness to be ascribed to each other. The question of the relation between Simmias' Largeness and that of Phaedo, or between Simmias' Smallness and that of Socrates, would, no doubt, create embarrassment, given that:
(x, y) {(x is larger than y) = (y is smaller than x)}. But the analysis adroitly avoids asserting any relation between the Largenesses or between the Smallnesses of two individuals. The principle that opposites exclude each other therefore remains intact.
Socrates expresses the relations between Forms and their opposites in a series of 'military metaphors'—'advancing', 'getting out of the way' (i,e. retreat), 'abiding' and 'admitting' hostile forces that 'occupy' a garrison, and 'perishing'. These metaphors will be kept up right through to 106e7. How are they to be applied to Largeness and Smallness? In particular, are 'getting out of the way' and 'perishing' genuine alternatives in this case, and if so, how do they differ?
Hackforth (148, n.3) believes that 'getting out of the way' is brought in here only to provide for the case of soul, the single case in which it is exemplified. This would suggest that the alternative is not meant as a real one in other cases. But in view of the repeated stress upon it, and its wide range of application (e7—a2), it seems better to find distinct interpretations for each option, if possible (see on 103cl0-e5, p. 198). It is plausible to suppose, with D. O'Brien (C.Q. 1967, 204, n.4), that Smallness 'advances' when Simmias is compared with Phaedo, and that his Largeness 'gets out of the way' precisely because, despite the comparison with Phaedo, he remains larger than Socrates. If this is correct, it will be preferable to think of 'perishing' as needing something stronger than mere cessation of the comparison with Socrates. For if Simmias' Largeness in relation to Socrates does not depend upon their actually being compared, it need not 'perish' when the comparison ceases. For 'perishing', then, an actual change of size in one of them will be required. Cf, Theaetetus 155b6—cl.
(3) The Forms Large and Small are pointedly distinguished from what Socrates calls 'the largeness in us' (d7) and 'the small that's in us' (e6). The contrast is repeated at 103b5, and must be significant. What is meant by 'the F in us', and what is its role in the argument?
Whether Plato distinguished a category of 'immanent Forms', with separate ontological status from the Forms proper, is disputed. The distinction is accepted by Hackforth passim, Bluck, 17—18, R. Demos, P.P.R. 1947-8, 456-60, R. G. Turnbull, P.Q. 1958, 131-43, and G. Vlastos, P.R. 1969, 298-301. It is denied by Verdenius (note on 103b5), and by D. O'Brien, C.Q. 1967,201-3.
The phrase 'immanent Form' suggests a more systematic doctrine than the evidence warrant?. Certainly, no consistent distinction between 'immanent' and 'transcendent' Forms can be founded upon Plato's terminology (see note 72). He may, more aptly, be said to distinguish here the property Largeness from individual instances of it. Such a distinction arises naturally out of the preceding talk of Simmias' and Phaedo's Largeness (102c4, 102cll). A somewhat similar notion, for the Form Likeness, appears at Parmenides 130b3— 4. But the scope of the distinction between Forms and their instances 'in us' remains unclear. Is it only for Forms of attributes, such as