Largeness and Smallness, that property-instances are distinguished? Or are there Forms 'in us' for all items for which Forms may be postulated, including such stuffs as fire or snow? Moreover, for those Forms that are explicitly distinguished from their property- instances, what counts as an 'instance' of the Form in question? Is it Simmias himself that instantiates the Form Largeness, or is it only 'the largeness in him' that does so? Or may both be thought of as instantiating the Form in different ways?
Doubt on these points leaves it uncertain what part, if any, 'the largeness in us' plays in the argument. Since the alternatives 'get out of the way' and 'perish' are applied to it, as they will later be to snow and fire, three, and soul, 'the largeness in us' has sometimes been regarded as their precursor in the argument, and they have been construed accordingly as 'immanent Forms' (see on 103cl0— e5). But it is not clear that 'the largeness in us' is meant as analogous to the disputed items in the later argument. Note that those items have no counterparts related to Large and Small in the way that they themselves are related to the Forms of Hot and Cold, Oddness, and Life. In terms of Socrates' 'safe' and 'subtle' reasons (105b—c), the only 'reasons' given for things being large or small are 'safe' ones. There is no entity which 'makes' things large or small, in the way that fire or snow, three or soul, (however interpreted), 'makes' them hot or cold, odd or alive. It is far from certain, therefore, that interpretation of the later argument should be controlled by the present distinction.
A possible way of relating the distinction to the argument will, however, be considered below. For this purpose it will be necessary to distinguish between the property-instances of a Form (e.g., Simmias' Largeness) and the individual things that may be thought of as participating in that Form (e.g. Simmias himself). Property- instances, since their designation must include the name of the Form in question, will be referred to in what follows as its N- instances. The individual things participating in the Form will be called its T-instances. Thus, 'the largeness in Simmias' will be said to be an iV-instance of the Form Large, whereas Simmias himself will be called a ^-instance of it. For the application of this distinction see Version B given in the notes on 104c7—d4 (p.204) and 104d5- e6 (p.207).
103a4—c9. An objection is now raised-against the principle that an opposite F will never come to be G: it appears to conflict with the law of opposites agreed earlier (70el—71all). Socrates shows that the objection rests on a misunderstanding, thereby revealing an ambiguity in such expressions as 'the large': they can mean either 'that which is large' or 'the property of largeness' (see on 70e4—71all, p.108). In the former sense 'the large' can come to be small, in the latter it cannot. Despite this clarification, however, expressions of the form 'the F' will continue to give trouble, notably at 106a-e. See on 105e 10-107a 1 (p.217).
To draw the distinction between largeness and large things, Socrates has to emphasize the word 'thing' (103b3), that he had used more casually earlier (71al0, b2). It is sometimes remarked, in this connection, that 'things' and their 'attributes' had not, before Plato, been differentiated. Cf., e.g., the use of 'hot', 'cold', 'dry', and 'wet', at 86b8—9. Only later will Plato himself coin a word for 'quality' (Theaetetus 182a8). It should be noted that Greek commonly uses unaccompanied plural adjectives, e.g. 'beauti- fuls', 'larges', 'smalls', to mean 'F things'. Of the adjectives prominent in the Phaedo only 'equal' is naturally so used in English.
At 103b5 Socrates distinguishes 'the opposite in us' from 'the Opposite in nature'. By 'the opposite in nature' is meant the Form F itself, as distinct from its property-instances 'in us'. For this use of 'nature' in the designation of Forms, cf. Republic 597b-598a, Parmenides 132d2, Cratylus 389a—d. The language at 103b7—cl again reflects the theory that particulars are 'named after' an eponymous Form. See on 65d4-e5 (p.96), 78dl0-e5, 102al0-d4.
At 103a7—8 the law of opposites is recalled in terms of the comparatives 'larger' and 'smaller'. Cf.70e6—71a2. For the shift from 'large' and 'small' at 102d5-103a2 to 'larger' and 'smaller' here, see on 70e4—71all, 100e5-101b8, 102al0-d4.
103cl0—e5. A new phase of the proof begins here. Note the semantic theory underlying the introduction of hot and cold into the argument (clO—11). Socrates asks, literally, 'do you call something hot, and again cold?', i.e. 'is there something designated by each of those names?' At 103e3—4 the Form is said to be 'entitled to its own name for all time'. Once again, the Form F is treated as the prime bearer of the name 'F'. Cf.l03b7—cl, and see previous note.
At 103cl3—d4 Socrates distinguishes the Hot and the Cold from fire and snow. Are Forms of Fire and Snow meant here, or physical stuffs? Interpretation of the argument hinges largely upon this much vexed point.
The. language is non-committal. Socrates uses no Form-referring expressions in connection with 'fire' or 'snow' at any point. It is true that Forms, regarded as bearers of common names, i.e. 'universals' (see on 65d4—e5, p.96), should include Fire and Snow no less than Hot and Cold. A Form of Fire is explicitly mentioned in the Timaeus (51b8). Cf. also Parmenides 130cl—4. But granted the need for such Forms in Plato's scheme of things, it is a further question whether they are being referred to here.
G. Vlastos (P.R. 1969, 318, n.70) and D. Keyt (Phronesis 1963, 168, n.2) have wished to understand snow and fire as 'immanent Forms', parallel to the Form of Three at 104d5—7, and have interpreted the whole argument accordingly in terms of entailment relations between Forms. Similarly, Hackforth (156, 162, n.3) thinks that the argument wavers between treating fire as a Form, and taking it as a concrete substance co-ordinate with snow. However, (i) one would expect fire and snow to be co-ordinate throughout, (ii) It seems hard to believe that at 106a3—10 either fire or snow could be anything but physical stuffs. For it could hardly be said of the Form of Snow, not even of an 'immanent' Form of it, that it would go away 'intact and unmelted' (106a5), or of the Form of Fire that it would not be 'put out' (106a9). Nor (iii) can fire be an immanent Form at 106b6, where Socrates speaks of 'the hotnessin the fire', unless it be supposed that there can be immanent Forms within immanent Forms. Above all, (iv) on the Vlastos-Keyt view, it seems impossible to interpret 'getting out of the way' and 'perishing' as genuine alternatives. Clearly, Socrates could not be suggesting that the Forms of Snow or Fire might 'perish', since all Forms are imperishable. But if it is 'immanent' Forms, parallel to the Large and Small 'in us' (102d7, e6), that are held to 'get out of the way or perish', how can these alternatives be distinguished in such cases as Snow and Fire? In those cases, it would not be possible, as it was with the Large and Small, to think of 'immanent Forms' as getting out of the way, when the relevant particulars were viewed in a different relation. For 'snow' and 'fire' are nonrelational terms. But the alternative is presented as if it were a real one. The contrast that Socrates will draw at 106a—c between snow, fire, and three, on the one hand, and soul on the other, suggests that only in the case of soul is 'getting out of the way' a forced option. In the other cases, both options are expressly left open. Cf. D. O'Brien, C.Q. 1967,204,208.