"You must understand," he added, "that it was an Italian ship that was hijacked, and this is Italian soil, with Italian jurisdiction. And we just can't afford to turn them over."
"Let me check with Washington to see if there is a misunderstanding."
Still standing by the plane, with the Italian three-star close by, I made another call to the Pentagon. I don't recall who answered, but it sounded like Admiral Moreau, and I knew that all the chiefs were listening.
"I want to bring you up to speed and to reverify my mission," I said. "Here is the situation: We have the plane. I have verified that the four terrorists are on board, along with eight to ten armed guards from the 777 Force, which I do not consider a threat. Also there are two other men, one a tough-looking Arab in his mid-forties, who has to be important, and a younger redheaded, freckled-face guy sitting at a table with him. We have not been able to identify these two. I have already taken the pilot off the plane, along with another individual who claims to be an ambassador. He is now calling back to Egypt and we are monitoring his phone conversations. Mostly he is requesting guidance to deal with the terrible situation they have ended up in.
"The Italian base commander here at Sigonella felt that he had to react," I continued. "I think more to save face than anything else. In my estimation, they have positioned about three hundred or so troops in a perimeter around us. We are eyeball to eyeball. I have an Italian three-star with me. He has called all the way back to his Ministry of Defense and can find no one with any knowledge of an agreement to turn over the terrorists to us. I have also talked to Ambassador Rabb, and he has no knowledge of such an agreement.
"I am not worried about our situation. We have the firepower to prevail. But I am concerned about the immaturity of the Italian troops, some of whom arc green conscripts, as well as the absence of anybody with the ability to control them in this tense situation. A backfire from a motorbike or construction cart could precipitate a shooting incident that could lead to a lot of Italian casualties. And I don't believe that our beef is with our ally, the Italians, but rather with the terrorists.
"Now with this picture, I just want to reverify that my mission is to take the terrorists off the plane and bring them back to the U.S."
After I finished, I got a "wait out."
About five minutes later, a response came — I thought from Secretary Weinberger, but it could have been Admiral Crowe, since I had never heard his voice over SATCOM: "You are the ranking American on the scene, and you do what you think is right."
I "rogered" the message. Which was exactly what I wanted to hear. It gave me the latitude to do what I thought would turn out best.
By this time it was about 4:00 A.M. We had been on the ground now for approximately two hours, trying to sort this mess out. During that time, I had occasionally overheard discussions between Italian officers, including some disagreements. There were apparently questions about which "magistrates" (judges) ought to have jurisdiction over the terrorists. The Italian justice system was complex, and there'd be plenty of magistrates involved, all with differing responsibilities. This could conceivably further complicate a conclusion that would be in the best interest of the United States.
After listening to all this for a while, and doing some thinking on my own, I'd come to my main conclusion: No matter how complex the Italian justice system was, and how many magistrates would be involved, we had to somehow find a way to fix responsibility for prosecuting the terrorists on the shoulders of the Italian government. We needed to find a way to hold their feet to the fire inescapably.
A little later, a way to do that came to me.
About that time, my counterpart, the Italian three-star, and I moved the short distance to the base commander's office, which was where he had to make his calls anyhow, to find a more suitable place to discuss the issues at hand.
When we got there, I made a proposal that I thought would be in the best interest of both governments. "The first thing we've got to do," I told him, "is un-mingle the troops, to minimize the possibility of a shooting incident between the United States and Italy that could leave a lot of dead or wounded Italians lying on this tarmac when the sun comes up — a situation you and 1 must avoid.
"Once we have done that, I will take the Force 777 guards off the plane, disarm them, and take them to a secure holding area. Then we will take the rest of the air crew off, leaving only the terrorists and the two unidentified individuals on the plane.
"Once that's done, 1 will reduce our security force to a minimum visible presence around the plane.
"Come daylight, you or whoever you designate can enter the plane and take the remainder off one at a time. Then, you, along with a two-man detail that I provide, will take them to whatever location the district attorney designates for charging and lock up; and we will assist in verification/identification." What I had in mind was to fly in some of the former hostages from Egypt and put the terrorists before a lineup, but I didn't spring this on the lieutenant general until later.
The lieutenant general seemed to like that idea and, with a nod of his head, asked for a few minutes to discuss the proposal with his higher-ups. He picked up the phone, and then about fifteen minutes later told me that the proposal was agreeable.
Soon after that, he ordered the Italian troops surrounding the aircraft to withdraw, and judging from their reaction, they were relieved to do so. But it was good to see that they left with no animosity.
Meanwille, the White House was calling Craxi again: The President felt strongly about bringing the terrorists to justice, the Italian was told.
The Italian prime minister claimed that he personally had no problem giving the hijackers up to the Americans; but this was an Italian legal matter, and Italian courts had jurisdiction.
During the next hour, we disarmed the 777 Force guards, removed them from the plane, and took them to a holding place where they could get some food and rest (under armed escort). Next, the power was shut down on the plane, and the crew was removed and reunited with the captain elsewhere on the base.
This left only the four terrorists and the two unidentified individuals on the plane.
At this point, in order to lower the anxiety level of the Italians, we reduced our guard force around the plane to six visible SEALs, but a reaction force remained nearby, if needed.
At daybreak, Colonel Annicchiarici, accompanied by several armed guards and a paddy wagon, showed up with the Egyptian "ambassador." The colonel and the ambassador boarded the plane, and after maybe two hours of negotiations, they persuaded the four hijackers to surrender. They were loaded in the paddy wagon and placed in a military jail at the air base. Later, they were taken downtown and arraigned before the local Italian district attorney.
The two remaining unidentified men, however, were by this time claiming diplomatic immunity as PLO envoys, and refused to leave the plane. The tough looking one was carrying an Iraqi diplomatic passport with a name on it that 1 forget, but we suspected — and could not yet positively prove — that he was the terrorist mastermind, Abu Abbas. The other one, the redhead, turned out to be the political officer of the Cairo PLO office — a functionary (as we later found out) by the name of Hassan.
If Abbas actually turned out to be on the plane, and we could bring him to trial, we would have achieved a far more significant victory in the war against terrorism than just grabbing the four hijackers. He was the mastermind and organizer; they were nothing but hit men.