(436—338 bce) makes in his rhetorical tract Antidosis. Thus it was probably standard to argue that, as a tool, rhetoric was morally neutral and could be used for good or bad. Plato would not have been impressed by such a defense—he believed that something must be actively good to be morally justified.
and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter—let us make an end of it.
UNDERSTANDING THE TEXT
How does Gorgias initially define "rhetoric"? To what redefinition does Socrates lead him? Why does Socrates not simply state his redefinition—what does he gain by drawing it out of Gorgias?
What other subjects besides rhetoric does Socrates claim to be focused on persuasion? What is the difference between these subjects and rhetoric, according to the dialogue?
Explain the distinction that Socrates draws between "knowledge" and "belief." Which one is the province of rhetoric? Which, then, is the subject of philosophy? Do you agree with Socrates that all kinds of persuasion create either knowledge or belief? Why or why not?
What major defense of rhetoric does Gorgias offer? Do you agree with his reasoning? Why or why not?
Are the words that Plato puts into Gorgias's mouth strong enough to represent an actual argument? At which points is Gorgias's position at its strongest, and at which points is it at its weakest?
MAKING CONNECTIONS
1. Would Plato agree with Aristotle's assertion (p. 177) that good arguments naturally tend to prevail over bad ones? Would Plato agree with Aristotle's implicit assumption that rhetoric should be studied so that good arguments can compete on the same grounds as bad ones? Explain your answers.
In what ways does Plato see language as exercising a destructive power? Compare his perspective to the views of Augustine (p. 184) and Toni Morrison (p. 217) about the power of language.
Compare Plato's attack on rhetorical manipulation with Wayne Booth's concept of "the advertiser's stance" (p. 198). Are the two authors' points the same? Explain.
WRITING ABOUT THE TEXT
Use Socrates's arguments against rhetoric to analyze a television commercial or other advertisement. In what ways might the advertiser have focused on persuasion at the expense of truth? Does the advertisement seem aimed at producing knowledge or belief?
Defend the teaching of rhetoric on the grounds that knowing how to be persuasive increases one's ability to do good. Perhaps draw on the examples of historical figures (Mohandas Gandhi or Martin Luther King Jr., for instance) who accomplished great things because of their ability to persuade others.
Analyze Plato's rhetorical use of the dialogue form. How does the format of a fictional debate affect the persuasiveness of Plato's argument? How might Plato reconcile his use of rhetoric with the opposition to rhetoric that he expresses in Gorgias?
aristotle
from Rhetoric
[350 BCE]
THE PHILOSOPHER ARISTOTLE (384-322 bce) began his career as a brilliant student in Plato's Academy. However, his views often clashed with those of Plato and other students, and after Plato's death (in 348 or 347 bce), he left Athens and eventually became the private tutor of Prince Alexander of Macedon, later known as Alexander the Great. When he returned to Athens in 355 bce, Aristotle founded his own school, the Lyceum, where he taught philosophy, natural science, and rhetoric.
Contemporary references indicate that Aristotle composed as many as 150 treatises on a wide variety of subjects (though many of these were probably detailed lecture notes taken by students at the Lyceum). The thirty surviving treatises cover such topics as logic, ethics, physics, metaphysics, politics, literature, and rhetoric and lay the foundations of Western reasoning. Unlike Plato, whose writings focus on the mind and the world of ideal forms, Aristotle focuses on the tangible realities of the external world. Also, while Plato's arguments tend to be prescriptive, or to advocate positions and points of view, Aristotle's writings are mostly descriptive, describing, organizing, and classifying their subjects.
Plato's and Aristotle's distinct approaches to philosophy can be seen clearly in their different approaches to rhetoric. Plato's Gorgias is an argument about the value of rhetoric, which he condemns as an inferior and dangerous counterfeit of philosophy. Aristotle's Rhetoric, on the other hand, concerns the practice of rhetoric. In it, he classifies different kinds of arguments, appeals, and tools that can form the basis for persuasive arguments. Much like the Sophists, Aristotle acknowledges that rhetoric can be either helpful or harmful, depending on how it is used. Unlike the Sophists, however, he believes that rhetoric inherently favors moral and just arguments because "things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites."
The first two chapters of Aristotle's Rhetoric are presented here. In the first part of this selection, Aristotle explains the usefulness of rhetoric. Rhetoric forms the counterpart of what he calls "dialectic"—while rhetoric is public speaking designed to persuade, dialectic is a more private philosophical dialogue designed to uncover the truth. In the second part of the selection, Aristotle establishes three categories of persuasive appeaclass="underline" pathos (appeals to emotion), logos (appeals to logic and reasoning), and ethos (appeals based on the character of the speaker).
Aristotle's own rhetorical style highlights the deductive reasoning for which he was famous. Aristotle typically starts with a statement of general principle and then applies it to specific instances. He also spends a great deal of time dividing and classifying phenomena.
Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic.[74] Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.
Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric[75] have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes,[76] which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down in some states—especially in well-governed states—were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus,[77]give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity—one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him.