Stalin and the Politburo continued to discuss the alarming news until they finally parted ways, exhausted, around three o’clock in the morning. It was not long before Zhukov telephoned Stalin to report that German troops had launched an invasion. After briefly trying to refuse the general’s demand that the vozhd be summoned to the phone, his chief bodyguard finally went to wake him:
After about three minutes, I. V. Stalin came to the phone.
I informed him of the situation and asked for permission to commence an armed response. I. V. Stalin was silent. All I heard was his heavy breathing.
“Did you understand what I said?”
Again silence.
“Will there be orders?” I persisted.4
Zhukov’s memoirs seem to suggest that Stalin withheld permission to respond to the attack and simply ordered Zhukov and Timoshenko to the Kremlin. But in 1956 Zhukov offered an important detail about this conversation that was never included in his memoirs. During the telephone call, he said, Stalin issued an order to the troops: “This is a provocation by the German military. Do not open fire to avoid unleashing wider action.”5 There is no reason to disbelieve this account.
According to Zhukov, he and Timoshenko arrived at Stalin’s office at 4:30 a.m. to find the Politburo already there. This timing contradicts the log of visitors to Stalin’s office, which states that Timoshenko and Zhukov’s first visit on 22 June occurred at 5:45.6 A simple explanation could be that the 4:30 meeting took place not in Stalin’s office but in his Kremlin apartment. In any event, after being updated by his military chiefs, Stalin again expressed doubts: “Couldn’t this just be a provocation by German generals? … Hitler surely doesn’t know about this.” He sent Molotov to meet with Germany’s ambassador, Friedrich von der Schulenburg.7 As Zhukov describes it, he and Timoshenko asked Stalin to order a counterstrike, but Stalin told them to wait until Molotov returned.
The idea that the attacks were a conspiracy by German generals and were unknown to Hitler fit perfectly with Stalin’s thinking. Further evidence that the Soviet leaders harbored serious illusions about Hitler can be found in Molotov’s behavior during his meeting with Schulenburg, which began at 5:30 that morning. Obeying instructions sent by his government, Schulenburg, clearly upset, read Molotov the following brief notification: “In view of the intolerable threat to Germany’s eastern border posed by the massive concentration and readying of all the armed forces of the Red Army, the German government feels compelled to take military countermeasures.” Molotov’s reaction suggests that he did not understand what was actually happening. He began to dispute that Soviet forces were concentrated along the border and concluded with the almost desperate question: “Why did Germany sign a non-aggression pact only to break it so easily?”8 He tried to convince Schulenburg that the USSR was innocent in this matter and that it was Germany that was being treacherous, although he must have understood that even if the German ambassador believed him, nothing could be done. Schulenberg was just the messenger.
This meeting took place right in the Kremlin, so by 5:45 Molotov was already back in Stalin’s office, along with Beria, Lev Mekhlis, Timoshenko, and Zhukov.9 As Zhukov describes it, upon hearing from Molotov that Germany had declared war, Stalin “silently dropped into his chair and became immersed in thought. A long and painful pause ensued.” Stalin agreed to issue a directive ordering the destruction of the invading enemy and added, “So long as our troops, with the exception of aviation, do not violate the German border anywhere for now.”10 This order was issued to the troops at 7:15 a.m., almost four hours after the invasion began.11 It showed that the top leadership still did not understand what was happening. Stalin did not sign the order. It went out over the signatures of Timoshenko, Malenkov, and Zhukov.
In the hours that followed, Stalin conferred with his fellow leaders on several questions. Among the most pressing was how Soviet citizens would be informed that their country was at war. It was not just a matter of an official statement but of how the war was to be presented, what political slogans would be put into play, and what objectives were to be pursued. Stalin’s comrades felt strongly that he should be the one to speak to the country, but he refused. The job fell to Molotov. Of course Stalin understood the political drawbacks of this decision, but he simply did not know what to say. The situation was fraught with uncertainty. Molotov’s speech announced that the country was at war, emphasized that Germany was the aggressor, and expressed confidence that the Soviet Union would prevail. He ended with the words, “Our cause is just. The enemy will be crushed. Victory will be ours.” Throughout this horrific war, these watchwords were emblazoned on posters and banners and repeated over the airwaves.
The archives contain a version of the speech written and edited in Molotov’s hand.12 The speech he actually delivered was somewhat different from this initial draft and added references to Stalin. It started with the introductory statement, “The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, have asked me to make the following announcement.” A paragraph was added toward the end calling on the people to “rally their ranks” around the party, the government, and “our great leader Comrade Stalin.” These references to Stalin were undoubtedly designed to preclude any doubts and rumors that might have arisen from his silence.
Molotov’s speech exposes a central political concern worrying Stalin during the war’s early hours. The brief remarks repeatedly emphasized the idea that the German aggression was completely unprovoked and that the USSR had meticulously adhered to the non-aggression pact. As the speech put it, “The German government was not once given grounds for complaining to the USSR that it was not fulfilling the agreement.” Molotov emphasized that Germany “is the invading side” and even called the German fascists “traitors.” Implicit in this word choice is the idea that there was an understanding between the two countries that could be betrayed.
The English historian John Erickson has suggested that Molotov’s speech exposed a sense of unease and even humiliation on the part of the Soviet leadership.13 It was as if Molotov were taking the German explanation for the invasion at face value and defending the Soviet Union against charges of aggressive intent. Was this insistence on Soviet adherence to the pact intended for Hitler in the faint hope that the invasion had indeed been launched by rogue generals? Or was the idea of Soviet blamelessness meant to influence public opinion in the West, in whose eyes it was suddenly important to seem a victim, rather than a partner, of Nazism? Or was the speech meant purely for the domestic audience in an effort to fan indignation toward a treacherous enemy?
Five minutes after noon, Molotov left Stalin for twenty minutes, during which his voice was broadcast over the radio while Soviet officials streamed in and out of Stalin’s office. A general army mobilization was announced. The situation remained ambiguous. Stalin decided to send high-ranking emissaries to the front: Zhukov, Shaposhnikov, and Kulik.14 The use of plenipotentiaries to represent him remained Stalin’s preferred method of overseeing the war throughout its duration.
At 9:15 p.m., another directive went out to Soviet forces, again over the signatures of Timoshenko, Malenkov, and Zhukov.15 The results of the first day of fighting were sugarcoated. While recognizing that the German forces had achieved “minor successes” in a number of areas, the directive claimed that in most border sectors “attacks were repelled with heavy enemy casualties.” Having painted this optimistic picture, the directive went on to spell out the goaclass="underline" deal a counterblow and destroy the enemy. In his memoirs, Zhukov noted his disapproval of the directive’s wording and his feeling that it did not reflect the true state of affairs.16