The MI warrant officer explained each of the altars. On one was arranged containers of blood, a skull, crows' feathers, and cars of corn with multicolored kernels. All of this, the warrant officer explained, puts the "worshiper" in the right frame of mind for some kind of atrocity or evil act.
On the other altar were arranged stuffed doves, pictures of babies, and other "nice" things. The "worshiper" would cleanse his soul here afterward.
In Noriega's bedroom were several pairs of red silk bikini underwear — a Noriega trademark. We had found them just about everywhere Noriega showed his face. According to the warrant officer, the witch doctor had likely told Noriega they would protect him from physical harm.
"Maintain tight security here," I told Johnson as I left. "I don't want anything disturbed before we show it to the right people. After that, we'll turn it over to Panamanian authority." Among those whom I especially wanted to see all this — and what we had found at Fort Amador — were high-level officials of the Catholic Church. As soon as Noriega had himself brought to the Nunciatore, General Thurman started talking with the Catholic hierarchy, and of course with Washington, about ways to resolve the problem. When I got the chance, I suggested to Thurman that he invite some selected Catholic officials down to show them what we'd found.
It was an eyeful, that's for sure; but it gave us real insights into the man Noriega. It also began to give me ideas about how to get Noriega out of the Nunciatore.
The first thing I did after 1 left was meet with Downing. We were particularly interested in finding a use for Noriega's red underwear. For all we knew, he was wearing a pair right then. If he ever had a need for the powers they gave, it was certainly then.
Our first idea was to hang a pair on a clothesline outside his window (Laboa had told us where it was) and shoot them full of holes to show him how empty their powers were.
"I can take care of that," Downing said, and the demonstration was carried out later that afternoon.
Meanwhile, I'd picked up an interesting detail from the warrant officer: A goat was a very bad omen. That set me thinking.
This led to an instruction to my J-2 to come up with the ugliest, stinkingest billygoat he could find, and doctor him up for Noriega. The next day the J-2 produced a goat with really impressive horns and a beard that came down just short of his knees. They decked him out in a pair of red bikini underwear, rigged him up so a remote control signal sent smoke blowing out of his nostrils and ears, and tied him outside Noriega window.
We never knew how Noriega took all this, but it couldn't have helped his digestion.
On the night of December 23, the media was cleared into Panama.
Well before the operation was launched, Thurman and I agreed on how we would work media affairs. Essentially, his headquarters would handle them, under his public affairs officer, an Air Force colonel; and I provided my public affairs officer, Jake Dye, an Army colonel, to SOUTIICOM, which established a media center in a large tent just outside the headquarters. There would be two daily press briefings — one in the morning and one in the afternoon.
From the beginning the operation had been kept secret, but on the night of the twentieth, there were enough media already in Panama to cover a good part of the activities in the vicinity of the Comandancia. TVs are common in Panama; which meant civilians could watch the battles taking place live on their home screens.
On the night of the twenty-third, Panama's airspace was still closed to everything but military traffic. A call came in from Pete Kemph at Howard Air Force Base. A Lockheed L-1011 was overhead, asking permission to land.
"Who's on it?" 1 asked.
Kemph called back, "It's a load of media; they've been cleared from Washington."
"We have no alternative but to let them land," I said.
They were met on the ground by Thurman and taken to Quarry Heights, where they were given a complete briefing. Afterward, Thurman announced that the plan was to put them out in groups of three or four with each rifle company so they could get front-line coverage. Company commanders would be responsible for their security, food, and protection. Every day they would select a small number to travel around in a helicopter and pick up their "take," which they'd have time to file for the evening news.
The media found this arrangement totally unacceptable. Each media team wanted helicopters of its own, so they could immediately get to the action (one team had a satellite communications set it would take a Chinook to carry).
"I'm sorry," Thurman told them, "but I can't accommodate you on that. We're still involved in security operations and don't have enough helicopters to support the troops, much less give you dedicated helicopters."
They reluctantly agreed to this arrangement, but that didn't last long. Many of them began to slip away and rent cars; pretty soon they were running around all over the place.
It didn't take the press long to find out that Noriega was in the Nunciatore. Not long after that, they took over the Holiday Inn, about a hundred yards away and were out on the balconies with their pinpoint microphones, trying to pick up what was going on.
This worried me. "We've got very sensitive negotiations going on outside the Nunciatore between Downing, Cisneros, Michael Kuzack," the U.S. Embassy representative, "and Laboa," I told Thurman, "and we have to find a way to block these microphones listening in. What I'd like to do is bring in some psychological operations loudspeakers and play music."
"Good idea," Thurman said. "Set it up."
And that's what we did.
Pretty soon, the press got teed off and started calling directly to the White House, claiming we were violating their first amendment rights by blasting them with rock music. That was not, in fact, true. It wasn't all rock music. We had also selected some good country-and-western songs, like Johnny Cash's "Ring of Fire," and "Nowhere to Run To," and "In the Jailhouse Now."
We didn't forget Noriega in all this. We wanted to send him a clear message that the ball game was over. During the afternoons, we hooked up the loudspeakers to U.S. Southern Command radio so he could also hear about the surrenders of his PDF commanders and the freezing of his overseas bank accounts.
The loudspeaker campaign didn't last long.
The White House put pressure on General Powell, who called General Thurman and demanded an explanation. General Thurman did that, but it apparently did not satisfy the White I louse, and we were ordered to stop the music.
As we wrestled with the problem of prying Noriega out of the Nunciatore, operations were going on throughout western Panama to bring security and stability, and great progress had been made (looting had practically ceased), owing in large measure to the signal sent by combat activities at H-hour. Also contributing to the success was the surrender of Lieutenant Colonel Del Cid. Word of his surrender had also almost certainly reached Noriega before he'd entered the Nunciatore; this would not have lifted his mood.
All the while, intelligence reports were coming in that Noriega supporters were planning rescue attempts.
One report claimed that rescuers planned to land a small helicopter inside the Nunciatore grounds and fly him out. In response, Downing positioned Ranger stinger-missile teams on every nearby high-rise building. There was no way a helicopter was going to get into the Nunciatorc.
Another report claimed Noriega was going to slip away out the back and down an irrigation ditch. Infantry troops were brought in to secure the ditch, and surveillance cameras with infrared capability were installed for all-around security.