The course we came up with was designed by one of the men who had put together the selection course for our top special missions units. The volunteers were always in unbalanced situations. They never knew what to expect. They never knew what was going to happen to them. They'd think they were stopping for a meal break, and would get a mission two minutes before they were going to eat. "Move. Report here,"which might mean five miles of hard marching with heavy rucksacks.
We never told them where or why or how far they were going. We never said, "You're going from here, and you'll end up over here. "Only, "You start here and go in that direction." Then they'd march until they met somebody else, who'd send them on another leg of the journey.
People who can't deal with ambiguous situations will fall out when they're out there alone and confused in the country, particularly when we've got them under physical stress.
We didn't harass them, the way they do at places like Jump School. We didn't have to. Sure, one morning we gave them push-ups and things like that, just to show them, "yes, we can do that to you if we want to. But that's not how we're going to do it. We're going to tell you what we want you to do and then see if you attempt to do it."
At the end of the course, we had a thirty-mile forced march, and that pretty well tested them out. We had people who quit just doing that — both officers and NCOs.
Some men we flunked. Some of them could do everything we asked for physically, but we took them, out for psychological reasons. Some men were loners and could not handle the stress of operating in a team.
We were looking for solid men of character and integrity, motivated for all the right reasons — men of maturity and sound judgment, with the inner strength to do whatever was required under all conditions and circumstances, and who did not have to be "stroked" to do their best.
It worked. We truly began to get the very best men. On top of that, we'd begun indoctrinating them into Special Forces right up front. They were paying a price to be in Special Forces. They'd made a real investment, and it was going to mean something to them. The result was that we were able to fill our slots with quality replacements, who were soon recognized by the Army by receiving promotions faster than their peers in the conventional Army did.
Next, we rebuilt and upgraded our training facilities at Camp MacKall (adjacent to Fort Bragg), where we did the Q Course and some of the other courses. During World War II, the Army had trained nearly all of their airborne units there, but everything was left over from then — Navy Quonset huts, an old mess hall, and a latrine. We needed a new sewage and water system, new buildings, and new training facilities; and General Thurman made sure we got all this when he was TRADOC commander.
As for integrating an awareness of special operations into the service schools, such as the infantry school at Benning or the armor school at Knox, and at the advanced courses at Leavenworth or the War College, not as much has been done there. I don't see in their curriculum any focus on Special Forces, Civil Affairs, PSYOPs, and Special Operations Aviation and how they can be integrated on the battlefield. That was a major failure we set about to correct, and which still needs work.
We've got to put an advanced training and education slice into all those schools. We've got to make sure those folks are being taught an appreciation of SF, because sitting in those audiences are future CINCs, senior staff officers, senior planners, and senior subordinate commanders for the CINC — and they need to know what we can do.
We've done a lot to make Special Forces even more professional. Now the Army has to learn how to use then? most effectively.
CARL STINER-BETWEEN THE WARS
Meanwhile, Carl Stiner was progressing through several key assignments: a tour with Army headquarters in Washington; a battalion command with the 82nd Airborne Division, where he was also division operations officer; study at the Army War College, and a Masters degree in public administration; a tour in Saudi Arabia, as the assistant project manager for training and modernizing the Saudi National Guard-a Special Forces — type assignment; brigade command at Fort Benning, Georgia; and in 1979, he and twenty-two other handpicked officers were sent to Saudi Arabia and Yemen to help the Saudis put out the civil war between North and South Yemen — another SF-type assignment.
After returning from Yemen, he was again assigned to the Pentagon to work for General Edward G. "Shy" Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff.
On a Thursday afternoon toward the end of February 1980, General Meyer called Stiner into his office. "When you come in tomorrow, Carl," he said, "I think you better wear your Class A uniform. And, oh, by the way, you better bring Sue in that afternoon. There's going to be a special ceremony."
"What kind of ceremony?" Stiner asked.
"I am going to promote you to Brigadier General," the General answered, "and you are going to be assigned as the Chief of Staff of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, MacDill AFB, Florida."
The RDJTF was created by President Jimmy Carter in response to a perceived slight against the Saudis and other friendly Arabs. All major nations except the Arabs had a standing U.S. unified command to look out for their security interests. "Why not us?" the Arabs had told Carter. Two years later, the RDJTF became the United States Central Command, and assumed responsibility for U.S. security interests in Southwest Asia.
The next day, Stiner, wearing his Greens, brought Sue in for the 3:00 P.M. ceremony.
When it was over, Meyer told Stiner to report the next day — Saturday — to Lieutenant General P. X. Kelley, who was to be the commander of the not-yet-activated RDJTF.
At that meeting, Kelley told Stiner to leave for MacDill on Monday, write the activation order on the way down, and publish it when he got there. This would activate the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, effective March 1, 1980.
When Stiner showed up at MacDill, he was met by a total staff of four enlisted personnel, but over the next couple of months, these were augmented by 244 handpicked men — mainly officers from all the services. Stiner remained there until May 1982, during which time he and the staff formed and trained the most effective joint command in existence, and wrote and exercised three major war plans for Southwest Asia (one variant became the foundation for Operation DESERT STORM seventeen years later).
In June 1982, he was reassigned to the 82nd Airborne Division as the Assistant Division Commander for Operations, now working for Major General James J. Lindsay In August 1983, a call came for him to report the following day to General Jack Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had another deployment.
This time, Lebanon.
VIII