Now all the gentlemen in the world know enough to condemn such acts and brand them as unrighteous. And yet when it comes to the even greater unrighteousness of offensive warfare against other states, they do not know enough to condemn it. On the contrary, they praise it and call it righteous. Is this what it means to know the difference between righteousness and unrighteousness?
If someone kills one man, he is condemned as unrighteous and must pay for his crime with his own life. According to this reasoning, if someone kills ten men, then he is ten times as unrighteous and should pay for his crime with ten lives, or if he kills a hundred men he is a hundred times as unrighteous and should pay for his crime with a hundred lives.
Now all the gentlemen in the world know enough to condemn such crimes and brand them as unrighteous. And yet when it comes to the even greater unrighteousness of offensive warfare against other states, they do not know enough to condemn it. On the contrary, they praise it and call it righteous. Truly they do not know what unrighteousness is. So they make a record of their wars to be handed down to posterity. If they knew that such wars were unrighteous, then what reason would they have for making a record of their unrighteous deeds to be handed down to posterity?
Now if there were a man who, on seeing a little bit of black, called it black but, 5 on seeing a lot of black, called it white, we would conclude that he could not tell the difference between black and white. Or if there were a man who, on tasting a little bit of bitterness, called it bitter but, on tasting a lot, called it sweet, we would conclude that he could not distinguish between bitter and sweet. Now when a great wrong is committed and a state is attacked, men do not know enough to condemn it, but on the contrary praise it and call it righteous. Is this what it means to be able to distinguish between righteousness and unrighteousness? So we know that the gentlemen of the world are confused about the distinction between righteousness and unrighteousness.
UNDERSTANDING THE TEXT
What comparisons does Mo Tzu use to illustrate the immorality of war? Are these comparisons valid? Are they effective in presenting his argument?
What is the moral imperative at the heart of all of the actions, including war, that Mo Tzu considers evil? Can his position be reduced to a "golden rule" of appropriate behavior?
What is the point of Mo Tzu's discussion of black and white? What is he saying about human perceptions of scale?
What does Mo Tzu mean by "offensive warfare"? What do you think he would say about defensive warfare? What conditions does he suggest have to be present to make war immoral?
MAKING CONNECTIONS
Compare Mo Tzu's argument in "Against Offensive Warfare" with the argument that he makes in "Against Music" (p. 236). What features do offensive warfare and music have in common?
Which of Thomas Aquinas's principles of a just war would Mo Tzu agree with? Which might he disagree with? Why? What might he say about an offensive war conducted to try to achieve a moral or utilitarian purpose?
Why is Mo Tzu's utilitarian position so different from Garrett Hardin's argument in "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor" (p. 582), which is also based on utilitarian principles?
WRITING ABOUT THE TEXT
Analyze the movement that Mo Tzu makes from small-scale to large-scale moral arguments. Evaluate the effectiveness of this movement in terms of inductive reasoning (pp. 655).
Write a rebuttal to Mo Tzu's argument by invoking Thomas Aquinas or George Orwell to argue that there are some situations that justify even offensive warfare.
sun tzu
from The Art of War
[400-320 BCE]
VERY LITTLE IS KNOWN about Sun Tzu, the Chinese general reputed to be the author of The Art of War, one of the most influential military treatises of all time. Scholars generally date the composition of the text to between 400 and 320 bce, in the turbulent epoch of Chinese history known as the Period of Warring States (475-221 bce), which occurred after the Chou Dynasty collapsed and before the Chinese mainland was unified under the Ch'in Dynasty. During this period of turmoil and constant warfare, the philosophies of Confucianism, Taoism, Moism, and Legalism emerged and competed for followers among the warring factions, and organized warfare became the subject of sustained and serious examination.
Though the existence of a historical figure named Sun Tzu cannot be conclusively demonstrated, the influence of The Art of War on Chinese military and political thought cannot be underestimated. Chinese texts from the classical period (about 500-200 bce) refer to it continuously, and it shaped the military strategies of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam for nearly 2,500 years. One of Sun Tzu's most recent devotees, the communist leader Mao Tse Tung (1893-1976), used many of the work's principles to seize power in China in 1949.
Like many philosophical texts of ancient China, The Art of War is a series of epigrams rather than a consistent or systematic explanation of the author's point of view. Each sentence of Sun Tzu's work is designed to be read and pondered as an individual unit of thought; however, these maxims all work together to produce a pragmatic and surprisingly modern view of the process of warfare. Sun Tzu persuades his readers not through argument, but through a powerfully constructed ethos and through the startling resonance that these maxims have with many people's experiences.
The maxims of The Art of War go well beyond giving prescriptions for armed warfare. They touch, often in very deep ways, on the essential structure of human conflict. Perhaps this is why The Art of War was reborn in the late twentieth century as a handbook for corporate managers looking for ways to defeat their competition and advance their own product lines. The following maxims from The Art of War constitute the whole of Chapter 3, "Attack by Stratagem."
Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.
To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them.
For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.
Thus, what is of extreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.
Next best is to disrupt his alliances.
The next best is to attack his army.
The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.
To prepare the shielded wagons and make ready the necessary arms and equipment requires at least three months; to pile up earthen ramps against the walls an additional three months will be needed.
If the general is unable to control his impatience and orders his troops to swarm up the wall like ants, one-third of them will be killed without taking the city. Such is the calamity of these attacks.