Fueled further by his father’s defection to America, Vasiliy’s anger left no room in his heart for forgiveness. The young officer often brooded over this moment and reaffirmed a long held determination to gain vengeance.
Vasiliy passed a fourth straight hour in the security vault, delving further into his favorite topic of strategic studies. Both elbows on the table, he considered the yet unread volumes stacked before him and rubbed his tired eyes. Fellow Zhukov officers had long since departed for the open mess hoping to avail themselves of vodkas which continued to be bought for the heroes of the Savo Island sinking.
He returned to his reading and reviewed several essays on current Soviet Navy planning. The Soviet approach offset an enemy goal to wrest control of the seas through their program, Maritime Strategy, where surface vessels carried the major load of combat operations. The Soviet Navy invested mainly in nuclear powered submarines of the attack class to counter this.
Soviet submarines enjoyed tactical advantage over allied surface warships and merchant ships, principally because they could remain undetected. They out-dove and outran everything in the U.S. anti- submarine warfare (ASW) arsenal except the ADCAP torpedo, carried only by U.S. submarines which the Soviets outnumbered five to one.
Aircraft carriers require twelve or more ships for logistic support, anti-aircraft warfare (AAW) and ASW protection. The collective radiated noise created by these ships made carrier battle groups easy to find and the Soviets quickly located them then maneuvered to point blank attack range.
The submarine is a lone wolf and holds exclusive advantage of surprise attack over all other warships. Best of all, they operate independently and need no support from other vessels.
A lone submarine and her crew of a hundred can disrupt the mission of twenty warships, manned by more than ten thousand seaman, a precedent established in the opening days of World War I. A German U-boat, manned by thirty-five seamen, attacked and destroyed an overwhelming superior force of three British battle cruisers manned by twenty-three hundred. Within an hour, three cruisers sank with the loss of more than fourteen hundred men.
From that day forward, submarines accounted for eighty percent of all combat related sinkings. If success in combat at sea accrues from sinking enemy ships, the smart money is invested in submarines.
Vasiliy wondered, Are the Americans oblivious to these facts? Is this why they blundered into their Maritime Strategy? Or did inter-warfare group bickering result in the American Navy being fully prepared only to fight the last war?
Between World Wars I and II, ignoring Germany’s near victory through U-boat destruction of twenty million tons of allied shipping, American naval planners focused instead on the issue of whether traditional battleships or the newly conceived naval air weapon held the greatest advantage.
At the onset of the Second World War, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor showed naval aviation to be in the driver’s seat. The fallacy in their theory revealed itself when Yamamoto’s planes overlooked the submarine base while en route to battleship row to destroy ships that would have virtually no impact on the outcome of the war. Within a week the by-passed U.S. submariners deployed throughout the Pacific and began a campaign that would bring Japan to her knees by the end of the war.
U.S. submariners systematically deprived Japan of its desperately needed access to the sea. Subsequent actions reduced imports below levels needed to sustain the mainland, much less those required to support ground forces throughout the Southwest Pacific. At Iwo Jima, U.S. Marines captured a Japanese garrison that had undergone sixty-five days without replenishment due to the U.S. submarine campaign.
Vasiliy thought, How good of the Americans to develop and battle test this strategy for us.
The advent of nuclear propulsion in 1955 enhanced submarine warfare of a magnitude beyond what all other naval warfare acquired through postwar technology. Diesel-Electric powered submarines of World War II remained submerged less than fifteen percent of their total deployment time. Long transits could be made only on the surface where they remained defenseless against warships and air forces.
Nuclear powered submarines remain independent of the atmosphere indefinitely.
American turncoat John Anthony Walker’s betrayal, with unwitting help from several allied nations, served much of this technology up to the Soviets on a silver platter.
Again, Vasiliy thought about the Americans. Perhaps the greatest weapon we have against capitalism is their own greed.
He recalled earlier Zhukov peacetime missions to monitor U.S. peacetime fleet exercises and observed repeated successful simulated attacks by 637 and 688 class submarines against carrier battle groups. He wondered whether the Americans knew of the Soviet surveillance and deliberately made themselves appear vulnerable. Now, Soviets subsequently confirmed these observations in real combat.
Soviet Intelligence also probed into the personal characteristics of prospective opposing warriors. Chinese General Sun-Tzu warned in 401 BC, Keep your friends close but your enemies closer.
American love of recognition supplied ample material to fill this Soviet need. Even officers of the silent service submarine arm shared an appetite for publicity. Character sketch brochures are handed out at Change of Command ceremonies, Submarine and Nuclear Power School graduations and Naval Academy yearbooks are compiled.
American newspapers openly published the detailed citations of officers being decorated. The Pacific Flotilla maintained an up-to-date directory on key officers serving in the U.S. Submarine Force.
Vasiliy believed this knowledge about his enemies would prove helpful in combat on the silent battleground and thought, When we have prevailed and there are no more wars to fight and I am a full admiral, perhaps I shall write a book.
Denver alternately raced then slowed and all but disappeared in the Pacific’s murky depths. The crew liked their Captain’s new look.
Gary Hansen quipped, “Sure is good to have my chair back.”
He was sonar supervisor on Brent’s watch and alluded to the captain’s heretofore-continuous presence in the sonar shack. A new sign on the door proclaimed Findin’ Ivan despite a standing order for posting nothing but official literature.
The glib Hansen reasoned, “We’re at war now, a special situation not covered in the standing orders.”
Not to be outdone the torpedo gang hung labels on each of the four-launcher breech doors: Vodka Express, Moscow Mule, Bottom Line and Utah’s Revenge.
A standing submarine axiom goes, clean ship, happy crew, hence the forenoon watch of each Friday found the crew busy at field day. Every man not on watch rousted out and manned his cleaning station. All did their best to make their ship a comfortable and inspiring place in which to perform Denver’s mission.
Initiated by the quick-witted Gary Hansen, the resumption of field day resulted in Ensign Woody Parnell becoming the butt of a prank by the crew. “Mr. Parnell, sir, we could clean these launcher doors much better if we had a bucket of steam.”
The gullible Woody replied, “A bucket of steam? What good would that do?”