Aitken's voice was flat. Did he understand the significance of the news he was relating? Ramage, not realizing that Aitken was copying him, was far from sure, but he was thankful for those unknown Indians who, revolting for reasons he could only guess at, had as if by magic removed three hundred soldiers from the Jocasta. That was as good as doubling the number of men he had in the Calypso . . . Then he remembered the forts. They were the threat; compared with them the prospect of three hundred more or less on board the Jocasta was of little account. Smile, Ramage told himself; Eames was beaten long before he reached Santa Cruz, beaten by a look at the chart.
"A fortunate coincidence, " Ramage commented. "A pity we can't help our Indian allies."
Aitken nodded as he peered into his canvas pouch. "And then there's this, sir." He took out a large sheet of paper which had been folded twice. "The master copied it for me from the one he uses. He vouches for the soundings because he's taken them himself."
Ramage turned his back to the wind. The paper was a good chart of Santa Cruz and the entrance with the forts marked in, and on the windward side of the large rectangular lagoon at the inner end of the channel was drawn the Jocasta, showing that she was secured fore and aft to buoys.
He handed it back to Aitken. "You'd better give that to Southwick. It's a great deal better than anything we have."
Ramage resumed his pacing. Even a perfunctory look at the new chart did not alter the major characteristics of Santa Cruz: it was still a square lagoon half a mile inland at the end of a channel which began as a narrow slot through the cliffs, although the hills on either side quickly sloped down so that Santa Cruz itself and the land round the lagoon was flat.
The Jocasta was at the eastern end of the lagoon; the town at the western. And high above the middle of the southern side was the Castillo de Santa Fe, taking its name from the high mountain, Pico de Santa Fe, which stood inland like a giant beacon, a landmark visible for twenty miles, though one which Eames's chart neglected to mention.
An American master and a group of Indians: Captain Ramage of the Calypso was finding some improbable allies. He turned to find Aitken waiting to speak to him.
"I forgot to mention, sir, " he began apologetically, "that the American said there is a Spanish guarda costa patrolling the coast. He saw her steering westward as he left Santa Cruz. They caught a Dutch ship smuggling a few weeks ago, so they're on the watch."
Ramage nodded and resumed his pacing. By now the boat had been hoisted on board and was being stowed, men waiting with the canvas cover that kept off the sun in the eternal fight to stop the heat drying out the planking. The Calypso's guns were being unloaded and run in; a headpump was already gurgling as men swabbed down the decks to wash away the sand. The William and Henrietta was a couple of miles away and sailing fast. There was a lot to be said for a schooner rig, Ramage thought; you soaked up to windward like water through paper.
Wagstaffe, who was officer of the deck, came up to report that the boat was secured, the guns run in, and the ship ready to get under way again.
"Carry on, " Ramage said, and went down to his cabin, sending a seaman to tell Aitken and Southwick to report to him with the charts. He slumped down on the settee, pitching his hat on to the desk. He was a hundred miles from Santa Cruz, and had not a single positive idea in his head. He had hoped that after leaving English Harbour a plan would come to mind; that once he was clear of the trial and all the petty irritations inflicted on a ship in harbour, he would suddenly find he had an answer to the problem of cutting out the Jocasta. Instead he had become more certain that it was impossible. The only possible chance was to send in the boats at night; rely on boarding parties creeping along the channel past the forts and seizing the Jocasta and sailing her out. This meant assuming that the Spanish sentries would be asleep.
It also meant he had to wait for a southerly wind - the only wind that would let the Jocasta sail out. But with Santa Cruz surrounded by mountains and hills, one could never be sure from out to sea what the wind direction would be inside the channeclass="underline" eddies round a hill and gusts rolling down the side of a mountain could change the wind direction in a given spot by ninety degrees. An east wind at the entrance could mean a south wind inside the lagoon. A north wind at the entrance could mean an east wind in the channel. And the Jocasta would have only the survivors of the boarding parties to man her and sail her out under the fire of three forts which, with all the noise going on, would be wide awake and ready to sink the frigate before she was halfway down the channel. The boats could not tow her out, he thought bitterly, since none would survive for long enough . . .
Eames had come and looked at the problem and gone back to tell the Admiral it could not be done. It was not a question of courage; it was a problem of wind directions and the courses that a ship could steer; of the amount of punishment a ship could take from dozens of guns firing down at ranges of a few score yards. Now, thanks to the American chart, there was less risk of grounding on a shoal but that was his only advantage over Eames . . .
If he decided on towing out the Jocasta he had to allow for the fact that the boats (rowed by the survivors, and those not needed on board the frigate) could not possibly tow her at more than two knots, probably less. The channel was half a mile long so it would take a quarter of an hour to get to the entrance, and the forts there could keep up a fire for another fifteen minutes at least after she had reached the open sea, even if it was a dark night. The Calypso could not wait close in to take over the tow: she would be taking a big risk if she tried to help from half a mile out to sea.
It couldn't be done; no amount of talking could change that. Eames would be in the clear although he had not even tried; Captain Ramage would be the man who attempted but failed to carry out the Admiralty's orders. Admiral Davis might even explain away Eames's visit by saying it was a reconnaissance . . .
The sentry at the door called: "Mr Aitken, sir, and Mr Southwick."
The two men came into the cabin, Southwick carrying a roll of charts. Ramage stood up and went to the desk, throwing his hat across to the settee. "Let's have the American chart here."
"It's a good chart, " Southwick said gloomily and shaking his head, "and all it tells us is -" he broke off and shrugged his shoulders. "I can't see how we can do anything without losing both ships."
Aitken was watching Ramage and clearly expected his Captain to smile and contradict Southwick. Instead Ramage looked down at the chart and said: "I can't either. How about you?" he asked the Scot.
“I - er, well, sir, we'll probably lose one ship."
"Ah, there you are, all you Scots are the same, " Southwick said with a sniff. "Too damned mean to lose two! "
"We mustn't be too generous with the King's property, " Ramage chided, and once again Aitken remembered the meeting in Captain Ramage's cabin on board the Juno before the battle off Martinique, when the Captain was facing the prospect of fighting a French squadron with only two frigates. He still had not got used to Captain Ramage's manner, and Southwick's was just as bad. Here they were, faced with impossible orders, and both of them joking. He supposed there was some sense in it. If the Captain and his officers walked round the ship with long faces before a battle, the men would think it hopeless and would not display the kind of reckless bravado that Captain Ramage seemed to inspire with that truly diabolical grin he wore at the prospect of gunfire. Better die joking than grumbling! But with just the three of them in the cabin and a sentry on the door, was it necessary to keep up the play-acting?