В наше время, через 67 лет после первой публикации, речь Сталина от 19 августа 1939 г. в ее оригинальной версии следует рассматривать как ценный исторический текст, подлинность которого никогда не была серьезно оспорена.
Очевидно, что включение этого текста в исторический канон может потребовать решения давно назревшей задачи масштабного пересмотра истории Второй мировой войны и обстоятельств, ей предшествовавших, а также причин, приведших к холодной войне.
В предвоенные годы многие хорошо осведомленные дипломаты, «знатоки Москвы», такие как Джордж Ф. Кеннан (George F. Kennan) из США, Жан Пайар (Jean Payart) из Франции, Юлиус Лукашевич (Juliusz Lukasiewicz) и Вацлав Гржибовский (Waclaw Grzybowski) из Польши, Фридрих фон дер Шуленбург (Friedrich von der Schulenburg) и Эрнст Кестринг (Ernst Kostring) из Германии, утверждали, что Сталин хотел большой войны в Европе, чтобы ослабить ее и тем самым создать условия, при которых Красная Армия могла бы осуществить «большевизацию» стран к западу от границ Советского Союза. Их анализ того, как Советы намеревались использовать грядущую «Великую войну», оказались подтверждены текстами речи Сталина от 19 августа 1939 г. и «Директив». Явное стремление некоторых историков примкнуть к Сталину, годами опровергая подлинность его речи, само по себе должно стать предметом серьезного профессионального внимания.
Приложение 1
Перевод на английский язык оригинального немецкого текста речи Сталина на заседании Политбюро от 19 августа 1939 г., полученного от французского агентства «Havas» по телеграфу из Женевы 27 ноября 1939 г. В ходе этого перевода особое внимание было уделено передаче смысла в соответствии с существующими французскими версиями текста того времени. В немецком переводе оригинальной женевской телеграфной копии речи Сталина и поясняющего сопроводительного текста, полученных через французское официальное агентство новостей «Гавас», абзацы, выделенные ниже, отсутствовали. Они приводились в соответствие с абзацами французских версий речи всякий раз, когда, отличаясь по языку, были очень близки или идентичны по содержанию.
Вставки в квадратных скобках в нижеследующем тексте сделаны с пояснительной целью.
[Deutsches Nachrichtenbiiro (DNB)]
FOREIGN NEWS AGENCIES
NO. 724, Berlin, 28.11.39
Completed 11.00
E/Kg
Havas
28.11.
Geneva
Why did Soviet Russia sign a Pact with Germany? The world community has asked this question for some time — and it continues to ask. What moved the government of the Soviet Union to sign political and economic treaties with Germany on October 19 [1939]? Until now we have not known what the conditions were under which Stalin received the unanimous approval of the Politbiuro for this shift in his policy. Now, today, the veil has been lifted.
We have received from Moscow, from a source which we consider to be absolutely trustworthy, the following detailed information on the meeting held, at Stalin's initiative, on August 19 [1939] at 10 p.m., and the speech that he delivered there for the occasion. On August 19, in the evening, Politbiuro members were urgently called together for an urgent and secret meeting, which was also attended by prominent leaders of the Comintern, but only those from its Russian section. Not one of the foreign Communists, not even [Georgii] Dimitrov, Secretary General of the Comintern, were invited to this meeting, whose purpose, not indicated on the agenda, was to hear Stalin's report.
Stalin began to speak immediately, saying in essence the following: «Peace or war. The issue has come to a critical pass. Its resolution will depend wholly on the position that will be taken by the Soviet Union. We are absolutely convinced that, should we conclude a treaty of alliance with France and Great Britain, Germany will be forced to remove its pressure from Poland and seek a modus vivendi with the Western powers. In this way, war might be avoided, but subsequent developments with respect to us will take on a dangerous character.
«On the other hand, if we accept Germany's proposal, which you know, is to conclude a nonaggression pact with it, it will undoubtedly attack Poland. Then the entry of England and France [into this war] will become inevitable.
«In such circumstances, we will have good prospects of remaining outside the conflict and, taking advantage of our position, we will be able to await our turn. This is just what our interests demand.
«Our choice is therefore clear: We must accept the German proposal and send the English and French delegations [at that time on hand for negotiations in Moscow] back home with a courteous refusal.
«It is not difficult to foresee the advantage that we shall gain from this
course of action. It is obvious to us that Poland will be destroyed before England and France are at all in a situation to come to her assistance. In this case, Germany will turn over to us a part of Poland right up to the limits of Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia.
«Germany will give us full freedom of action in the three Baltic states. It will not oppose the return of Bessarabia to Russia [sic]. It will be prepared to yield to us Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary as a sphere of influence.
«Only the question of Yugoslavia remains open, its resolution depending on the position taken by Italy. If Italy remains on the side of Germany, then the latter will demand that Yugoslavia enter the zone of its influence. Through Yugoslavia it will obtain access to the Adriatic Sea. However, if Italy does not enter [the war] with Germany, then it will obtain access to the Adriatic Sea through Italy, and in this case Yugoslavia will pass into our sphere of influence.
«We must, however, keep in sight the possibility that Germany will emerge from the war as loser, and not as victor.
«Let us examine the case of its defeat. In this case, England and France will still be strong enough to occupy Berlin and to destroy a Soviet Germany, and we shall not be in the situation to come effectively to the help of a Soviet Germany.
«Our goal therefore requires that Germany should wage war as long as possible so that England and France grow sufficiently weary and exhausted and are unable to destroy a Soviet Germany.
«Our position will derive from this consideration: While remaining neutral, we will help Germany economically, providing it with raw materials and foodstuffs. But our assistance, it should go without saying, must not exceed a certain limit in order not to damage our economy or weaken the power of our army.