Since 1978 democratically elected municipal governments in many cities have tried to alleviate some of the worst effects of the uncontrolled urban boom of the 1960s. They acquired more parkland and began to provide a variety of public cultural facilities. Meanwhile, growth in the larger metropolitan areas has shifted from the central cities to the suburbs. Even smaller cities, such as Valladolid, León, and Granada, have begun to suburbanize. Demographic trends
Spain: Age breakdownEncyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
Population density of Spain.Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.Spain experienced the traditional preindustrial pattern of high birth and death rates throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, but both began to decline shortly after 1900. The slow but continuous fall of birth rates stalled during the 20 years after the Spanish Civil War, when the Franco regime (1939–75) followed policies that encouraged large families. In the late 1960s the decline resumed. The low birth rate, which was especially marked among young women, contributed to a rate of natural increase that was near zero at the end of the 20th century, though in the beginning of the 21st century there was an upturn fuelled by the birth rate among the immigrant population.
Death rates declined steadily after 1940, although they rose slightly during the 1990s as the population aged. However, life expectancy in Spain increased dramatically, and by the end of the 20th century it was among the highest in the world. The greatest improvement was in the area of infant mortality. The striking overall change was a result of the higher standard of living made possible by the economic “miracle” of the 1960s and by the general availability of high-quality medical care through the government-sponsored system.
By the 1990s Spain’s major demographic indicators were similar to those of other industrialized countries of western Europe. As birth rates and death rates declined and life expectancy increased, the Spanish population aged significantly during the final decades of the 20th century, posing a growing challenge to the Spanish economy and society.
The Spanish population grew rapidly in the 30 years after the Civil War, in part because the death rate fell more quickly than the birth rate but also because of changes in marriage patterns. In the years immediately after the war, economic hardship discouraged people from marrying, and the average age at first marriage rose. By the mid-1940s, however, the percentage of those who married grew significantly (especially among women), reaching its highest level between 1955 and 1960 and remaining high until the mid-1970s, when it began to decline markedly. Likewise the average age at first marriage decreased until the 1990s, when it began climbing again. By the end of the 20th century the average age of first marriage for women had risen again (to between 25 to 29), and the average age at which women had their first child was about 30.
Beginning in the 1970s, Spaniards also began to have fewer children, and at the turn of the 21st century the total fertility rate was one of the lowest in Europe and well below the rate of replacement. The size of the average household also declined during this period, and the number of Spaniards living in traditional households, composed of a married couple and their children, also dropped. Economy
The Spanish economy began to industrialize in the late 18th century, and industrialization and economic growth continued throughout the 19th century. However, it was limited to a few relatively small areas of the country, especially to Catalonia (where textile manufacture took hold) and the Basque Country (where iron and steel were made). The overall pace of economic growth was slower than that of the major western European countries, so that by the early 20th century Spain appeared poor and underdeveloped compared with countries such as Great Britain, Germany, France, and even Italy.
The Spanish Civil War and its aftermath left Spain even farther behind, and the economic policies of the Franco regime failed to revitalize the economy. For nearly two decades after the war, the government followed a policy of autarky, or national economic self-sufficiency, similar to the policies of the pre-World War II fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. This approach entailed high levels of government intervention through highly protective tariffs, currency regulation, marketing boards for agriculture, and import controls. There was also a high degree of government ownership, realized through the National Industrial Institute (INI), which was created in 1941 to develop defense-related industries and other industries ignored by the private sector. The self-imposed economic isolation was reinforced by the Western democracies, which shunned Spain after 1945 because of its “fascist” government. Spain did not receive Marshall Plan aid from the United States and was excluded from a number of international organizations.
Spain’s autarkic policies were a failure, and by the late 1950s the country was on the verge of economic collapse. This crisis led to a major change in economic policy, and in 1959 a team of technocrats announced the Economic Stabilization Plan. This plan allowed a less-restrained market economy and the fuller integration of Spain into the international capitalist economy. The Stabilization Plan set the stage for the period of rapid economic growth known as the Spanish economic miracle. From 1960 until 1974 Spain’s economy grew an average of 6.6 percent per year, more quickly than that of any country in the world except Japan, and agriculture fell from being the most important sector of the economy in terms of employment to the least.
Spain’s economic miracle occurred during a period of high prosperity in the West, and it was largely dependent on these favourable external circumstances. Three factors were especially important. The first was foreign investment in Spain. Limited under the policy of autarky, it increased rapidly once the economy had been liberalized. The United States was the most important source, followed by West Germany. The second significant factor was tourism. General prosperity made foreign travel possible for many Europeans and North Americans. With its many beaches, warm climate, and bargain prices, Spain became an attractive destination, and tourism quickly became the country’s largest industry. The third factor was emigrant remittances. From 1959 to 1974 more than one million Spaniards left the country. The vast majority went to Switzerland, West Germany, and France, countries whose growing economies were creating a massive demand for unskilled labour. There they joined Portuguese, Italians, Yugoslavs, and Turks as “guest workers.” These emigrants sent large sums of money back to Spain—more than $1 billion in 1973 alone.
The great dependence on external conditions, however, made Spain’s economic growth vulnerable to economic changes elsewhere as the Franco era ended. The oil crisis of 1973, which initiated an extended period of inflation and economic uncertainty in the Western world, brought Spain’s economic growth to a halt. Political instability following Franco’s death in 1975 compounded these problems. The clearest sign of change was the dramatic increase in unemployment. The unemployment rate rose from 4 percent in 1975 to 11 percent by 1980, before peaking at more than 20 percent in 1985.
Economic growth returned, however, during the late 1980s, spurred by industrial restructuring and integration into the European Economic Community (EEC). Although growth rates were well below those of the 1960s, they were still among the highest in western Europe. Unlike the earlier boom, this one was accompanied by high inflation and continuing high unemployment, which, though lower than in previous years, were nonetheless significantly higher than the EEC averages. Although unemployment began to drop, at 16 percent in 1990 it was almost double the average for the EEC. Young people trying to join the workforce for the first time were hit particularly hard.