The difficulty here stems partly from the fact that the original definition of death (64c) had left it unclear what the proper subject of 'die' and 'be dead' is supposed to be (see on 64c2—9, p.86). Is it the whole man, the composite of body and soul, that is to be called 'dead', when its elements are separated from each other? Or may these elements themselves be said to 'die'? Death is almost invariably attributed either to the man (e.g. 70a3—4, b3, 80c2), or to a personal subject (as at 59a7, 87a4, 115d9), or to animate things (72c5—d3). 'Die' is occasionally used of the soul alone (77d3—4, 84b2, 88a6, 88d8). Only here is it used of the body, and Socrates avoids saying that the body 'dies' by referring to it as 'the mortal part'.
At 106e9—107al Socrates moves from the claim that 'soul' is immortal and imperishable to the claim that 'our souls' are in Hades. Once again the conclusion is drawn in terms of individual souls (see on 70c8-d6). Whether the shift from 'soul' to 'our souls' is justified will depend upon how the former is interpreted (see on 105c9—dl2). At some point in the argument it must be supposed that Socrates is talking of soul as a particular, not merely a Form. But if 'soul' means merely 'soul-stuff, the transition to 'our souls' might be questioned (see on 64e4—65a3, p.90).
107a2-bl0. What are 'the initial hypotheses' (b5), that Socrates tells his listeners they must explore further? It can hardly be doubted that they consist in, or at least include, the Theory of Forms. 'Hypotheses' (plural) could refer to the Theory alone, the positing of each Form being thought of as a separate hypothesis. In referring to them here, Socrates is recognizing that the whole case for immortality has rested upon postulates that are in need of further support. See on 65d4-e5 (p.97) and 101c9-102a9 (p.191).
The words 'you will, I believe, follow the argument to the furthest point to which man can follow it up' (b7—8) mean that the listeners will follow 'as far as is humanly possible'. They do not imply any reservations on Socrates' part as to the soundness of the argument, but simply echo Simmias' sentiments about 'human weakness' (bl). These are in keeping with his remarks at 85c—d about the limits of human reason. Cf. also 66e—67a.
4. MYTH (107cl-115a8)
The myth that now follows gives a speculative picture of the afterlife and judgement of departed souls. It includes a scientific theory as to the nature of the earth. And, by contrasting our earth with 'the true earth' above, it symbolizes the distinction between the sensible world and the world of Forms.
107cl-d2. Socrates here stresses the special need for 'care of the soul' in view of its immortality. K. Dorter (.Dialogue 1970, 574) takes the passage to mean that Socrates, by giving his listeners faith in immortality, deters them from 'nihilistic immorality'. But
Socrates does not say at 107c6—8 that if there were no afterlife, everything in this life would be permitted. He says that if death were the end, it would be a godsend for the wicked, since it would rid them of their wickedness. Far from suggesting that reward, or avoidance of punishment, in the next life is the reason for being good in this one, he implies that wickedness is burdensome in itself, whatever may happen after death. This is consistent with Plato's defence of justice in Republic ii—ix, which is independent of eternal rewards and punishments. See on 69a6—c3 (p.103), 81d6— 82d8.
At 107c3 the phrase 'what we call "life"' implies that ordinary usage wrongly restricts 'life' to the period of incarnation, whereas the soul 'lives', properly speaking, for ever. Plato often suggests that words are systematically misapplied and ordinary ways of speaking can mislead us. See 115e4—6. For other examples, cf.60b4, 64d3, 68c5—9, 71b7—8, 73b5, 75e5, 76a6-7,82bl, 86d3,95d4,96a7-8, 99b2—6, 112c2. See also Symposium 205b-d, Republic 493a-c.
108c5—109a8. The geophysical theories that follow include an account of the shape, position, surface, and inner structure of the earth, and a description of its seas, rivers, and volcanoes. Some of these subjects had been touched on by Socrates earlier (97d—98a, 99b—c). Here he shows more knowledge of them than his professed ineptitude for natural science might have suggested.
The identity of 'Glaucus' (108d4) is uncertain. But 'the skill of Glaucus' seems to have been proverbial for 'a great scientist' (Hackforth).
At 108e5 the translation 'round', rather than 'spherical', avoids prejudging the question whether the earth is, in fact, thought of as spherical. For the traditional interpretation see Bluck, 135, 200—1. For the alternatives see J. S. Morrison, Phronesis 1959, 101—19 (hemi-spherical), and T. G. Rosenmeyer, C.Q. 1956, 193-7, Phronesis 1959, 71—2 (disk-shaped), opposed by W. M. Calder, Phronesis 1958, 121-5.
113dl—114c8. Punishments in the afterlife are represented as purgatorial (d7—8), not vindictive (cf. E. R. Dodds, ed. Gorgias 525b 1—526d2). Only incurable malefactors are consigned to Tartarus for ever (el—6). Their punishment is a deterrent to other souls (cf. Republic 615c—616a), a belief which, as Dodds points out, makes sense only if the doctrine of rebirth is presupposed.
At 114a8—b5 souls are depicted as begging forgiveness for earthly misdeeds, which they must, presumably, remember having committed. Personal survival is, indeed, often held to entail the persistence of at least some memories from the life before death. But there has been nothing in the foregoing arguments for immortality to suggest that the discarnate soul remembers anything from its former life, or that it is capable of such states as penitence (al). See on 64e4-65a3 (p.90).
The idea that fully purified souls will live 'bodiless' (c3-4) for the rest of time has appeared before (81 a9), and implies that these souls will be altogether immune from rebirth. Strictly, this is incompatible with the conception of the soul's endless alternation between incarnate and discarnate states, which was posited at 77d4. For 'bodiless' existence cf.76cl2 and see on 76cl 1—13.
114dl—115a3. The status of the myth is indicated at 114d 1-6: exact knowledge of the afterlife is disclaimed, but belief in 'either this or something like it' is said to be 'a noble risk'. Such myths are, as E. R. Dodds has said (ed. Gorgias 523a2), 'a prolongation into the unknown of the lines established by philosophical argument'. They go far beyond anything the argument has suggested regarding the experience of the discarnate soul, and do not lend themselves to logical analysis.
'One should repeat such things to oneself like a spell' (d6—7). This recalls Socrates' earlier injunction to 'sing spells' to charm away the fear of death (77e8—9). But the myth just concluded would be more likely, one would think, to have the opposite effect on anyone who repeated it to himself, unless his conscience was unusually clear. Cf. Republic 330d4-331al.
114d8—115al should not be taken to imply that reward after death is the sole reason for practising the virtues mentioned here. See on 69a6-c3 (p.103), 81d6-82d8, 107cl-d2.
5. SOCRATES'DEATH (115bl —118al7)
Socrates gives final directions to his friends, and drinks the poison. His death follows.
115bl—116al. This passage contains some striking expressions of the idea that the soul is the 'true self. See on 64e4—65a3 (p.88).
117e3-118a4. For the action of the poison see Burnet, 149-50, and C. Gill, C.Q. 1973, 25-8. Gill argues that Plato's description of the symptoms is highly selective, and that the whole account is designed to represent the conception of soul that has been advocated in the discussion.