At 104c5 Socrates says: 'Moreover, twoness isn't opposite to threeness.' Hackforth (151, n.3) thinks that this remark has no relevance by itself, and 'restores logic' by supplying in his translation a counterpart statement about two to the one just made about three, i.e. that two will perish rather than become odd. But this is unnecessary. The point of insisting that three is not an opposite is to show that the refusal to admit opposites may be a feature of things that are not opposites themselves. For this is to be the position with regard to souclass="underline" it will be held to exclude an opposite, death, even though it is not an opposite itself. Cf. O'Brien, C.Q, 1967,213-15.
104c7—d4. There are major uncertainties of translation in this passage, which affect the interpretation of the whole argument.
The present version of 104c7—9 leaves it open whether the 'other things* mentioned in the second half of tire sentence are Forms. Hackforth, however, translates: 'Hence it is not only two opposite forms that won't endure an onset by one on the other; there are others also that won't endure the onset of opposites.' This makes Socrates claim that not only do Forms of opposites exclude each other, but that certain other Forms likewise exclude one member of such a pair. Accordingly, Hackforth renders the question at 104cll—12: 'Then would you like us, if we can, to specify what sort of forms these are?' However, Forms are not explicitly mentioned in the text, and the question whether the definienda are Forms is prejudged in such a translation. The present version, 'would you like us to define what kinds these are?', leaves the matter open.
At 104dl—3 the translation makes Socrates refer to things that are 'compelled by whatever occupies them' to have not only the occupier's Form, but also that of some opposite. For the grammar and text, see notes 70 and 71. The version adopted follows Tredennick, G. M. A. Grube, C.P. 1931, 197-9, and J. Schiller, Phronesis 1967, 54—5. This is consistent with the translation of 104c7—9 above. For the 'things' referred to here, like those at 104c8, will not necessarily be Forms, but may be other items, which, on being occupied by a Form, such as Threeness, are thereby compelled to have not only the character of that Form, but also that of some opposite Form, such as Oddness. However, the Greek may be equally well, or better, translated either (i) 'those that compel whatever they occupy to have not only their own (viz. the occupiers') character but the character of some opposite as well', or (ii) 'those which compel the object which they come to occupy to have not only its own (viz. the occupied object's) character, but also the character of a certain opposite'. For (i) see O'Brien, C.Q. 1967, 215—16. For (ii) see Hackforth (similarly Bluck). The important difference between both these versions and the translation adopted is that they make Socrates specify as the definienda a class of occupying Forms. For in these versions, the definienda will be identified with the occupiers, and these in turn will be illustrated at 104d5—7 by the Form of Three; whereas on the translation adopted, the definienda will be identified with the things occupied by such Forms, and are therefore unlikely to be Forms themselves.
The present version of 104dl—3 is better suited to the view of the argument preferred in these notes. It enables the disputed items to be taken not as Forms but as physical stuffs or numbers. It is, admittedly, subject to some linguistic difficulty, although in view of the uncertainty of the text at 104d2 this is not decisive (see note 70). In addition, however, one substantive objection to taking 104dl—3 as required by this translation must be acknowledged. It makes Socrates refer to a class of items such that whatever occupies them, they are compelled to have not only the Form of that thing, but also the Form of some opposite. And it may be doubted whether there exists a class of items, such that any Form occupying them imports the Form of an opposite along with it. It is true that in the case of numbers more than one Form may have this effect. It will be mentioned later (105a6—bl) that not'only 'ten' but also 'the double' excludes the Odd. The number ten may thus be thought of as occupied by at least two Forms, those of Ten and Double, that compel it to be even. But it is not clear that all Forms have such an effect upon it.
Possibly, therefore, the phrase 'whatever occupies them' refers not to a plurality of Forms occupying one and the same item, such as ten in the above example, but rather to a plurality of Forms severally occupying the different items that Socrates is seeking to define. These include the whole series of natural numbers (104a7— b4). So Plato, with numbers uppermost in mind, could perhaps have written 'whatever occupies them' with reference to the whole series of Forms for numbers, each Form being thought of as occupying a different number, and making it either even or odd.
It may be useful here to set out alternative versions of the whole argument warranted by the translations just considered. Version A is based on the translation adopted. Version B is supported by rendering the definienda at 104c7—13 as Forms, and translating 104dl—3 with Hackforth or O'Brien. Divergent interpretations of certain passages discussed in later notes will be labelled A or B with reference to these versions. For the term W-instance', used in B3 and B8, see on 102d5— 103a3 (p.196). For an assessment of the key stages of the argument, on each of these versions, see on 105b5—c8 (p.213) and 105c9-dl2 (p.214-15).
Version A
Al. There are items which, although not themselves opposites, will not admit one member of a pair of opposites (104c7—9).
A2. These items are such that, if they are occupied by a non-
Version B
Bl. There are certain non-opposite Forms, such that whatever possesses them will not admit one member of a pair of opposite Forms (104c7—9).
B2. These non-opposite Forms are such that whatever they
Version A
opposite Form A, they must possess an opposite Form F(104dl — 8).
A3. Such items will never admit the opposite of the Form F, i.e. the Form G, hence are un-G (104d9-e6).
A4. Such items may be defined as things that bring the Form F to whatever they enter (105a3- 4).
[A3 + A4]:
A5. Items occupied by Form A that bring the Form F to whatever they enter will never admit the Form G (105a4-5).
A6. If a thing (jc) is such that, whatever y it is in, y will be F, x may be said to 'bring' F to y (supplied).
A7. Soul is such that, whatever body it is in, that body will be living (105c9-d2).
[A6 + A7]:
A8. Soul brings Life to whatever body it occupies (105d3—5).
A9. The opposite of Life is Death (105d6—9).
[A5 +A8]:
A10. Soul will never admit the opposite of what it brings (105- dlO-12).
Version B
occupy must have not only them, but an opposite Form as well (104dl—8).
B3. When a non-opposite Form A brings an opposite Form F to whatever the Form A occupies, then an iV-instance of the Form A will never admit F's opposite, the Form G (104d9-105a5).