“That message was made very clear by your President’s television announcement yesterday,” Tang said. “As we indicated in our response, the Teguina government has stated that Jose Samar has no authority to conduct foreign policy or dictate military terms anywhere in the Philippines, including Mindanao or the separate southern state. Therefore, Samar’s words have no meaning and your position is illegal and completely without merit.”
“The Philippine constitution granted Samar’s state the right of self-defense,” Danahall pointed out. “Samar is completely within his powers to delegate that responsibility.”
“That is a matter for the United Nations to decide,” Tang said. “They should be allowed to deliberate the matter.”
“We agree,” Danahall said. “But the survival of the autonomous government of Jose Samar is in the best interest of the United States, and the position and strength of Chinese forces threaten their survival. Will the Chinese military agree to cease all hostile actions and pull its forces back until the matter of Mindanao sovereignty is decided?”
“I think that would be an important consideration,” Tang said, “except for Jose Samar’s rebel forces. President Teguina maintains, and my government agrees, that a ceasefire will only allow the rebels to consolidate their position and stage more and deadlier attacks on innocent citizens. We have tried to negotiate with Samar, with no success — we have even sent envoys to Guam to attempt to talk with Samar there. He will not speak with us. He ties our hands…”
“Your military forces are much more powerful than his,” Kellogg observed. “You have nearly a hundred warships in the south Philippines alone; your forces outnumber his ten to one. It’s reasonable to assume he’s afraid of being crushed to death by the sheer size of your forces.”
“A cease-fire has to be made in the spirit of cooperation and fairness,” Tang said. “We will hold our present positions and stop all new troop additions if Samar agrees to withdraw his forces and come to the bargaining table.”
“You must withdraw your forces from the Philippines first…”
“We are in the Philippines by invitation of the legitimate President,” Tang Said calmly. “We need not deal with rebel leaders such as Samar, or for that matter with the American government…”
“Samar is also a member of the Philippine government,” Danahall said pointedly.
“I understand Samar has been brought up on charges of treason and corruption by the government,” Tang said. “He has been stripped of his authority until his trial — if he ever surrenders himself to justice…”
“The United States does not recognize the Teguina government, because we have no evidence that President Arturo Mikaso is dead,” Cesare said. Tang shifted his interlaced hands slightly, as if gesturing that, yes, Mikaso was really dead. “Can you confirm Mikaso’s present situation? Is he dead?”
“I cannot confirm that, sir…”
“If you cannot confirm it, we will not recognize Teguina’s presidency,” Danahall said. “In which case the constitution is still valid and Samar has equal power and authority as Teguina…”
“Samar appears to be fleeing from justice — he is acting like a common criminal,” Tang said. “He is hiding in the jungles, he refuses to speak with his own government, he is inciting the people to revolt. Stories I have heard say that he has the backing of several Islamic terrorist organizations to help him win the presidency by violence. How can the United States back such a man?”
Those rumors about the terrorist groups, unfortunately, were true — several Moslem terrorist groups had pledged themselves to Samar to help him overthrow the Chinese, the Americans, and the Manila government. It was a major source of embarrassment for President Taylor right now. But Danahall replied, “Samar is understandably in fear for his life, especially with Chinese troops in Manila. He is not in hiding; he is en route to Guam under the protection of the U.S. government until this matter can be resolved.
“I think the best option right now is for all foreign troops to get out of the Philippines and leave that government to itself. If we can have reasonable assurances that the will of the people is being done and that peace is being restored, then we will not object to any further Chinese incursions. But the United States regards the current level of Chinese military involvement as an invasion, and we are now in a position to stop it. Will the Chinese pull out of the Philippines?”
Tang made a few notes in a small notebook. “I will deliver your query to my government,” the ambassador said, “along with your earlier statements and concerns.” Tang then closed his notebook, as if signaling an end to their meeting; it had lasted only a few minutes.
“Have you any messages from your government, Mr. Ambassador?” Secretary Danahall asked. “Does your government simply request that the world allow you to occupy the Philippines with large military forces? Or do you want nothing more than to be a willing mercenary for Daniel Teguina’s first coup?”
“We are not seeking conquest, only stability for my country,” Tang said. “We see the unrest in the Philippines as extremely injurious to Chinese trade, foreign relations, and social and political stability in our own country. As you know, gentlemen, the Philippines has many ethnic Chinese in its population, as well as loyal supporters of the world socialist movement, all of whom have suffered in past years. If we fail to support Communist leaders overseas and allow those with common beliefs and heritage to be slain and dominated by others, how would my government appear in the eyes of its own people?”
Danahall, Cesare, and Kellogg refrained from replying or voicing their outrage at Tang’s flamboyant, rhetorical remarks. Finally, after all these weeks of waiting, all these days of threats of military conflict, the Chinese were going to get around to their demands — it would not be useful at this point to interrupt, no matter how offbeat or disagreeable his words were.
“We are also very concerned about other problems in the South China Sea region, namely the dispute over the Spratly Islands and Palawan. China has claimed possession of those islands for hundreds of years; we feel we have the right to develop those islands, all of those islands, as we see fit. The current inequitable division of the Spratly Islands will no doubt cause much bloodshed in the future.
“The Philippine island of Palawan also once belonged to China, as evidenced by the large number of ethnic Chinese living there.” Tang paused knowingly, making eye contact with the Americans before him, and said, “If Chinese claims to the Spratly Islands and Palawan could be resolved in a way favorable to all concerned, perhaps a way might be found to avert disaster and bloodshed.”
So that was it, Danahall thought: China wanted the Spratly Islands and Palawan.
Danahall and his staff had had to do some serious cramming in recent days to reacquaint themselves with those two island chains that China seemed ready to go to war over. And, historically, Tang was right — several hundred years ago, before European explorers ventured to the Orient in large numbers, Chinese merchantmen, fishermen, and refugees did populate most of the islands in the South China Sea, including the Spratlys and most of the Philippines. Like the Spratlys, Palawan had been occupied and claimed by many Asian, Polynesian, and European nations over the centuries. At least a dozen countries had claims for these rugged, dangerous islands.
But all that was rather ancient history. China might have a fairly solid claim to the Spratly Islands — which they had already reportedly traded to Vietnam, at least for the time being — but whether they had any modern claim to Palawan was another thing entirely. What possible use China had for Palawan was a mystery to Danahall. The island was mountainous, sparsely populated, and useless as a shipping or trading port because of its proximity to the “Dangerous Ground,” the shallow waters of the South China Sea, so hazardous to commercial freighters. It might make a strategic air-base location from which to threaten islands and waters belonging to other ASEAN countries, but even that was doubtful. Was this some sort of new manifest destiny for China — or a cover for something else…?