It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular
7. Topics: one of Aristotle's six known works on logic, which form a collective work called the Organon.
case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism. What makes a man a 'sophist' is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. In rhetoric, however, the term 'rhetorician' may describe either the speaker's knowledge of the art, or his moral purpose. In dialectic it is different: a man is a 'sophist' because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a 'dialectician' in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty.
Let us now try to give some account of the systematic principles of Rhetoric itself—of the right method and means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is.
2
Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available 10 means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.
Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there are the outset—witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented.
Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that
the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.
There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions—that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts—sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other.
UNDERSTANDING THE TEXT
What, according to Aristotle, is rhetoric's primary purpose?
What does Aristotle consider the hallmarks of "well-drawn laws"? Do you agree with this assertion? Why or why not?
How does Aristotle differentiate between a "Sophist" and a "rhetorician"? Can one employ rhetoric without being a Sophist?
What are Aristotle's three means of persuasion? What specific skills does each method require? Which method do you consider the most persuasive, and why?
MAKING CONNECTIONS
Compare Aristotle's defense of rhetoric with the one made by Gorgias in Plato's Gorgias (p. 166). Which of Gorgias's ideas does Aristotle echo? How does his position differ from Gorgias's?
How might Wayne Booth (p. 198) respond to Aristotle's assertion that the strongest arguments will always prevail? Cite passages from "The Rhetorical Stance" in your reply.
3. How do Aristotle's views of the natural superiority of true arguments compare with the warnings given by Toni Morrison (p. 217) about the destructive power of speech?
WRITING ABOUT THE TEXT
Select a text that was written specifically to persuade—such as Martin Luther King Jr.'s "Letter from Birmingham Jail" (p. 425) or Rachel Carson's "The Obligation to Endure" (p. 328)—and analyze its use of Aristotle's three means of persuasion. How effective are the text's appeals to logic, appeals to emotion, and appeals based on the character of the speaker?
Write an essay in which you agree or disagree with Aristotle's assertion that "things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites." In your experience, do morally sound, factually correct arguments generally prevail in public discourse?
Compare Aristotle's and Plato's (p. 166) views on rhetoric. What underlying assumptions might have contributed to their very different ideas about the art of persuasion?
augustine
from On Christian Doctrine
[426]
IN 397, AUGUSTINE (354-430), a newly appointed bishop in the Algerian city of Hippo, shocked his followers by writing a candid autobiography of his early life. Raised Christian, Augustine abandoned the faith for a series of sexual and philosophical adventures that he recounts in great detail in his Confessions. At the age of 31, Augustine reconverted to Christianity and, shortly thereafter, began a career in the church that would last until his death in 430 at the age of 76.
Augustine of Hippo was one of the most prolific writers in the early Christian church, and he was indisputably its greatest theologian. Well trained in Greek and Roman philosophy, he formulated his own, uniquely Christian answers to many of the enduring questions of his day. He wrote dozens of books and tracts that helped to establish Christian doctrine in the fifth century and refute the various Christian heresies that had split the early church into competing factions. Soon after his death, Augustine was proclaimed a saint by popular decree. In 1298, he was officially declared one of the first four "Doctors of the Church" by Pope Boniface VIII.