The local man did not look for a track but for particularly swampy ground and meadows where one could expect the fewest Soviet positions. Thus it was possible for about 1,200 men from Küstrin to move across without firing a shot or the Russians noticing. Once the first Russian lines were behind us, we went in a northerly direction with many diversions to the Schäferei sheep farm. Of course there were many Russian positions and other Soviet bunkers on the way. The rifle-armed Russian sentries thought that only Russian troops could be moving about and let us through unchallenged. The Soviet troops seemed to be sleeping in many of the bunkers but were killed in cold blood without a shot being fired if they drew attention to themselves. Certainly it would have been possible to take a large number of prisoners along with us, but as it remained uncertain what kind of fighting awaited us, this was not done. The troops were in a good fighting mood on this march. On one occasion I saw a solder angrily berating for five minutes a Russian who had surrendered. When the Russians realised that they were confronted by German soldiers, they usually surrendered. We were not fired on once from Russian bunkers or by sentries.
One outstanding advantage for us on this enterprise was the weather: it was a dark night and raining. The stress of the march was nevertheless immense. We stumbled mainly though swampy meadows or ploughed fields. The heavy Oder mud clung thickly to one’s boots, making walking difficult and demanding the last of one’s strength from everyone. Nearly all the men were completely exhausted, but again and again they gathered up their strength and straightened their backs. Of course we had become all mixed up and there was no longer any cohesion between companies and platoons. The constant firing of flares forced us to keep taking cover, which was physically very demanding. We came to the second Russian lines near Gorgast, where we were accosted by a Russian sentry with a password, and when we failed to reply the Russians opened up on us with two machine guns and five or six rifles. We fired back with the remainder of our ammunition, shouted ‘Hurra!’ and ran into the fire in an attack. The Russians fled when they saw that we were in earnest. The Russians then started using heavy weapons, firing shells and mortars into our ranks. This developed into a fight lasting one to one and a half hours. However, it did give us time to draw breath. Incidentally, a German soldier fired a Panzerfaust into a bunker at the beginning of the fight that silenced all the weapons in it, after which Russian soldiers immediately surrendered from two other bunkers. As our ammunition was about to run out, we suddenly stopped firing and kept quiet. We marched on. Only then and now did we have to attack with cries of ‘Hurra!’ and chase the Russians away. The Very lights coming from the German lines were useless. To my knowledge, before we set off the Gruppenführer had radioed that we were trying to break through towards Golzow with 1,200 men and requesting that, should we succeed, to make tactical use of the gap. Opposing light signals were agreed. It was later established that the radio message had not got through, which was why the corresponding light signals were lacking. We had also finally lost our direction during the previous fighting. I believe that we had moved several kilometres between the Soviet and German lines. When the completely exhausted Küstrin team finally found the right direction for Golzow, we came under extraordinarily heavy fire from the German front. We replied to the fire at first, but when we realised that it was coming from the German front line, we stopped firing. With loud shouts and singing the national anthem we eventually made ourselves noticed. I reckon, however, that we had suffered our worst casualties from the German fire. In Golzow we immediately asked that the German casualties lying in no-man’s-land should be recovered that same night. I know from SS-Gruppenführer Reinefarth that he too was lying there completely exhausted and that he was finally brought out in an armoured reconnaissance vehicle. As to the extent of our casualties, I have not been able to get any approximate figures so far. We had reckoned from the start that a good half would be left on the wayside in the breakthrough. The wounded could not be brought along, as everyone had been told in advance, for the last of one’s strength was needed.
The town of Küstrin is a single heap of rubble. The buildings have been shot through, burnt out and those burnt walls still standing shot through yet again. There is not a single Küstrin family that will find the smallest item of their personal goods again. Certainly Küstrin fortress has shown itself worthy of its great historical past in this war. Only when the town was completely shot up, when the ammunition and food stocks were destroyed and there was no chance of holding on any longer did the troops assemble for a breakthrough battle. When one thinks that during the days and weeks beforehand all the men had become tired and burnt out, the breakthrough battle was a unique performance that deserves recognition. SS-Gruppenführer Reinefarth gave the order to break through at the last minute, making a decision that was fully justified. He did what a responsible and self-confident leader must do in such a situation. Metaphorically speaking, there were only two possibilities. Either the fortress held on for another 20 minutes and then surrendered defenceless to the Bolshevik soldiers, or, taking the last of the ammunition, the men broke out and thus, despite the expected losses, several hundred men were saved for the German front. In the troops’ opinion, the garrison should have been taken out through the ‘pipeline’ as soon as Kietz and the Neustadt were lost, to establish a new Oder front west of Küstrin, which would have saved about 3–4,000 men at no great cost.
It will be understood that one simply cannot accept or believe that any earnest attempt was made to relieve Küstrin. If one had been made, then it is at least astonishing that several divisions with fresh, rested soldiers with tanks and heavy weapons were not able to do what the fought-out and tired fortress garrison of Küstrin achieved in the opposite direction with just a few small arms. There are few fortresses that could hold out for ten weeks against such superior forces.
To finish my report, I would like to make an observation that perhaps would not be unimportant in the continuation of the war. First, the question of why it is that the soldier breaks down so often and runs away. I have only one explanation for it, and that is the lack of good officers who not only lead in a military sense but also establish a close comradely relationship with their men. The men [in Küstrin] were all completely exhausted and weary from week-, month- or year-long fighting. They daily experienced the enemy’s superiority in weapons and manpower and were losing confidence in their own resources. They had reached an emotional state in which nothing mattered any more. Although it is not allowed in such a tense situation, one might survive if one were at least allowed to have some leave in limited circumstances. When that is impossible, a solution for the fighting troops should constantly be looked for. A unit after a week’s fighting in the forward area should earn a week’s rest in a rear area. One still sees full garrisons in the country, so such an exchange of soldiers should be possible. A unit that has been able to sleep comfortably for a week and has had its clothing and weapons repaired and even some training, returns refreshed into battle. Old First World War soldiers often told me that they had never experienced units fighting and fighting until they finally died. For instance, during those ten weeks in Küstrin perhaps a third of the troops could have been stood down. Certainly it was necessary to have a large proportion of the troops familiar with the local terrain remaining in place. It was the same with the Volkssturm in Küstrin. Much of their accommodation was full of lice because they had no change of clothing, which made them dirty and consequently unhappy and discouraged. They could have been brought back once every so often to have a good sleep, sort out their clothing and above all have a good wash and even get half a day’s training. These troops would certainly be valuable in the further fighting. Here is an example: