That was the real strategic significance of the Ho Chi Minh Trail — its security. Throughout the war, the North Vietnamese were able to use Laos and Cambodia as sanctuaries. Though such sanctuaries were never total or absolute, U.S. and allied forces were severely limited in their ability to attack them.
In fact, the best opportunity for putting a cork in the Trail was probably early in its existence. Its presence was beginning to be recognized by 1961 and 1962, but it hardly seemed a factor in the war. Perhaps 1,500 North Vietnamese troops a month filtered down into the South, an insignificant number compared to the tens of thousands per month (including tanks and other heavy weapons) that later used the Trail. As a result, few in authority took it seriously, and that generally remained the case until it was too late to do anything about the Trail without committing massive forces — and by then political considerations had ended any chance for such a commitment. It was a big mistake. Another one was the belief held by most American military commanders that the war would be decided by slugging it out with heavy firepower and conventional forces. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese never bought this concept. To them the war was at times a conventional war, at times a "people's" war, and at times a guerrilla war; they chose the mode of combat that best suited their advantage — and our disadvantage.
It is credible to argue that if the United States or South Vietnam had found some way to permanently block the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1962 or 1963, then the massive American intervention three or four years later might not have had to happen — and perhaps the war in Vietnam would have turned out more happily.
WHITE STAR
In 1961, early in his brief presidency, John Kennedy was faced with a mess in Laos — part Communist-backcd insurgency, part dynastic struggles between competing princes, and part power grabs by military leaders. All of which was made more complicated by virtue of the complex ethnic makeup of the country. In addition to ethnic Laotians, the backcountry was inhabited by semiprimitive Kha and Meo tribes, who were both disliked and distrusted by the Laotians. Though the tribesmen were often superb soldiers, the Laotians were not eager to arm or train them.
The initial power struggle in Laos followed close on the heels of the Geneva Conference of 1954, which gave Laos independence. On one side was the Royal Laotian government, officially headed by a titular king but in reality led by neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma. On the other side were the Communist insurgents, the Pathet Lao, led by Souvanna Phouma's half brother, Prince Souphanovong, and supported by the North Vietnamese (though they were always more interested in South Vietnam). Until 1959, the Pathet Lao occupied the two northern provinces, but worked to expand on that base. From 1959 until 1961, amid coups and countercoups, the situation grew even more complex, with the emergence of a right-wing power base under General Phoumi Nosavan, who seized power in December of that year. Meanwhile, the neutralists had lost U.S. backing (which went to General Nosavan) and threw in with the Pathet Lao, while at the same time begging the Soviets for help. The Soviets were ready to give it — though predictably most of their assistance went to the Communists.
According to the classic "Domino Theory," "We had to do something about Laos." If Laos fell to the Communists, could South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand be far behind? Though history has proved the Domino Theory wrong, it made a lot of sense then.
Earlier in 1961, following the withdrawal in 1960 of the French Military Mission to Laos, U.S. Special Forces were officially admitted into Laos — their presence was no longer clandestine; they could wear U.S. uniforms, including their green berets — and were designated by the newly established U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Laos (MAAG Laos) as White Star Mobile Training Teams.
These teams performed many tasks: Some became instructors in recently opened Laotian military schools. Others went into the field with the Laotian Army as conventional operational advisers. Others provided medical assistance or coordination and communications services; gathered intelligence for MAAG Laos; or worked closely with the minority hill peoples, where among other things they formed, equipped, and trained Meo and Kha military companies.
It was in this last mission that the White Star teams made their lasting mark. In the hills of Laos, Bill Yarborough's vision of Special Forces was tested and proved. Here also the Special Forces organization and leadership learned the lessons they brought with them not long afterward, when they were assigned to take on the mess in Vietnam.
The White Star teams were fortunate in their leadership.
One commander, for example, Lieutenant Colonel John T. Little, had learned the Bill Yarborough lesson welclass="underline" that only part of the Special Forces mission in Laos was to show indigenous soldiers how to march, shoot, and communicate. In a message to the troops in Laos, dated September 22, 1961, and titled "Civil Assistance," Little laid down the parameters that were to guide the White Star teams. These are extracts:
In an insurgency situation, the guerrilla is dependent on a sympathetic population. Counter-guerrilla operations must, therefore, have as one objective winning the population's cooperation and denying the enemy their sympathy.An imaginative program of village assistance, properly backed by the military and civil authorities, is one form of psychological operation which will contribute significantly both toward this objective and toward the achieving of U.S. goals in Laos.You arc not in competition with other U.S. agencies… you are the spearhead and focal point for the injection of these activities until Laos civil assistance teams are trained and operational.Upon arrival in the village, pay a courtesy call on the Chao Muong [the district political boss]. Do not talk shop on the first meeting. Just make friends.Deal directly with the Chao Muong. Do not work through his subordinate. Always work through one man — the chief.Make a statement on graft. Let the Chao Muong know that under no circumstances will you tolerate graft, and if you detect it, your aid will stop. If corruption starts, the villagers will tell you. You do not need to search for it.Always make the villagers share the workload. Let them know that all these projects are village projects, not U.S. help for the helpless. Once you do one project all by yourself, the villagers will forever after expect this from your team. Do not give them something for nothing. For example, a good approach could be: "I will try to get a tin roof for your school house if you will build the school and furnish all other materials and labor.Try to present our ideas to the Chao Muong in such a fashion as to make him think it was his idea in the first place. Let him win full credit for the completion of any project. Do not issue orders to him or demand an instant decision. When you approach him with an idea, let him have a night to think about it. But the next day be sure to gently push him toward a decision.Initially your weapon is talk. It must be interesting, arousing, intelligent. You are a master salesman for the United States. Some pitfalls for newcomers: drinking too much at social functions (keep your mind clear for business); getting involved with native women (creates jealousy and hate, and makes you a setup for anti-U.S. propaganda); being arrogant, sarcastic, or belittling in your conversation (these people are hypersensitive and proud, and you will come to a dead end if they dislike you). Maintain the proper team attitude of good-natured willingness and endless patience in the face of resentment to change and complete apathy. Be tactful, be tolerant. Show exceptional tolerance to the children and the very old. Be courteous, be relaxed, and do not be in a hurry.For success in this mission, observe the native customs. For example, when you are visiting a village, inform the villagers that you are coming so that the people can assemble. The Chao Muong always makes a political speech on these occasions. Never force your way into a village where broken branches across the trail indicate a closed celebration. Follow the native custom of removing your footgcar when going into a village house. Learn the customs of your region.Make sure the United States gets credit for all U.S. items distributed. When the Chao Muong makes a speech to the citizenry about the tools and supplies they are to receive, make sure he tells them that the equipment comes from America.The sky is the limit in what you can achieve. You cannot make a new Laos in one day, but it only takes one day to start. Now is the time to start beating the enemy at his own game — the winning of men's minds, emotions, and loyalty to the concepts that motivate us: freedom, justice, individual human rights, equality of opportunity, and a higher living standard.