Stalin

Stalin reacted feverishly. As Germany solidified its control over Western Europe in the summer of 1940, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were incorporated into the USSR, as were Bessarabia and part of Bukovina, both of which had been taken from Romania. A top priority for the Stalinist leadership was the rapid sovietization of these new possessions. A large-scale expropriation of private property was accompanied by a massive purge of the population. Repression now fell on the newly integrated western regions. As usual, in addition to the arrest and execution of “unreliable” citizens, many were exiled to remote areas of the Soviet interior. In four relocation campaigns in 1940 and the first half of 1941, some 370,000 people were moved from western Ukraine, western Belarus, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia into the Soviet interior. This was a huge number given the small populations of these regions.⁵¹

Busy as he was dealing with hundreds of thousands of “suspect” people in the newly sovietized areas, Stalin did not forget about faraway enemies. In August 1940 Lev Trotsky was killed in Mexico on his orders. An NKVD agent who had penetrated Trotsky’s inner circle killed the former opposition leader with an ice pick. Stalin had long stalked his most implacable, energetic, and eloquent foe. Was he driven by a personal thirst for revenge or concern that Trotskyites within the USSR might rally in time of war? Most likely both factors played a role.

Having subdued the territories stipulated for Soviet control under his agreements with Hitler, Stalin faced the question: What now? On one hand, the success of the German war machine made friendship with Hitler more important than ever. On the other, the growing threat that Nazi aggression posed to the USSR made such friendship increasingly dangerous. Soviet and German interests were clashing in Finland, where Germany, having occupied Norway, was making inroads as a result of the outcome of the Winter War. The two powers were also clashing in the Balkans due to Hitler’s desperate need for Romanian oil. Stalin also hoped to gain a share of Romania and Bulgaria and achieve a long-standing Russian imperial goaclass="underline" control over the Turkish Straits.

For Stalin, the signing of the Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy, and Japan on 27 September 1940 was bad news. The three aggressor countries were agreeing to help each other divide up the rest of the world. Germany and Italy were recognized as dominant in Europe, and Japan in Asia. In theory, this agreement was aimed at Great Britain and the United States. But Stalin had every reason to worry.

Believing it necessary at this stage to avoid exacerbating tensions with the Soviet Union, in November 1940 Hitler made a conciliatory gesture by inviting Molotov to Berlin. During negotiations with Hitler and von Ribbentrop, the Soviet foreign minister insisted that his country’s interests be recognized in Finland, the Balkans, and the Turkish Straits. Hitler was equally firm, especially when it came to Soviet claims in Finland and Romania. While avoiding making specific promises, Hitler suggested that the USSR become a fourth partner in the Tripartite Pact, take part in dividing up the British Empire, and determine exact Soviet spheres of influence through further negotiations.⁵² Both sides apparently were probing to see what such an arrangement might offer. Was this four-way alliance ever a real possibility? On one hand, we know that while these negotiations were going on, Hitler was already hatching plans to invade the USSR. We also know that Stalin was entirely aware of the threat posed by Germany. On the other hand, in August 1939, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was being concluded, the Soviet Union and Germany were just as fundamentally hostile toward one another. Everything had changed in an instant once Stalin and Hitler found a point of common interest.

On 25 November 1940, shortly after his return from Berlin, Molotov gave the German ambassador in Moscow the Soviet conditions for a four-way pact. Here, Stalin was again resorting to the tactic that had yielded success in August 1939. In exchange for the support of his partners (and with an understanding that significant amounts of Soviet raw materials would be supplied to Germany), he issued four specific demands. First, German troops must pull out of Finland. In exchange he would guarantee that Finland would remain friendly toward Germany and supply it with timber and nickel, a point on which Hitler had particularly insisted during his talks with Molotov. Second, Stalin laid claim to Soviet influence in Bulgaria, including the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty and the establishment of Soviet military bases near the Turkish Straits. Third, the three partners must recognize the Soviet Union’s right to expand southward through Iran and Turkey to the Persian Gulf. Fourth, Japan must give up claims to coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin in exchange for “fair compensation.”⁵³ This program, which closely mirrored the aspirations of the Russian Empire, probably included everything Stalin wanted, and he was undoubtedly prepared to bargain. The submission of these conditions to Berlin indicated, presumably, his readiness to cast his lot with the aggressor countries.

It has been asserted, however, that Stalin never seriously considered Hitler’s proposal to form a four-way pact and that the demands sent to Berlin on 25 November were a delaying tactic, intentionally designed to be unacceptable to Germany. The most significant evidence cited by proponents of this view is an account of a Politburo meeting on 14 November 1940, during which Molotov supposedly reported on his negotiations in Berlin. The account has Stalin stating that Hitler could not be trusted and that the time had come to prepare for war against Germany. But there is no record of any such Politburo meeting or of Stalin making this remark. The only source of this information is Yakov Chadaev, chief of administration for the Sovnarkom (Sovet Narodnykh Kommissarov; the Council of People’s Commissars—the Soviet cabinet), who claimed to have been present and to have taken notes at the meeting.⁵⁴

There are several reasons to doubt Chadaev’s account. First, Molotov could not have been in Moscow on 14 November since that is the day he boarded the train home from Berlin. Furthermore, it is hard to understand why Stalin would have wanted to hold such a meeting, especially one including people who were not Politburo members.⁵⁵ Most other major foreign policy decisions during the prewar years (including the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939) were not voted on by the Politburo. Stalin kept his foreign policy cards close to the vest, at most consulting with Molotov. The talks exploring joining the Tripartite Pact were a closely held state secret.

Another piece of evidence casting doubt on the meeting is the log of visitors to Stalin’s office, which shows no activity between 6 and 14 November. It is nearly certain, therefore, that Stalin spent these days at his dacha.⁵⁶ Finally, there is no evidence of any Politburo meetings in November, and even if there had been, Chadaev is unlikely to have been allowed to attend, to say nothing of his taking notes. As chief of administration for the Sovnarkom, he gained easy access to Stalin only after the vozhd became chairman of that body in May 1941. The fact remains that on 25 November 1940, Stalin responded quickly and substantively to Hitler’s proposal for an enhanced alliance. Berlin did not react to Stalin’s conditions, despite being prodded by Moscow. Soon after Molotov left Berlin, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia—three countries entirely dependent on Hitler’s will—joined the pact, followed in March 1941 by Bulgaria, which Stalin had so insistently claimed for his sphere of influence. In April Germany took over Greece and Yugoslavia.