The air war against Japan and mainland China was intensified.
Whilst improvements and technological advances again benefitted from the imperatives of active warfare, the decisions made ensured that priority was given to tried and trusted hardware, which was to be delivered in the numbers needed to throw back the Communist hordes.
Thinking started to change when numbers of newer model Soviet tanks made their presence known, and existing tank types were suddenly found wanting. Development projects shelved as the Allies basked in the glory of the German defeat were restarted and given increased impetus by the imperatives of the front.
The Allied infantryman in Europe, during the early months of 1946, was much the same as his Soviet counterpart. Whilst kit was reasonably functional, in general, the Allied soldiers were less hardy and found the freezing conditions less bearable, a higher number succumbing to temperature related conditions.
Supply was generally good, although there were occasional local shortages, caused mainly by the extreme conditions, and occasionally by pro-communist groups ambushing supply convoys.
That the Allies had command of the air was a boost to morale, but the Allied ground troops were battered and bruised by the hard defensive fighting of the later months of 1945, and morale had become a problem amongst some of the more junior formations, especially those that had seen hard fighting.
Those that were new and recently arrived steeled themselves for the horrors to come.
Having taken a very real beating in August 1945, the Allied Air Forces bounced back surprisingly quickly, re-establishing their numbers quickly and seeking domination of the skies in short order.
However, the effectiveness of the force had taken a severe knock, and it was not until October 1945 that domination went hand in hand with fully effective air operations across the spectrum of air combat.
The ground attack force, which had taken a deliberately higher hit from the initial Soviet attacks, recovered least quickly, part of the reason that the Red Army advances continued into November 1945.
As 1946 was ushered in, aircraft and pilots available began to approach January 1945 numbers, without taking into account the experienced pool of ex-Luftwaffe air crew that was steadily being retrained on available Allied aircraft types, or being returned to the fray in captured German machines.
Morale in the Allied Air Forces was extremely high. They knew that they had achieved mastery of the air, and had inflicted grievous losses on the opposition.
Morale was further boosted by the arrival of decent quantities of superior new aircraft, such as the F80 Shooting Star, Gloster Metoer and de Havilland Vampire, enabling the Allies to stay ahead of their enemy across the spectrum of disciplines.
Whilst the report of the attack on Maaldrift highlighted some unfortunate circumstances, poor judgement, and incredible luck on the part of the small attacking force, no chances were taken. Security at all air force establishments was greatly increased and the few further attempts made were nipped in the bud, without the loss of a single Allied aircraft.
A weapon used in limited quantities in the German War, namely napalm, found itself further developed and refined. It began to be used in increasing quantities, as its effectiveness against the mass formations favoured by the Red Army was realized, as well as its capacity against fixed positions or, indeed, to demoralize anything in the vicinity of an attack.
It was estimated that, by 26th March 1946, 40% of all munitions delivered by ground attack aircraft were napalm-based.
Having been troubled by the surprisingly effective Soviet submarine efforts in the early stages of the war, the Allied Navies accepted criticism that they had not responded effectively for far too long, particularly in regard to the threat of the type XXI.
The anti-submarine groups were quickly re-established and worked up to peak performance, establishing domination of all waters in which they worked.
There had also been some glaring errors in intelligence, that had permitted interned Soviet shipping to function as supply vessels in neutral ports, and serious errors of judgement regarding the possibilities of established Soviet bases beyond the mouth of the Baltic.
Some excused the issues, given the lack of serious threat from the Kriegsmarine in the closing months of the German War, but it was generally accepted that the Navies, across the range of nations, had been caught well and truly on the hop.
However, the problems were addressed, with more than one senior commander finding himself sailing a smaller desk, in a new job with less responsibility.
By the time of the Baltic phase of Operation Spectrum, the Allied Navies were back functioning at top level, and the results of the ‘ambush’ of Red Air Force and Navy assets in the Baltic illustrated that in spades.
In the Pacific, the USN adopted responsibility for blockading Japan, Manchuria, and the Soviet Eastern seaboard. Two excursions by Soviet Pacific fleet submarines enjoyed little success and the losses had sent a clear message to Soviet naval command, ensuring their assets stayed in port.
Battleships and cruisers launched the numerous forays into Chinese waters, cruising off-shore, taking out an airfield here, a bridge there. Smaller warships moved in closer, patrolling up and down the Chinese coast, seeking targets of opportunity, all of which ensured that the seas in the east remained very firmly under Allied control.
The lack of any Soviet or Japanese naval presence of note meant that there was no pressure to encourage further Allied naval development, although the Midway, Coral Sea and Franklin D. Roosevelt heavy carriers had been completed and sent to persecute the Siberian mainland.
The failure of the programme’s plutonium test in July 1945 caused a rethink of the plans to invade Japan, although that rethink had not prevented the exodus of units from Europe until the Soviets attacked.
Scientists assured their political masters that a device would be ready by summer 1946; indeed, the uranium bomb was considered ready to go, and had been for some time. It was the plutonium bomb that awaited a successful trial in the desert at White Sands.
Given the limited amount of suitable fissionable material available, the decision had been made not to deploy any devices until the military situation in Europe became more or less favourable. If the Soviets produced a surprise, then the weapons could be deployed as strategic weapons capable of destroying huge numbers of soldiers. If, when the Allies advanced, stubborn pockets of resistance grew, they could be used to eliminate such positions. Should Soviet defences prove insurmountable, or should the political will of the people falter, then they would be delivered on top of political targets in the Soviet Union, to break the enemy’s will first.
That was the basic plan, in the limited circles that knew of the existence of the weapons.
However, it was the political objections of others, mainly from the Allied nations, which made the use of such devices in continental Europe a political hot-potato.
Whilst the senior Allied leaders had not been told the full technical details and facts, the general outline of what was possible had been revealed, and most had recoiled from idea of using such ‘big’ bombs.
German Army – DRH – Deutsches Republikanisch Heer.
German Air Force – DRL – Deutsches Republikanisch Luftwaffe.
German Navy – DRK – Deutsches Republikanisch Kreigsmarine
By the time of the meeting of the Allied Powers at Versailles on 22nd February, German and Austrian forces in Italy totalled fourteen and four divisions respectively, most of which were considered combat ready.