The principles of realpolitik that often guided Stalin in the international arena called for caution. Continuing the policy of a divided Korea while strengthening the Communist North as a force to counteract the Americans seemed like the best option. Kim Il Sung’s demands, or rather insistent requests, to reunify the country by force were easy for him to continue to turn down. The China factor aside, the North Korean leaders were still Stalin’s puppets. Only the USSR could give the North Koreans arms and other vital resources needed for the government to survive. The Chinese themselves relied on Soviet assistance.
Tilting the scales in the other direction was the great-power urge for expansion, the natural tendency to fill a void and capture territory that was not clearly spoken for. Many scholars believe that Stalin may have been emboldened by a statement the Americans made in January 1950 about the sphere of the United States’ national interests that included no mention of Korea. It sounded like an admission of American weakness after defeat in China. Optimistic assurances by Kim Il Sung and a wager on a pro-Communist uprising in the South’s rear offered the prospect of a blitzkrieg that would confront the United States with a fait accompli and leave no time for effective intervention. Also heavily weighing the scales on this side were the pretentions of the USSR, and Stalin personally, to the role of leader of the revolutionary movement in the Third World. Finally, Stalin may have wanted to compensate for setbacks in Europe.
Whatever his thinking was, in early 1950 Stalin decided in favor of action and signaled Kim Il Sung that he could begin preparing an invasion. In April Kim came to Moscow to meet with Stalin and discuss the details.93 Together they outlined a plan and timeline for the war, and with the help of the USSR, the North Koreans began urgent preparations. By the time combat began, they had acquired a huge advantage over the South. On 25 June 1950, Kim Il Sung’s troops began their offensive. Like many other attempts at blitzkrieg, this one met with defeat. The rapid response by the United States, which Stalin had worried about but chosen to discount, dramatically changed the situation. The American leadership saw the aggression in Korea as the start of a broad Soviet offensive that would ultimately include Europe.94 Having decided to intervene, the Americans quickly outmaneuvered the Soviet bloc diplomatically. A session of the UN Security Council, convened the very day military operations began, condemned the North as the aggressor (Yugoslavia abstained and the Soviet ambassador was absent).95 Soon afterward, American troops landed in South Korea and were quickly joined by forces from fifteen other states, a fact that was of greater political than military significance.
Despite some initial successes by the North, this start to the war dampened Kim Il Sung’s confidence. Stalin demanded that the war go on and encouraged the North Koreans with advice and new deliveries of military hardware. “In our opinion the attack absolutely must continue and the sooner South Korea is liberated the less chance there is for intervention,” Stalin wrote the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang on 1 July 1950.96 But the wager on a victorious conclusion to the war before serious American forces could reach the peninsula failed. After capturing almost all of South Korea by September, the North Koreans were not able to fully expel its government. The Americans launched a powerful counterstrike. Under the UN flag, coalition forces advanced rapidly and by the end of October had captured most of North Korea and taken Pyongyang. The time had come for the Soviet side to play its final card: the Chinese “volunteers.”
Now began the confusing and still little-studied negotiations between Stalin and the Chinese leadership. At one point it appeared they had ended in failure. On 13 October Stalin sent the following directive to Kim Il Sung: “We feel that continuing resistance is pointless. The Chinese comrades are refusing to take part militarily. Under these circumstances you must prepare to evacuate completely to China and/or the USSR. It is of the utmost importance to withdraw all troops and military hardware. Draw up a detailed plan of action and follow it rigorously. The potential for fighting the enemy in the future must be preserved.”97
The Soviet ambassador urgently met with the North Korean leaders and read them Stalin’s telegram. As the ambassador reported, “Kim Il Sung stated that it was very hard for them [to accept Stalin’s recommendation], but since there is such advice they will fulfill it.”98 How serious was Stalin’s directive? Was he truly prepared to lose North Korea? Apparently he was. If the Chinese refused to send troops, Stalin had no other option since he categorically rejected the idea of bringing in Soviet troops. It is also possible, however, that Stalin believed the decision to evacuate forces might lead the Chinese to think twice. The American advance was more threatening to China than to the USSR. Furthermore, having announced his intention to withdraw, Stalin continued to try to engage the Chinese. He made concessions on the question of arms deliveries and offered more specific promises to deploy Soviet air cover. These efforts bore fruit. Mao agreed to enter the war. “The old man writes to us that we must step up,” is how he described Stalin’s demands to his comrades.99
Battered by the Chinese, the South Koreans and their allies withdrew from North Korea. In early 1951 they lost Seoul for the second time. Then came a counterstrike from the South. It was beginning to look like neither side could achieve a decisive victory. The Soviet Union tried to stay in the shadows, although Stalin did keep his promise to provide covert air support for Kim Il Sung’s and Mao Zedong’s forces. The main victims of this great-power standoff were the Korean people. Millions of lives were lost, and the Koreans were forced to live as a divided nation. Those in the North endured one of history’s most brutal dictatorships, a regime that largely followed the Stalinist model.
The Korean War heightened international tensions and spurred the arms race. While the development of military industries had always been an unquestioned priority for the Soviet leadership, during the final years of Stalin’s life the buildup moved to a new level. In January 1951 a meeting was held between the Soviet leadership and top officials from the Eastern bloc. Archival documents relating to this meeting remain classified. The only reason historians know it even took place is that it is mentioned in various memoirs. The most detailed description of what happened there is given in the memoirs of Hungarian Communist Party leader Matyas Rakosi. According to his account, the Soviet side was represented by Stalin and several members of the Politburo and military. The East European countries sent their first party secretaries and defense ministers (only the Polish party secretary was absent). Sergei Shtemenko, chief of the General Staff of the armed forces of the USSR, gave a speech about the growing threat from NATO and the need to counterbalance it with a military buildup by the socialist countries. The Soviet leadership assigned the satellite countries the task of greatly increasing the size of their armies within three years and creating a military-industrial foundation to support this enhanced military might. Shtemenko provided specific numerical targets.
Rakosi states that Shtemenko’s numbers provoked debate. He quotes the Polish defense minister, Konstantin Rokossovsky, as saying that the army the Poles were being asked to assemble by 1953 was already being planned but would not be attainable until 1956. Other representatives also questioned their countries’ abilities to manage such a rapid buildup. The Soviets, however, were adamant. Stalin answered Rokossovsky that the timetable set forth by the Poles could remain in place only if Rokossovsky could guarantee no new wars before 1956. Absent such a guarantee, it was better to adopt Shtemenko’s proposal.100