While this drama was playing out in Cairo, a few members of the NSC staff in Washington came up with a brilliant idea. They were aware, from intelligence intercepts, that the Egypt Air aircraft had not yet left the ground. So why not use planes from the aircraft carrier Saratoga, which was nearby in the Mediterranean, to force the plane down at some friendly airport and take the terrorists into U.S. custody?
After some discussion, the NATO base at Sigonella was chosen as the friendly location that would cause the fewest potential problems. Sicily was Italian, and so was the Achille Lauro. After further discussion, it was determined that intercepting a civilian airliner was indeed physically possible. The President was contacted, and Reagan gave his approval.
Meanwhile I was still on the ground on Cyprus with my two C-141s, awaiting darkness so I could launch for home. I had with me my battle staff, my communications (including my low-level intercept capability), and my medical unit, as well as Captain Bob and two of his SEAL platoons — my reaction team, in case anything unforeseen happened en route.
I was just about to launch Bob's C-141, when I received a call from Vice Admiral Moreau, who briefed me on a concept plan — approved in principle by President Reagan — for capturing the terrorists should they be flown from Egypt to Tunisia. "F-14s from the Saratoga will be responsible for intercepting the Egypt Air plane and forcing it down at Sigonella. You are to follow the plane into Sigonella, capture the terrorists, and fly them back to the U.S. in chains to stand trial. Stand by for word to launch in order to link up with the F-14s that will make the intercept." And then by way of conclusion: "The Italian government has given its approval of all this, both for the landing and for our taking the terrorists."
This last proved to be over-hopeful. At this point the Italian government had no idea that we were going to do anything of the kind, and it's doubtful that they would have approved it if they had known. The mistake was a screwup — a mixed-up communication somewhere along the line. But as it turned out, it was a welcome failure, since it afforded an opportunity to capture the terrorists who had hijacked the ship and killed Leon Klinghoffer.
After my conversation with Art Moreau, I walked over to brief Bob and his men. The first thing I noticed was the look of disappointment on all their faces — disappointment that they'd missed the opportunity to conduct the ship assault and deal appropriately with the criminals who had brutally killed an American. But as soon as I got to the part of my briefing that said we had another opportunity to capture the terrorists, several of the SEALs began forcing themselves to puke out the sleeping pills they had taken so they could sleep on the way home. they were ready for the new mission.
THE INTERCEPT
A secure — and urgent — call came to Rear Admiral Dave Jeremiah on the USS Saratoga from 6th Fleet headquarters. They were to change course and prepare to launch what was called their "alert CAP" (the Combat Air Patrol consisted of two F-14 Tomcat interceptors and an E-2C Hawkeye radar plane, which would direct the fighters). Though the Saratoga's captain had no idea what was going on, or why they were changing course, he couldn't miss the 6th Fleet's urgency, and he launched the alert CAP.
At 7:10 P.M., local time, an F-14 took off, soon followed by an E-2C radar plane. Moments later, the mission came through: "To intercept and divert to Sigonella, Sicil, a Boeing 737 charter with the Achille Lauro hijackers on board now en route from Cairo to Tunis." More F-14s were launched. Eventually, six of them (supported by aerial tankers) made a fence over the Mediterranean between Crete and Egypt.
As I was preparing to launch from Cyprus with my two C-141s shortly after the F-14s had launched, shit once again happened: The pilot informed me that one of the engines on my plane would not start. It was probably a "glow plug" problem, he told me.
"How many glow plugs are in an engine?" I asked the mechanic (we always carried a mechanic on special operations missions as part of the crew). "And how many does it take to start it?"
"There are six per engine," I recall him saying, "but it only takes one good one to start an engine."
"So why can't we take one or two from a good engine and put them in the failed engine to get it going?" I asked.
"We can give it a try," he said.
Four or five of us then deplaned to give the mechanic a hand removing and replacing the engine cowlings, while the mechanic transferred the "glow plugs." This took about thirty minutes.
Now the engine was ready to go. However, because the earlier attempts to start it had "loaded it up" with fuel, the mechanic was concerned about chances of a fire. "Now let's get everybody off the plane," he announced, "and get ready for the fireball if it starts." Everybody quickly deplaned, and the mechanic gave the pilot the signal. The three good engines were started, and then the failed engine was given a try. Nothing happened for maybe thirty seconds, and then some smoke came, and then all of a sudden a flame jetted out as far as the tail of the airplane — or at least that was how it seemed. The pilot smiled and gave a thumbs-up to all of us outside, then we quickly reboarded the aircraft.
After launch, we remained in radio contact with the E-2C, so as not to interfere with the intercept operation. Flying time from Cyprus to Sigonella was about three or four hours.
Back in the United States, at 4:37 P.M., Washington time, President Reagan directed Defense Secretary Weinberger to intercept the plane and its hijackers.
"National Command Authority" is two men, the President and the Secretary of Defense, who is second to the President in control of the armed forces. This means command authority passes through the Defense Secretary on the way down to, say, the 6th Fleet
Weinberger called the Pentagon and gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Crowe, the okay to proceed.
Meanwhile, the E-2C watched for the Egypt Air 737. When they picked out likely contacts flying the route from Cairo to Tunis, F-14s then had to check the tail numbers. Around midnight, they began checking out possible radar contacts.
The first two blacked-out aircraft they examined turned out American C- 141 transport planes — our team on the way to Sigonella.
The F-14s intercepted their target two tries later — tail number 2843. A pair of F-14s with lights out now flew, one on each of the commercial aircraft's wingtips. The crew and passengers of the Egypt Air plane were in total ignorance that they'd been bracketed by U.S. fighters.
The formation proceeded westward. No problem. That was where the Americans wanted them to go — for the time being.
Meanwhile, the State Department had asked the Tunisian government to deny the Egyptians permission to land, and the Tunisians had agreed. When the Egyptians tried Athens, they again got a negative response. Their only recourse was to return to Cairo, and Cairo control had to comply with their request.
At this point, the Egyptian pilots got a surprise: "2843, this is Tigertail 603. Over," the E-2C Hawkeye radioed. The Egyptians did not reply.
The Hawkeye repeated: "2843. Tigertail 603." It took four tries before the Egyptians got nerve enough to acknowledge.
"Tigertail 603. Egypt Air 2843. Go ahead."
"Egypt Air 2843. Tigertail 603. Be advised you're being escorted by two F-14s. You are to land immediately… immediately… at Sigonella, Sicily Over."