Perhaps unsurprisingly, the MoD dismissed these as ‘teething troubles’ which would be rectified, reminding everyone that the US M16 rifle had experienced similar problems when first issued, before going on to become a very well-regarded weapon. A total of 32 minor modifications were made over the next eight years to fix some of the reported problems. The most notable were a metal shroud that was glued (early) or welded (later) around the magazine catch to prevent it being released accidentally, replacements for parts that proved insufficiently robust and an improved bipod catch. After the Royal Marines in Norway encountered problems with snow balling behind the trigger, preventing it being pulled, the original flat-backed trigger was replaced by a new design with a V-shaped knife edge on the back, allowing it to cut through accumulated snow. Despite these issues, production of the second tranche of weapons was approved; given the amount of time and money already invested, backing out would have been extremely embarrassing for the MoD. The SA80 was about to undergo a much more severe test, however.
When the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded the small but oil-rich state of Kuwait in 1990, the British government committed 54,000 troops to the US-led coalition to push the Iraqis out again. This deployment – Operation Granby – formed about 10 per cent of the total coalition forces, and the largest national element after that of the United States.
Although sand ingress had previously been identified as a problem with the SA80, little had been done to rectify this, and the British troops encountered problems almost as soon as they arrived in Saudi Arabia to begin training in the desert. As Lieutenant Alistair Watkins of the Grenadier Guards remembers:
We soon discovered irredeemable jamming problems with our SA80 rifle. Taking cover in the sand, and any other movement, had to be done very carefully to avoid getting sand anywhere near it, which obviously wasn’t sensible… We worried all the time about them jamming. Much later, someone buried a captured Iraqi AK-47 in the sand, dug it up then fired and it worked perfectly. Equally, the American M16 rifle was rock solid. (Quoted in McManners 2010: 183)
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Rogers, commanding The Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales’s), agreed: ‘If the smallest amount of sand got into our rifle – the SA80 – it jammed. Oiling it, the sand got stuck in the oil, making it worse, and we were to discover further problems with SA80 as the hot weather increased’ (quoted in McManners 2010: 73). Troops used muzzle caps and adhesive tape to seal sand entry-points, kept an empty magazine on the weapon at all times to prevent dirt entering via the magazine well and adopted a routine of cleaning weapons in petrol to remove any oil that might attract sand, then lubricating them liberally immediately before going into action.
When the ground offensive began in January 1991, it was preceded by an intensive aerial bombing campaign which seriously damaged Iraqi ground forces, communication links and infrastructure. Despite some heavy fighting, the coalition forces quickly achieved their objectives, defeating the Iraqi forces encountered and pushing them out of Kuwait before a ceasefire was ordered after only 100 hours of ground combat. The SA80 saw relatively little use due to the short duration of the war itself, and because it largely involved armoured operations in open terrain rather than infantry combat. The troops mostly remained mounted in their vehicles, except for clearing Iraqi positions once they had been overrun. What combat did occur took place at very short ranges (75m or less), and in a number of cases LSW gunners swapped their weapons for IWs issued to the crews of their Warrior IFVs, as the shorter weapon was handier for trench-clearing and able to take a bayonet.
In the aftermath of the fighting, the Army’s Land Systems Evaluation Team (LANDSET) reviewed the SA80’s performance during the conflict. Their report pulled few punches:
SA80 did not perform reliably in the sandy conditions of combat and training. Stoppages were frequent despite the considerable and diligent efforts to prevent them… infantrymen did not have CONFIDENCE in their personal weapon. Most expected a stoppage in the first magazine fired. Some platoon commanders considered that casualties would have occurred due to weapon stoppages if the enemy had put up any resistance in the trench and bunker clearing operations. (Quoted in Raw 2003:174)
The MoD was caught wrong-footed when the classified LANDSET report was leaked to the press, and initially dismissed it as ‘a fake’ before reluctantly admitting that it was genuine. The MoD continued to downplay the report’s significance, however, both in the press and to a subsequent Defence Select Committee.
The SA80 weapons saw relatively little combat during the First Gulf War, since British infantry only deployed from their Warrior IFVs when Iraqi positions needed to be cleared. Fears over the possible use of chemical weapons meant that most British troops went into action wearing their NBC suits, many of which were in temperate rather than desert DPM material. Fears that wearing the protective suits would lead to heat exhaustion were quickly dispelled, as the invasion took place in some of the coldest weather the region had seen in decades, and many troops actually found themselves glad of the suits for warmth. The soldiers wear Combat Body Armour and Personal Load-Carrying Equipment (PLCE) webbing – note the extra magazine pouches worn by the LSW gunner, who would expect to use up his ammunition faster.
This four-man infantry ‘brick’ has the standard mix of three L85A1 IWs plus an L86A1 LSW, though LSW gunners in some bricks exchanged their weapons for their Warrior driver’s L85A1 since it was handier for trench-clearing and could take a bayonet. The second man hasn’t fixed his bayonet so that he can quickly slide an L60A1 Close Assault Weapon (CLAW) rifle grenade over the flash hider if necessary. The black tape holding the forestock of his rifle together was a commonly seen field repair. The last man is assigned to watch the brick’s rear – enemies can appear unexpectedly from behind during trench-clearing.
Although British troops deployed on peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo throughout the 1990s, these deployments never escalated into actual combat, so once again the SA80’s fitness for purpose was not tested. Troops also continued to provide ‘aid to the civil power’ in Northern Ireland as part of Operation Banner until this finally came to an end in 2007. Weapons were rarely fired in anger on Internal Security tours, but the SA80’s compact size was ideal for operations that involved a great deal of urban patrolling and deploying from vehicles. There was considerable criticism, however, that the rifle only being usable from the right shoulder sometimes prevented soldiers making the best use of cover from doorways and street corners.