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At the same time, the Russian infantry moved into the attack against the 1st/57th breaching the centre of the line and threatening to split the battalion in two. To prevent this and chase the Russians off, Lieutenant Fenet collected all his available forces on the right wing of the battalion and counterattacked immediately along the line of the front.

The counterattack succeeded and while the battalion was regrouping not far from Bärenwalde, contact was established with the 1st/58th defending the edge of the woods in liaison with elements of the 15th SS-Latvian Division. At about 1100 hours Lieutenant Fenet learnt that orders had been issued at 0800 hours for him to return to Bärenwalde, where fierce fighting had been going on all morning.

At about 0600 hours, the first Russian reconnaissance units made contact with the 1st/58th and were vigorously repelled. The first proper attack took place at 0900 hours and was also checked with the loss of a few casualties. Although the battalion had contact with the 2nd/57th on the left, with which its initial forward positions were aligned, it had no contact with anyone on the right, neither German, Latvian, 1st/57th, nor even Rigeade’s 3rd Company, which had been detached to occupy a position to the southeast. The 1st/58th thus had no protection on its right flank.

Captain Monneuse therefore ordered Lieutenant Tardan to make contact with the 3rd Company. Lieutenant Tardan took with him his command group and a section of mortars under Sergeant Salmon, and spent 2 hours searching for it in vain. Then, seeing elements of the 1st/57th and Latvians coming back, he sent the mortar section to opposite Bärenwalde along the Neustettin–Schlochau railway line, which was being organised as the second line of defence.

Several violent attacks developed on the 1st/58th’s front during the course of the morning, but, after enduring the heavy opening bombardments, the battalion was able to check all the Russian attacks. The 1st/57th played its part late in the morning when it came under flanking fire from the heavy weapons of the Russian infantry. Once it had stopped an attack, it continued on its way.

But the enemy had more success in the 2nd/57th’s sector, breaking all contact between the 1st/58th and the 2nd/57th. The Soviets occupied Bärenwalde and infiltrated the rear of the 1st/58th, obliging Captain Monneuse to withdraw in turn. Being delayed, he ordered Lieutenant Géromini’s 2nd Company to open a passage and then provide a rearguard for the battalion’s withdrawal.

The 2nd Company’s attack proved irresistible and all the heavy weapons got through without incident except for two 75mm guns, the carriages of which had been damaged and were made unserviceable. All the wounded were carried out on the men’s backs to the new position along the railway line.

It was almost noon when the vanguard of the 1st/57th came into sight of Bärenwalde and found that the village was already occupied by Russian tanks. The 1st/57th then made a half turn to resume contact with the 1st/58th, but some members of that battalion encountered on the way said that there had just been another Russian attack, more violent than before and supported by flame-throwers, which had completely disorganised the defence.

With the Russians occupying Bärenwalde and advancing along the Heinrichswalde road to Hammerstein, Fenet’s 1st/57th was in danger of being encircled. To avoid this, the battalion marched westwards under cover of the woods that occupied a large part of the terrain between Bärenwalde and Hammerstein, and arrived at the camp at nightfall having sustained another two attacks on the way.

Second-Lieutenant Rigeade’s 3rd Company of the 1st/58th had occupied the position designated, well away from the remainder of the battalion, at night and without prior reconnaissance, in liaison with the 15th SS-Latvian Division. The first Russian attack occurred at 0900 hours on the 25th. The Latvians dug in on the right were soon located by the enemy and, coming under heavy mortar fire, quickly withdrew. Believing that they had swept aside all resistance, the Russian infantry continued to advance but had to retire rapidly when they came under surprise fire from the well-camouflaged 3rd Company.

Then elements of the 1st/57th passed by, coming from the south as they withdrew towards Bärenwalde. Now isolated without contact to either left or right, Second-Lieutenant Rigeade was withdrawing his company on the road to Bärenwalde when two tanks with infantry escorts emerged from the woods on his right. The latter were engaged with automatic fire and one tank was damaged by a Panzerfaust, but the company was split into three groups, which then made their way through the woods to reach Bärenhütte.

The withdrawal of the 2nd/57th was covered by the infantry guns of the regimental company and the heavy weapons of Second-Lieutenant Philippe Colnion’s 8th Company deployed alongside the railway line, as well as a combat team from Second-Lieutenant Brunet’s 6th Company. The remains of the 2nd/57th, in some disarray, had to regroup behind the railway line to the left of Bärenwalde station, which served as the rough boundary with the 1st/58th, of which there was still no news, and the first elements of which had yet to withdraw.

Towards midday on 25 February, as Brigadier Puaud and SS-Colonel Zimmermann watched from the front line, the Russians launched a new attack. Despite the incredible ravage caused to this human tide, the wave of attackers advanced steadily and some twenty tanks emerged from Bärenwalde with the support of ground-assault aircraft. The 6th Company of the 2nd/57th, which had not yet completed its withdrawal, put up a magnificent defence, and was able to break contact thanks to the very heavy and precise fire from Captain Robert Roy’s infantry gun company, which stopped the enemy and allowed the withdrawal to take place.

A total of four enemy tanks were destroyed. The first by an NCO using a Panzerfaust, the second by a mine placed by the regiment’s engineer section, the two others by the regimental 75mm anti-tank guns that were old training pieces towed into position by a tractor taken from the Latvians. However, these guns were soon silenced and rendered useless. Officer-Cadet Vincenot, who was directing their fire, was seriously injured as a result of this violent enemy fire, and Lieutenant Flacy was wounded by a tank shell.

But the enemy started gaining ground and losses were heavy. The position became untenable and, after an hour of fighting, Captain de Bourmont was obliged to give the order to withdraw at the very moment that the first elements of the 1st/58th pulled back on the right wing.

The 2nd/57th was the first to set off to the north towards Elsenau, but its 7th and 8th Companies remained isolated north of the road and railway. Cut off, they retired fighting all the way to Elsenau. Lieutenant Artus, the regimental adjutant, was killed by a burst of fire. As a result of the last attack, an important breach had been made in the centre of the regiment’s lines several hundred metres from the railway station, dislocating the units. The withdrawal was confused and the seriously wounded had to be abandoned. The officers, without exception, stayed behind to cover the men’s withdrawal.

On a bend in the road at the bottom of a ravine, 300m along the way, elements of the 1st and 2nd Companies of the 58th had set up an anti-tank ambush, just in time to catch the first Russian tank surging through. It was destroyed with a hit from a Panzerfaust, probably fired by Lieutenant Fatin, while Sergeant Robert destroyed another by the same means.

Held back by this action, Lieutenants Fatin and Géromini with some of their men lost contact with the remainder of the 1st/58th and followed Captain de Bourmont, who, with the remainder of the 2nd/57th, withdrew to the divisional command post at Elsenau. This village was held by the Inspectorate’s small Honour Guard and Training Company, commanded by SS-Lieutenant Wilhelm Weber.