At 106b7—cl Bluck translates: 'what is there to prevent it (sc. the odd) from perishing and in that way ceasing to be odd, and becoming even?' (his italics). But this would involve the paradox of saying that the odd, having perished, acquires the fresh property 'even'. This recalls the earlier problem of finding a subject for 'comes to be G' where G is a numerical predicate. See on 96e6—97b7 and notes 58 and 65. It is easier to take 'even' at 106cl as the subject of 'coming to be', or, as in the translation, to render the phrase impersonally. Cf. O'Brien, op.cit. 95, n.3.
II. It is natural to take 106d2—9 as a proof that 'the immortal is imperishable'. For the meaning of 'the immortal', see 1(1) above.
One way of taking the proof is as follows:
If the immortal, being everlasting, admits perishing, then
there could hardly be anything that does not admit it (d2—4).
But
There are things that are imperishable, viz. God and the Form
of Life, and anything else immortal there may be (d5-7).
So
The immortal is imperishable.
On this view, the function of (2) is to deny the consequent in (1) by affirming the existence of some imperishable things. This would enable the antecedent in (1) to be denied by contraposition. And this denial would be equivalent to (3). But on this reading, the words 'anything else immortal there may be' in (2) would be question- begging. For it would be illegitimate to adduce 'anything else immortal there may be' as cases of immortal things that are imperishable, in order to prove that immortal things are, as such, imperishable.
But it is also possible that (1) and (2) should be taken separately, rather than as premisses in a single argument. On this view, the real argument resides in (1). Cebes is there implying that the immortal must be regarded as imperishable, inasmuch as it is everlasting. He is assuming, without argument, that there are, indeed, imperishable things. Socrates then endorses his point by mentioning items that are, in fact, both immortal and imperishable, viz. God and the Form of Life.
But if (1) is read in this way, the phrase 'being everlasting' seems to beg the question. For whether the immortal is, indeed, 'everlasting' is precisely what is at issue. Moreover, the words 'anything else immortal there may be* are still difficult. For what could they refer to? Individual souls could hardly be meant, for Socrates would then be anticipating the conclusion drawn at 107al. On the other hand, if Forms, other than the Form of Life, are meant, why is the Form of Life itself singled out for special mention? Are not all Forms equally imperishable?
For the argument to work at all, it must be supposed that there are at least some things that do not admit perishing. What basis is there for this supposition? It is sometimes suggested that Plato is here relying upon the unstated assumption that 'nothing can come from nothing or disappear into nothing'. See, e.g., Archer-Hind, 119, n.l. The possibility of everything's perishing and nothing's existing is, on this view, being implicitly ruled out. The postulate that there must always exist something is being taken as fundamental, like the earlier, undefended assumption that not everything could finish up dead (72c5— d3).
But such a postulate would seem inadequate for the purposes of the argument. For the supposition (SI) that there must always exist something should be distinguished from the supposition (S2) that there must be something that always exists. The postulate just mentioned asserts only SI. Yet it is S2 that is required. Even if SI were granted, would it afford any support for S2? And would S2 be effectively supported by invoking God and the Form of Life?
Some commentators have supposed that Plato here falls back upon an appeal to religious faith. Thus Hackforth writes (164): 'it is only if we allow that the appeal is to faith that we can avoid a feeling of deep disappointment in this matter, inasmuch as from the standpoint of logic the argument has petered out into futility.' But the bathos of an appeal to religious faith at the climax of a philosophically sophisticated argument would only deepen the disappointment. A lame appeal to 'divine doctrine' is the last thing we should expect in the light of 85d2—4. Moreover, when Cebes says (d8—9) that the imperishability of God and the Form of Life would be admitted 'by all men', he cannot be serious. God's imperishability would not be admitted 'by all men'. A sceptic would object that it is at least as much in need of proof as the immortality of the soul. The 'religious faith' interpretation simply undercuts the central enterprise of the dialogue.
It is, however, possible to understand the allusion to God and the Form of Life differently. For these two entities are precisely the ones required, in terms of the kinds of 'reason' that Socrates has displayed, as 'reasons' for the existence of the universe as a whole. In the case of living things, 'life' and 'existence' are plausibly identified (see on 95e7—96a5, p.171); and the universe as a whole is viewed by Plato as a living thing (see on 72all—d5, p.l 13). The 'safe' reason for a thing's being alive is that it participates in the Form of Life. And the corresponding 'subtle' reason is that something else has brought Life to it. At the level of individual organisms, this will be soul. And at the cosmic level, it will be God.
A possible role for God and the Form of Life, within the framework of the foregoing argument, thus suggests itself. They supply, respectively, the subtle and safe reasons needed to explain the existence of a living universe. In this role, God constitutes the cosmic 'reason' for which Socrates has searched (99c6—8). Such a 'reason'answers, in metaphysical terms, his initial question (96b2—3) about the source of life. It fits the allusions to God's designing intelligence in his criticism of Anaxagoras (see on 97b8—98b6), and anticipates the theistic account of the universe in the Timaeus.
If this is correct, the allusion to God is no mere deus ex machina, but an application to the universe as a whole of the pattern of explanation implicit in Socrates* earlier examples. It may even be said to point to a quasi-causal argument for the existence of an eternal being. The pivotal principle of such an argument would be, once again, that a true 'reason' cannot admit the opposite of that for which it is the reason (see on 100e5— 101b8, p.186, and 105b5—c8, p.212). If the living universe demands an explanation of that sort, then there must be something that cannot admit the opposites of life and existence, and can therefore neither die nor perish. Such a reason is God, the true 'reason', perhaps, that Socrates has said he will 'display' (100b8). In this way his 'second voyage' turns out, after all, to lead to the kind of 'reason' he had hoped to discover. And the scholastic arguments for a necessary and eternal being can be seen as 'footnotes' to Plato's text.
III. At 106e5—107al the argument is clinched: 'when death attacks a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies; whereas the immortal part gets out of the way of death, departs and goes away intact and undestroyed.' Here, as at 106bl—4, there is difficulty in interpreting 'death'. It cannot be equated either with (i) 'separation of soul from body' (64c2—9) or with (ii) 'perishing of soul' (91d6—7). Substitution of (ii) for 'death' leads to confusion. 'Perishing of soul' could not explain the word 'dies', which is applied at 106e6 to 'his mortal part', i.e. the body; nor could soul intelligibly be said to get out of the way of 'perishing of soul', i.e. its own perishing.
O'Brien (op.cit. 102) says that death is here thought of in sense (i): 'This death is obviously death in the old sense, the death that forces the separation of the soul from the body'. But the old sense of 'death' seems inapplicable here. For in that sense the soul could just as well be said to 'die' as could the body. There would be no case for suggesting that the body 'dies' in that sense, but the soul does not. Nor, in the old sense of 'death', could the soul readily be said to 'get out of its way' (e7).