Would a man living in serious fear of attack venture—let alone relish—such an excursion? The intensification of repression that came in late 1934 was prompted by more complex calculations. Kirov’s murder provided an ideal pretext for action of the sort any dictatorship relies on to promote its central task: solidifying the power of the dictator. Admittedly, by late 1934, Stalin was already a dictator, but dictatorships, like any unstable system of government, depend on the constant crushing of threats. During this period, Stalin faced two such threats, which at first glance appear unrelated. The first was the remnant of the system of “collective leadership” within the Politburo, and the second was the survival of a significant number of former oppositionists. These threats belonged to what might be called Bolshevik tradition. They hung over Stalin like a sword of Damocles, reminders that there were alternatives to sole dictatorship. His fellow Politburo members enjoyed significant administrative, if not political, independence. They ran the various branches of government and had a host of clients from within the party and state apparats. The bonds of institutional and clan loyalties, along with the vestiges of collective leadership and intraparty democracy, were the last impediments to sole and unquestioned power.
In a speech given in early 1937, Stalin divided senior officials into several categories. He labeled one “the generals of the party” (the three or four thousand most senior officials) and another “the party’s officers” (thirty to forty thousand mid-level officials).79 Until the mid-1930s, the party’s old guard had held a place of honor within these two groups, but Stalin had reason to distrust these respected figures. Whatever they might say from the podium, however earnestly they swore allegiance to him, he knew: these party elders well remembered that Lenin’s testament at one point almost brought Stalin’s political career to an end, and he had held onto power only through the support of Zinoviev and Kamenev; that in the late 1920s Stalin had managed to defeat the Rykov-Bukharin group only with the support of the Central Committee; and that party policy in the 1930s had brought about catastrophic failures. By 1937, party functionaries had every reason to regard Stalin as “first among equals,” but not so long ago he had been one among many jockeying for position. Stalin knew that the old guard had the clearest memory of that time.
Over long years of collaboration, the Old Bolsheviks had established close relationships with each other. Stalin periodically shuffled the deck, but it was hard to disrupt the networks of personal loyalty that had formed around officials at various levels. Leaders took “their people” with them from job to job. The people in these networks had divided loyalties: they served the dictator, but they also had their own patrons within the Politburo or other high-level bodies. Of course all of these groups lacked formal cohesion and political power. No one has yet found evidence of a serious effort by them to oppose Stalin. At most, they expressed their dissatisfaction privately. But like any dictator, Stalin assumed the worst. He anticipated being stabbed in the back the moment the domestic or international situation worsened. Replacing the old guard with absolutely devoted younger stalwarts was a critical aspect of his program to solidify his position. The growing threat of war provoked the vozhd’s anxiety and desire to secure his power in case the unexpected happened. “The conqueror’s peace of mind requires the death of the conquered.” This phrase, attributed to Genghis Khan, was underlined in one of the books in Stalin’s library.80
The conquered—the repentant and humiliated former oppositionists—were indeed a worrisome subgroup within the community of Old Bolsheviks. Although the secret police kept a close watch over them, the former oppositionists were still party members in good standing. Many held posts within the government and even the party apparat, or they had senior positions in major economic enterprises. Most Old Bolsheviks remembered the role the oppositionists had played during the glory days of the revolution. Kirov’s murder and the fabricated case alleging that followers of Zinoviev and Kamenev were involved in a terrorist plot changed everything. The former opposition was transformed overnight from comrades who had once committed political indiscretions into “enemies” and “terrorists.”
The former oppositionists were not the only ones affected by this sudden transformation. Among the old guard it was hard to find anyone who was not in some way tied to them. A significant proportion of Soviet generals had served under Trotsky, who had founded the Red Army and led it for many years. Many up-and-coming functionaries had “erred” in their youth. In the 1920s, either because they were not yet sure which way the winds were blowing or were simply following their hearts, many had at some point supported the opposition. Others developed friendships with future members of the opposition during their years underground and during the revolution or when they fought side by side during the Civil War. Some had recently collaborated with repentant oppositionists. In short, in striking a blow against the former oppositionists, Stalin launched a huge shake-up in the party ranks. It allowed him both to take care of political opponents who might have been lurking in the shadows and to purge the apparat overall, including getting rid of some of his Politburo comrades.
Between 1935 and early 1937, the persecution of former oppositionists was accompanied by shake-ups at the highest echelons of power. The Kirov murder strengthened the position of three enterprising young men: Nikolai Yezhov, Andrei Zhdanov, and Nikita Khrushchev. Yezhov’s promotion was especially significant. It was on his shoulders that Stalin placed direct responsibility for conducting the purge. After acquitting himself well in fabricating cases during the Kirov Affair, Yezhov was entrusted with a new assignment—the Kremlin Affair. In early 1935 a group of support staff working in government offices located in the Kremlin—maids, librarians, and members of the Kremlin commandant’s staff—were arrested and accused of plotting against Stalin. Among those arrested were several relatives of Lev Kamenev, who was charged with hatching the plot.81 The arrestees came under the authority of Stalin’s old friend Avel Yenukidze, who oversaw the running of all Kremlin facilities, and he was accused of abetting the plot.82 Stalin took a great interest in the Kremlin Affair. The archives show that he regularly received and read arrestee interrogation protocols, made notations on them, and gave specific instructions to the NKVD.83
Although Yenukidze was not a member of the Politburo, he was an intimate part of the system of collective leadership insofar as he was close friends with many top officials, including Stalin himself. Stalin in essence used Yenukidze to test the durability of the collective leadership system. This was the dictator’s first significant strike against his inner circle. The test was successful. The Politburo offered only weak resistance, and Yenukidze was fired, arrested, and shot. For a while Stalin trod carefully, taking the operation one step at a time, but gradually the cleansing of the top nomenklatura picked up steam. A turning point was the first Moscow show trial of former opposition leaders in August 1936. After being extensively tortured, the defendants, who included Kamenev, Zinoviev, and other prominent party figures, were proclaimed terrorists and spies and then shot.