Stalin

Stalin, not surprisingly, was indignant, perhaps even furious. He responded to the grievances of his “friends” with a show of hurt feelings and accusations of their undermining unity. On 3 August 1923, immediately after meeting with Ordzhonikidze, he wrote to Zinoviev and Bukharin: “Evidently you’re not hesitant to make ready for a break, as if it were inescapable.… Do as you wish—there must be some people in Russia who will see that for what it is and condemn the guilty.… But what fortunate people you are: you’re able to dream up all sorts of fairy tales at your leisure … while I’m stuck here like a chained dog and turn out to be ‘guilty’ to boot. You can tell anyone you want. All that soft living has gone to your heads, my friends.”⁷⁷

This half-angry, half-friendly letter attests to Stalin’s relatively limited options in opposing his colleagues. For their part, Zinoviev’s and Bukharin’s proposals signaled that they still felt they could limit Stalin’s influence. They were not impressed by Stalin’s expression of injury. Calmly but firmly they let him know that the matter was not settled. Soon they would be able to meet face to face in the south, where Stalin was planning to vacation in mid-August.

Stalin could not have relished this prospect. His opponents held all the cards. Their proposal to reorganize the secretariat so as to promote unity and cohesion seemed perfectly reasonable. Stalin’s objections would appear to confirm Lenin’s warnings that he did not want to work as part of a team. Zinoviev’s accusation that Stalin was violating the principle of collective leadership also put him in an awkward position. And another idea advanced by Zinoviev and Bukharin could prove particularly dangerous—that Stalin’s position on events in Germany was “incorrect.”

The political crises that had shaken Germany since early 1923 had reawakened Moscow’s dream of salvation through European revolution. For the Bolsheviks, who still had trouble imagining a future for the USSR if it remained the only socialist bastion, socialism in Germany would be a great relief. But they took warning from the European revolutionary movements’ recent defeats. Stalin was among the Bolshevik leaders who urged restraint, while Zinoviev and Bukharin were eager to do battle, as was Trotsky, for whom world revolution remained a precondition for the victory of socialism in Russia. Realizing that his cautious approach was becoming politically dangerous and gave his rivals ammunition against him, Stalin made an effective political move. On 9 August 1923, amid frantic letter writing with Zinoviev and Bukharin, he placed a resolution before the Politburo summoning Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Bukharin back to Moscow to discuss the prospects for revolution in Germany. Naturally, all three agreed. The meeting was set for 21 August.

This change of plans gave Stalin important advantages. He deflected charges that he was not sufficiently attentive to revolutionary developments in Germany. Also, the question of reorganizing the secretariat and the collective leadership was pushed off the agenda by the more urgent German problem. Stalin had managed to disrupt Zinoviev’s and Bukharin’s offensive and had forced them to follow a new script. After gathering in Moscow on 21 August, the Politburo heatedly and enthusiastically discussed the impending German revolution, the assistance the USSR would provide, and the possible responses by European powers. Everyone agreed that war was imminent. Supporting his colleagues’ optimism, Stalin stated: “If we really want to help the Germans, and we do want that and must help, we have to prepare for war seriously and thoroughly, since in the end it will be a matter of the existence of the Soviet Federation and of the fate of world revolution in the near future.… Either the revolution in Germany will collapse and they will beat us, or revolution will succeed there and everything will go well, and our situation will be assured. There is no other option.”⁷⁸

Here we see that Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders still shared the opinion that the USSR’s fate was tied to the fate of world revolution, although the extent of this interdependence was not discussed in detail. What exactly did Stalin mean by “they will beat us” or “our situation will be assured”? What would this “beating” entail, and just what kind of assurance did he expect? These appear to be empty phrases, a nod to Marxist orthodoxy. When it came to tactical questions, he still sounded cautious and skeptical. He refused to support Trotsky and Zinoviev’s proposal to set an exact date for the German revolution, believing it was better to make preparations and await the right moment. He also warned against hasty “leftism”: “Concerning the [German Communist] leftists. They are the most dangerous people for us. A premature takeover of factories, etc., would hold great dangers for us.”⁷⁹ On the question of setting an exact timetable for revolution, he wound up in the same camp as Bukharin and Aleksei Rykov.⁸⁰ The latter was the most consistent adherent of caution: “It is completely clear that everything is being bet on this one card. We are absolutely not ready.… We have to back off.”⁸¹

With war supposedly looming, the reorganization of the secretariat must have seemed inconsequential. We do not know how and when this issue, which just two weeks earlier had seemed vitally important, was finally resolved—probably some agreement was reached in the corridors during breaks between meetings devoted to Germany. As a result, in September 1923 a rather pointless decision was made: Zinoviev and Trotsky were made members of the Central Committee’s Organizational Bureau rather than the secretariat. This move would do nothing to solve the original problem—Stalin’s excessive control over decision making, to which Zinoviev and Bukharin had so hotly objected in July and August.

An event of great political significance took place at a plenary session of the Central Committee in September. The plenum adopted a decision to place Stalin and Voroshilov on the governing bodies of the military—Trotsky’s domain. Trotsky was being surrounded by his political opponents on his own turf. He stormed out of the plenum in indignation.⁸²

Historians still lack information on how this highly provocative attack against Trotsky was staged. It must have emerged from behind-the-scenes collusion between (at least) Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. They may have rationalized their actions with the following logic: events in Europe were coming to a head. The role of the Red Army and the military would be crucial, as it had been during the Civil War, and the influence of the Red Army’s recognized leader would grow. The military therefore had to be brought under the control of Politburo members other than Trotsky before he became too powerful. It is unclear who initiated the ejection of Trotsky from the army’s leadership. What is clear is that Stalin benefited significantly from this sharp escalation in the power struggle among the party’s top leadership.

Aggrieved and isolated, in October 1923 Trotsky launched a counterattack. He submitted a letter to the membership of the party’s Central Committee and Central Control Commission charging that the majority of Politburo members were conducting a misguided and unsound policy. He became a magnet for dissatisfied members. A fierce struggle broke out in which Zinoviev and other Politburo members, even those who felt that Stalin was already too powerful, were forced to join forces with him. In the coming two years this polarization—the Trotsky camp versus the Stalin camp—would serve Stalin well.

Discussion of Lenin’s last dictated texts, about the need to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary, was shaped by this battle. Lenin died in January 1924. In May came the next party congress. During the congress, party leaders decided to disclose Lenin’s “testament.” By general consensus this was done in such a way as to minimize the sting to Stalin. Lenin’s final dictated words were not read at a general session of the congress but at the meetings of separate delegations.⁸³ This procedure made it inevitable: Stalin was reelected as general secretary. Trotsky did not speak out, but it was not his silence that helped Stalin. Trotsky’s very presence was enough.