Their victory for freedom had not been without cost:
All armored vehicles, crew-served weapons, and ammunition were evacuated to the United States.
All other weapons and ammunition, except what was needed for training and equipping the new presidential security, reaction, and police force, was either destroyed or evacuated to the United States.
All vessels/ships and aircraft were restored to operational condition and left with the new government.
All money was turned over to the new government.
All explosives and chemical weapons were destroyed.
On January 3, we began a phased redeployment (January 18–26) of the 17,000 combat troops over and above the 9,500 troops normally assigned to SOUTHCOM.
Much nation-building work still had to be done in support of PROMOTE LIBERTY. Some of its requirements could take up to two years. The units involved with longer-term programs remained in Panama, but were rotated on a scheduled basis.
For the next nine days, my headquarters, JTF South, continued stability operations while managing the phased redeployment of our forces. We were also transitioning to a headquarters, JTF Panama, commanded by Major General Cisneros, which would take over responsibility for nation-building and security. Its headquarters and Military Support Group had been activated on December 21. Soon it would take control of the 193rd Brigade, the Marine Amphibious Unit, and additional forces that would remain behind — one of Major General Carmen Cavezza's combat brigades, plus a battalion of MPs from the 16th Military Police Brigade.
JTF South passed over all responsibilities to JTF Panama on January 11.
On January 12, at 8:00 A.M., two thousand troopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, the XVIII Airborne Corps staff, and I jumped onto Sicily Drop Zone at Fort Bragg to a cheering, flag-waving crowd of five thousand family members and dignitaries, among them, General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff. The troops assembled on the drop zone and marched with their colors waving in the brisk cool breeze to the bleachers area.
This is what I said there:
"Thank you — and I cannot begin to tell you what you mean to us.
"1 wish you could have marched with us across that sand, and experienced our feelings as we drew closer and realized the meaning that you and these children conveyed with the flags you were waving.
"The mission to Panama was a difficult one. We literally decapitated a government, and then shook hands with the very people we had fought the night before and said, 'We want to help you now.'
"You would have been very proud of your soldiers. They're dedicated and motivated by all the things the American flag stands for, the very flags you were waving. No one ever fought more bravely or with more compassion for those they faced in battle.
"Everyone knew there would be danger, but not a single one hesitated to go, or to enter battle time and time again. They were well-trained for the mission, and they fought the way they had trained. We believe that what we were sent to do was just and right.
"Twenty-three of our comrades are at peace today, and they deserve the highest honors for their sacrifice. Our experience adds meaning to the expression 'Freedom Isn't Free.'
"To the families and all the members of this great community, we thank you for your prayers and your support. It gave us strength when strength was needed — and we thank you from the bottom of our hearts."
POST-ACTION THOUGHTS
In the days following Operation JUST CAUSE, I was asked many times, "What lessons did you learn?" and, "If you had to do it all over again, what would you do differently?"
Let me answer the second question first: "I'd have guarded the Nunciatore. That way we would either have grabbed Noriega on the way in, or we would have taken that option away from him."
As for lessons learned: JUST CAUSE was a very successful operation. There were several reasons for its success:
First, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 clearly established the chain of command down to theater level, along with the authority for fulfilling command responsibility. Under this act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was made the principal military adviser to the National Command Authority (SECDEF and President), and the Joint Staff was made directly responsible and subordinate to the Chairman, not to the Joint Chiefs, as had been the case before. This docs not mean that an astute Chairman does not consult with the service Chiefs; but it eliminated consensual decision-making that was sometimes influenced by service parochialism. The act also included the warfighting commanders-in-chief in the chain of command, and gave them additional authority for conducting military operations in their theaters for wartime as well as peacetime activities.
Second, clear guidance was given by the National Command Authority to General Thurman.
Third, from the start, General Thurman gave me full authority over all forces and the necessary freedom for developing the plan.
Fourth, once the plan was completed, we briefed it all the way up through the decision-making authority, and it was approved as written.
Fifth, we were allowed enough time to fully rehearse.
Sixth, when the operation was launched, we were allowed to execute it without changing the plan.
Back to the question: "What lessons did you learn?"
I can't say we really learned any lessons. In my opinion, you only learn a lesson as a result of a big mistake, or when you have failed to anticipate an event somewhere along the line — training readiness, plan development, or the like — that could effect the mission.
With that said, however, we did validate some principles and procedures that contributed to our success in Panama, which also apply to future operations:
• Integrated planning and execution are key to success for all contingency operations, particularly for joint operations when forces from other services are involved.
• A streamlined "warfighter"-oriented command-and-control structure, responsive to needs at lowest levels, is imperative.
• Overwhelming combat power results in quick victory with fewer casualties on both sides.
• Continuous review of rules of engagement, with responsive and assured dissemination, maximizes combat capability and flexibility.
• Use of Joint Communications Electronic Operating Instructions (CEOI) is crucial for successful joint operations.
• Troops fight to standards to which they are trained — and nothing more. There is no substitute for live-fire training, under the most realistic conditions, as you expect to fight.
• Maximum latitude must be allowed units at lowest level; otherwise don't expect their fullest potential.
• No force more powerful than PSYOPs can ever be brought to the battlefield. If you can influence the minds of your foe, the job is much easier and less expensive by every measure.
• Appropriately integrating Special Operations and conventional forces maximizes force potential and capability in ways not otherwise possible.
Though all of this contributed immeasurably to the success of Operation JUST CAUSE, it is no more than what is normally expected of senior commanders.
And finally, the plan the leaders create may be a thing of great beauty, yet it is only as good as the troops that execute it. The outcome is determined at their level.
I cannot praise enough the motivation, the technical and professional competence, the daring, the maturity, and the caring of our troops at all levels from all the services. Our officers and NCOs were superbly trained; they led their troops the way troops expect to be led. They and their troops did everything we asked — and then more. They have earned the credit for all that was accomplished in Operation JUST CAUSE.